


12

AD A119778



DTIC
ELECTE
SEP 29 1982
S D H

82 09 29 035

DTIC FILE COPY

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH ASSOCIATES

NAVAL PERSONNEL ORGANIZATION; A
Cultural-Historical Approach.

James F. Downs, PhD
Principal Investigator

(12)

DTIC
ELECTE
SEP 29 1982
S D
H

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release:
Distribution Unlimited

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER 0001 AD	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. AD-A117778	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) <u>Naval Personnel Organization;</u> <u>A Cultural-Historical Approach.</u>		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Final
7. AUTHOR(s) James F. Downs, PhD. Judith Cohart, J. D. Constance Ojile		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) N00014-80-C-0198
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Development Research Associates, Inc. 11260 Roger Bacon Drive #300 Reston, VA 22090		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS 627683N, RP63-521-002 NRL70-902
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS		12. REPORT DATE August, 1982
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 198
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Distribution unlimited; Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of the United States Government.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Supported by Office of Naval Research, Manpower R & D Program		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Good order and discipline, rating structure, manning patterns, age of force, training, lateral entrance, advancement, reward and recognition, sea-shore rotation, authority, organizational change, uniform and grooming.		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This is a longitudinal study of changes in the Navy's official and unofficial personnel policies during the twentieth century. Data were gathered along a number of dimensions at 10-year intervals from 1900 to 1980. The emergence of new enlisted ratings is documented, along with changes in the non-judicial punishment system. Conclusions are drawn as to the reasons for the development of a training system; changes in recruitment.		

DD FORM 1473
1 JAN 73EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0102- LF-014-6601

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

Block 20, Abstract (cont.)

CON → strategies and manning; and variations in the handling of discipline. Changes in one area of the Navy "matrix" are seen as having effects on many other parts of the system.

Key dimensions studied are: organization structure, good order and discipline, recruitment, training, advancement, rewards and recognition, retirement, assignment and rotation, leave and liberty, uniform regulations, and authority.

The study brings into question a number of assumptions about the past, including the effectiveness of the "Old Navy" discipline, the status and role of the warrant officer, and the cultural patterns related to uniform and grooming regulations.




TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
1900	13
1910	33
1920	46
1930	63
1940	80
1950	92
1960	105
1970	119
1980	131
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS	148
APPENDICES	173



Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	<input type="checkbox"/>
By _____	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A	

SOURCES

ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY	SNR
ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF THE DEFENSE	SDR
UNITED STATES NAVY REGULATIONS	NR
UNITED STATES NAVY UNIFORM REGULATIONS	UR
NAVY REGISTER	R
UNITED STATES NAVY AWARDS MANUAL	AA
ANNUAL REPORT BUREAU OF NAVIGATION	BN
ANNUAL REPORT BUREAU OF PERSONNEL	BP
BUREAU OF PERSONNEL MILITARY STATISTICS	BPS
BLUEJACKET'S MANUAL	BJM
OUR NAVY MAGAZINE	ON
NAVY TIMES	NT
MANNING THE MODERN NAVY	HARROD
THE NAVAL ARISTOCRACY	KARSTEN
UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS	NIP

INTRODUCTION

This study attempts to examine the Navy over an eighty year period as an environment to which naval personnel respond through their actions. Seen in this way, the Navy becomes a system in the ecological sense within which organisms (in this case naval officers, enlisted people) react to the physical or structural environment and to the actions of other organisms in the system. The system is seen as the result of policy established in response to external demands, economy, foreign policy, international affairs, the public mood, the desires of Congress and the civilian executive branch of the government. Because this is a human, as contrasted to an animal, plant, mechanical, electrical, hydraulic or other system there is an important additional dimension of system dynamics. This is the symbolic or cultural dimension which is seldom addressed in organizational or management studies. The importance of this aspect of human systems will be discussed subsequently.

PURPOSE

Aside from any intrinsic value an investigation of this type might have, it is the investigator's belief that it should have some practical and relatively near term utility for those charged with decision making responsibility. To that end this report attempts to present information and the conclusions in a form which will be useful as an additional kind of management information which might provide policy makers with a framework for considering the possible middle and long range consequences of policy or procedural decisions made in response to immediate problems with which they are confronted.

ASSUMPTIONS

Basic to this study is the definition of system which holds that all parts of a system are interrelated and that changes in any part will have an effect throughout the system. The interrelationship however is not only synchronic as it is in inorganic systems (e.g., the functioning of a gasoline engine is not affected by how well or badly the carburetor functioned in the past but only how well it functions now) but chronological. Put simply, the effects of event, actions and decisions continue to be felt over long periods of time, creating in many cases secondary impacts which generate the need for new actions, reactions and decisions. Everyday wisdom recognizes that every solution tends to create new problems but in day-to-day organizational life we often neglect (perhaps because we do not have adequate tools for analysis) or even to consider the problem-solution-problem chain which led us to a particular situation. This research demonstrates that not infrequently this neglect tends to lead us back to, or very close to, the starting point which generally results in the re-initiation of almost precisely the same process.

A further assumption is that implied above: that human systems are different in kind from every other system. Organizations can be said to have behavior, structure and process. Because we are dealing with human behavior, structures created by humans and processes which are carried out by humans, we must deal with yet another dimension, that of symbols or culture.

While the United States Navy may not fit in all details standard anthropological definitions of culture¹ it does, over all, provide a very close analogy, one which allows the application of anthropological theory and research strategies. The Navy possesses a distinct set of values, behaviors, attitudes, interpersonal relations and expectations which distinguish it as a military organization, a maritime organization, a Navy, and finally, a particular Navy. Values, behaviors, attitudes and interpersonal relationships are linked by a distinctive set of symbols and language, both formal and informal, which define the parameters of the specific system.

A third assumption about organizations which underlies this research is that human organizations are apt to be self correcting on one hand and at the same time self deluding because the elements of the organization, that is the human beings involved, often make the system appear to work by violating its formal policies and procedures. In organizations with some degree of historical depth, this factor is often recognized on the informal or covert level of culture. In the case of the Navy the acceptance of "gumshaw" as a means of accomplishing tasks which would be difficult or perhaps impossible if formal policy or procedures were adhered to, is a clear example of this phenomenon. The practical effect of "gumshaw" then is to mask for long periods in many cases the inadequacy of policy decisions, thus leading decision makers to believe they have adopted correct policy when in fact the organization is meeting its commitments in spite of, rather than because of, its directors.²

Another phenomenon which this research will also demonstrate is that over a relatively long period the informal adjustments to policy tend to become official policy; that is in anthropological terms shift from the covert level of Navy culture to the overt level.

An overall assumption of the project is that a failure to understand these long term dynamics within the organization often results in the development of procedural subsystems which tend to produce exactly the opposite effect than that which was intended by the policy maker. This most frequently occurs when the organizational model consciously or unconsciously used by the policy maker is inappropriate: That is, it is a mechanical or mathematical model rather than one which takes into account the ability of human beings to interpret, misunderstand, adjust or violate established policy either to meet their own needs or to satisfy demands made upon them by other policy. A perhaps sensational example of this is the response of a Navy recruiter to the quota demands made on one hand, and the physical, moral and mental standards for recruits made on the other. A third dimension is the personal need of the recruiter to maintain a quota in order to remain in a desirable-duty assignment. These three demands are not infrequently met by making adjustments, often illegal adjustments, in the quality of recruits through altering test scores, ignoring past police records or minor physical imperfections. The result is that the Navy maintains its recruiting goals while the recruiter remains in his or her assignment to the eventual detriment to the quality of the enlisted force. At the same time the organization continues to adhere officially to physical, mental and moral standards which may be unrealistic, a fact which is obscured by the adjustment at the recruiting level, and the subsequent dispersion of the problem throughout the service.

METHODOLOGY

Anthropological research is, outside the field, often characterized as "field work" or "participant observation": the actual involvement of the researcher in the ongoing activities of a society or culture. While this approach is most certainly central to the anthropological discipline, it is not the only research method utilized. Any field research project is supported and supplemented by reference to any documentary, statistical, demographic or other data available. In the case of studies of ethno-history it is obviously impossible for a researcher to depend entirely upon participant observation. Any data available from informants who remember past events through which they lived are, of course, collected through interviews but any source of first hand accounts, newspapers, journals, memoirs, official records, etc., must be utilized to flesh out the picture of past cultural events.

While every effort was made to locate and interview survivors of the earliest periods of the study, there are very few such persons alive and those few are for the most part rather poor informants whose memories are seriously affected by the ravages of age and illness. There may well be no living veteran of naval service prior to 1910. A few veterans of the WWI period were located at the Naval Home in Gulfport, Mississippi. Limitations of travel funds precluded any "heroic" efforts to locate other survivors of these early periods.

Veterans of the 1920-30 period were interviewed as were those of subsequent periods. In addition the principal investigator enjoys the personal advantage of association with his father who was a veteran of WWI service in the Navy and has himself served in the regular Navy from 1944 to 1948, Naval Reserve (including active duty 1950-51) 1948-52, and subsequent service in the Naval Reserve from 1973 to the present including active duty in 1974-75, 1977-79 and is presently on active duty (January 1982). This experience has permitted intimate association with veterans of all periods of service under study from the mid 1930's to the present. In addition this service included experience in thirteen ship types for periods of from a few days to over a year and a half, as well as shore duty in Human Resource Management, Training, Navy Headquarters in Washington, D.C. and at the United States Naval Academy. Data presented in this report have been drawn from all these experiences and associations.

To develop comparable data over the eighty year period the project has drawn heavily on examination of ships' logs which, until the 1960s, served as a repository of virtually all significant events which occurred aboard ship and reflected actual day-to-day occurrences as contrasted to official policy.

At each decennial point, ships representative of the types in commission at that time were selected.

1900 - Battleship;	U.S.S. <u>Iowa</u>
Cruiser;	U.S.S. <u>Chicago</u>
Destroyer;	U.S.S. <u>Perry</u> , U.S.S. <u>Worden</u> ³

1910 -	Battleship;	U.S.S. <u>Iowa</u> , U.S.S. <u>Oregon</u>
	Cruiser;	U.S.S. <u>Chicago</u>
	Destroyer;	U.S.S. <u>Preston</u>
	Collier;	U.S.S. <u>Proteous</u>
1920 -	Battleship;	U.S.S. <u>Arizona</u>
	Cruiser;	U.S.S. <u>Chicago</u>
	Destroyer;	U.S.S. <u>Preston</u>
	Collier;	U.S.S. <u>Proteous</u>
	Oiler;	U.S.S. <u>Brazos</u>
	Fleet Tug;	U.S.S. <u>Navajo</u>
1930 -	Battleship;	U.S.S. <u>Arizona</u>
	Aircraft Carrier;	U.S.S. <u>Lexington</u>
	Cruiser;	U.S.S. <u>Salt Lake City</u>
	Destroyer;	U.S.S. <u>Preston</u>
	Oiler;	U.S.S. <u>Brazos</u>
	Fleet Tug;	U.S.S. <u>Navajo</u>
1940 -	Battleship;	U.S.S. <u>Arizona</u>
	Aircraft Carrier;	U.S.S. <u>Lexington</u>
	Cruiser;	U.S.S. <u>Salt Lake City</u>
	Destroyer;	U.S.S. <u>Preston</u>
	Oiler;	U.S.S. <u>Brazos</u>
	Fleet Tug;	U.S.S. <u>Navajo</u>
1950 -	Battleship;	U.S.S. <u>New Jersey</u>
	Aircraft Carrier;	U.S.S. <u>Midway</u>
	Cruiser;	U.S.S. <u>Springfield</u> , U.S.S. <u>Columbus</u>
	Destroyer;	U.S.S. <u>William C. Lawe</u>
	Oiler;	U.S.S. <u>Monongahela</u>
	Fleet Tug;	U.S.S. <u>Paiute</u>
1960 -	Aircraft Carrier;	U.S.S. <u>Saratoga</u>
	Cruiser;	U.S.S. <u>Columbus</u>
	Destroyer;	U.S.S. <u>William C. Lawe</u>
	Oiler;	U.S.S. <u>Hessayampa</u>
	Fleet Tug;	U.S.S. <u>Paiute</u>
1970 &	Aircraft Carrier;	--
1980	Cruiser;) Units not identified
	Destroyer;) for reasons of
	Oiler;) confidentiality
	Fleet Tug;	--

Ships were selected in terms of types which would, it was presumed, have a continuing life throughout the period of study. It should be noted that only two types, destroyers and cruisers, are in fact represented at each decennial check point. In the earliest periods auxiliaries, colliers, tugs and the like were not yet incorporated into the fleet, being instead part of the U.S. Naval Auxiliary Service or the fleet train. As such their records were not comparable to those of fully commissioned vessels. The actual structure of the auxiliary service was not investigated although the log of U.S. Proteus, for 1915 (the first year in which such vessels appear in the archives) records the vessel having a Master and other civilian maritime officer titles; but at the same time records a number of naval ratings among the crew. Whether this was merely a convention or whether in fact naval enlisted people were commanded by civilians or whether the officers had some military status other than that of officer of the line is a matter for further investigation by Naval historians. Submarines were in commission in 1900 and have remained so throughout the period of study. It was decided to eliminate this type of vessel because it has historically constituted such a separate community within the Navy as to warrant separate study. The other vessels in commission in 1900, sheathed, protected and armored cruisers, dynamite vessels, torpedo boats and torpedo boat destroyers, monitors, various yachts, patrol craft, and gun boats were substantially removed from the naval lists by 1910. Battleships endured until 1960 and then disappeared (the brief recommissioning of New Jersey in mid 1960s falls between decennial points).

As the battleship begins to disappear, the aircraft carrier becomes first part of and then the backbone of the battle fleet. In addition the working vessels of the auxiliary force are increasingly elevated to the status of commissioned men-of-war. No amphibious types were studied because none existed prior to WWII and because of the dramatic changes in the size and capabilities of various amphibious vessels. For instance the LST, which first appeared as a relatively small almost jerry-built vessel destined for a wartime career and then oblivion has grown into an 8,400 ton vessel with a crew of very nearly two hundred providing little real continuity other than that of the type designation.

The fleet tug, which appears in the 1920 list, continues through the period of the study as does the oiler which overlaps and eventually replaces the collier in the 1920-30 period. It should be noted that it was difficult in the later periods of study to locate oilers with a continuous twelve month log due to the wholesale conversion of many of this type from the United States Ship designation to that of United States Naval Ship. This completed a cycle which began prior to World War II and is not yet completed, the shift from semi-naval to naval back to semi-naval status in response to operational and budgetary needs.

In a sense the selection of ships for the list constitutes the first of the "findings" of this study to the degree that it demonstrates the dynamic nature of the fleet. During the period of the study no fewer than 20 types of ships were commissioned and put into service which have completely disappeared from the present Navy list. This technical adaptation of the fleet to meet new technological and operational demands then constitutes much of the physical environment against which the lives of naval officers and enlisted people have been played out.

Once selected, the logs of the vessels included in the list were located in the National Archives and the decennial year log (or in some cases the log of the year closest to the decennial year) was reviewed to recover the following data: numbers of absentees, numbers of charges brought to Captains' masts, numbers of court martials held, types of punishments awarded. In addition whenever the logs recorded awards, commendations or promotions this information was recorded. While no attempt was made to construct detailed narratives of the year under study, other interesting information was noted, particularly if it appeared to illustrate processes or procedures of the time.

Ships' logs also yielded, for most of the years under investigation, the make-up of the crew, presented in the quarterly muster lists which recorded the number and rank of officers, warrant officers, petty officers, non-rated people, sergeants and privates of the Marine Corps.

The procedures outlined above held constant for the years 1900 through 1960. At that later date Navy record-keeping procedures became much more dispersed and ephemeral. Records of captains' masts and punishments were no longer entered in ships' logs and the muster lists became increasingly difficult to interpret due to the fact that officers on board were reported by billet rather than rank. This required estimates of probable rank of various billet holders on the part of officers who had served in the type in question. No unit records of captain's mast remain for the 1970 period. Thus NJP figures for this time frame are based on extrapolations from other data.⁴

Individual unit records are not available for the 1980 period. They are now recorded by type commanders in total numbers without breakouts of various types of offense other than those which are drug related. The availability of officers and enlisted people who have served in vessels of the various types during the past few years made it possible to develop roughly comparable figures for the entire period under study.

While the ships' logs were being examined, investigations were undertaken to explore other dimensions of naval life not as clearly demonstrated in the record. These included rank and rate structure, recruitment and training policies, advancement requirements, rewards, recognition, pay, leave and liberty, retirement policy and uniform regulations. The project as originally proposed included an investigation of habitability. This dimension was abandoned because time and fiscal constraints prevented an exploration of the materials which might have yielded relevant information. On the other hand, a separate line of investigation related to the study of rank and rate, the examination of evidence for changing patterns of military authority, was initiated.

Sources for these latter dimensions included the annual reports of the Secretary of the Navy for the years immediately preceding the decennial years, official manuals of regulations, The Blue Jackets Manual, recruiting materials, cruise books, unofficial publications including Our Navy and Navy Times, official publications such as the Naval Personnel Statistical Abstracts published from 1948 to the present and other official records of the Bureau of Navigation. The investigators were fortunate in the fact that

Professor Fred Harrod's book, Manning the Modern Navy,⁵ was published and available. In his valuable work Professor Harrod present. in tabular and graphic form a number of statistics which paralleled those sought in this project, thus shortening our work. Harrod covered the period 1899 to 1940, leaving the basic process of developing post WWII data to us. Another useful work was Karsten,⁶ which provided data on the officer Corps from 1865 to 1925. A number of memoirs, biographies, autobiographies and one novel also provided useful background information.

The customary method of presentation of materials of the scope of this research is in the form of a book or monograph length manuscript. One of the goals of the principal investigator, however, has been to develop a format which would make it easier for decision makers to use historical data in the decision making process. Thus the findings for each decennial year will be summarized under the various dimensions investigated to form the Naval Environmental Matrix, one dimension of which is time and other various elements of naval life. The intent is to present the history of each of these dimensions (e.g., recruiting, training etc.) in summary form for each ten year period, thus isolating in time when specific changes took place and providing a device for weighing the impact of any individual change on other dimensions of the matrix.

The presentation is by no means offered as a complete and detailed history of eight decades of naval personnel history. That would require far more time and resources than have been allotted to this project. It is hoped that in this form the matrix can serve as a model for further investigations using shorter time frames or more detailed examinations of the policy dimensions. For purposes of comparison and analysis, graphic and tabular materials are presented in appendix as will general conclusions justified at this time. Additional appendices will contain manuscripts currently being considered for publication which have been prepared based on the data collected.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The year 1900 was selected as the starting point of this investigation, not because it marked a centennial but because of the passage of the Naval Personnel Act of 1899 which established the basic structural format of the modern Navy. The post Civil War deterioration of the Navy, its regeneration in the mid 1880s and its triumphs in the Spanish American War provided the background for a reorganization of the laws and policies governing naval personnel, commissioned and enlisted. In many cases the Personnel Act incorporated changes which had occurred previously, particularly in the 1890s. In other cases it made changes in personnel management which had been requested over a number of years by various Secretaries of the Navy. The creation of fixed term enlistments, for instance, was a product of the 1880s and the establishment of the rate of chief petty officer came in the mid 1890s.⁷ The 1899 act was the first major revision of naval personnel practice and structures since 1862 when the demands of the Civil War required some dramatic organizational changes.

To understand the magnitude of these changes it is necessary to review, briefly, the general structure of the post Civil War Navy wherein the problems the act of 1899 sought to correct had generated.

The officer corps, both line and engineering, with few exceptions was composed of graduates of the United States Naval Academy. Only officers of the line carried titles of military rank (Ensign, Lt., Commander, etc.). Officers in the Engineering Branch were ranked as Engineers, Passed Assistant Engineers and Assistant Engineers. Midshipmen at the Naval Academy were taught by Professors of Mathematics.* The titles Medical Director, Inspector, Surgeon, Assistant Surgeon, and Passed Assistant Surgeon identified medical officers. The supply and financial affairs of the Navy were watched over by Paymasters, Assistant Paymasters and Passed Assistants. What we would today consider to be the Civil Engineer Corps was divided into Naval Constructors and Civil Engineers. Chaplains, then as now, cared for the spiritual needs of the Navy. Staff Officers were accorded rank relative to that of the line. Promotion and precedence were based on seniority.

Officers, once commissioned, remained on the lists of the Navy permanently although they might well not be on active duty. The practice of putting a ship in "ordinary," that is decommissioning her, unless she was on active cruising service, meant that there were many fewer billets than there were officers. Those without assignments were assigned to await orders at reduced pay. Some billets ashore did exist and a number of secondings to the Lighthouse Service, the Fisheries Service and the like also provided occupation for officers who did not have sea billets. With seniority as the sole criterion, advancement was extremely slow and it was not unusual for lieutenants to be in their late thirties or early forties. Senior officers well into their sixties were the norm.⁸ Although the regulations called for promotion as a reward for heroism, the years between 1865 and 1898 had seen few such promotions.⁹ Within the service the line officers were given highest precedence. The civilian world however was apt to accord more prestige to Paymasters, Surgeons and Engineers, professions highly respected outside the service and for which civilians had some point of reference. The duties of officers of the line were entirely those of the deck and gunnery. Little knowledge of engineering beyond basic theory was required of them. Among the senior officers there was, after sixty years of steam, still some distrust of mechanical power. Trained in sail and required by parsimonious Congresses to use sail except in emergencies (for a time captains were required to enter in the log in red ink the fact that they were using steam power and thus expensive coal) the seniors had only recently abandoned the idea that all ships needed at least auxiliary sails. Many ships of the Navy, even those built since the 1880s, were designed with masts and yards to carry canvas. Seamanship, particularly seamanship under sail, was the predominant skill of the line officer. Gunnery was a sadly neglected art. Flag officers embarked usually went ashore when their flagships held gunnery exercises to avoid the noise and disturbance. Electricity was a generally accepted innovation aboard ship although its full potential was still being explored.

*Professors of Mathematics also served at naval observatories and performed other duties of a scientific nature.

While officer manning of the fleet was designed to provide a career force, enlisted manning in the second half of the 19th century, although it was undergoing a number of changes, remained a relatively haphazard system. In general service in the Navy was viewed, as it had been for the past several centuries, as only one of the alternatives available to the professional seaman. The Navy satisfied its need for technical specialists required on board men-of-war by direct competition for skilled artisans in the labor market place. Sailors tended to specialize, that is ship repeatedly in the same type of vessel, so that at least some of the enlisted force were people who had served repeated cruises with the Navy. In the second half of the 19th century the desirability of having career enlisted people on board was increasingly recognized and "continuous service" men were provided with a certificate attesting to previous enlistments and paid a small bonus in subsequent enlistments. Perhaps the major change during this period was the shift to fixed-term enlistments. Previously sailors had shipped for a specific cruise, being paid off when the ship returned to the United States and was put into ordinary. To encourage people to join the Navy by guaranteeing a set number of years of employment, enlistments for a fixed number of years were initiated. As in the past a grace period of four months was permitted between enlistments without interruption of continuous service. Veterans could claim a berth and rations aboard a receiving ship during this period. While in this status they were required to obey regulations and assist in cleaning but had no other obligations save to re-enlist at the end of the time.

Recruiting was carried out in four major ports on the east coast and at Mare Island where permanent "naval rendezvous" were maintained. In addition a person could enlist on any receiving ship located at a naval station or base. In ports where no recruiting station existed, they could enlist directly on board any cruising vessel of the Navy to fill vacancies. Professional seamen could be enlisted the first time only in the ratings of ordinary or able seamen, a period of naval service being required before they could be promoted to Petty Officer in the seaman branch. Others in the engineering, artisan or special branches could be enlisted in any rating for which they were qualified by civilian experience.

The major training effort undertaken by the Navy during this period was the apprentice program. Established as a means of recruiting a career enlisted deck force, the apprentice program enlisted boys from 14 to 18 until they were twenty-one. They underwent training in reading, mathematics, geography, seamanship and gunnery at apprentice training schools before being sent into training ships for up to a year, before being assigned to cruising ships. These lads progressed from apprentice third class to apprentice first class and could be, in the last year of their enlistment, promoted to seaman or to coxswain. Other people without experience at sea could be recruited directly into service as landsmen to receive whatever training which might be available at a receiving ship or on board.

It should be made clear that the term "petty officer" did not mean the same thing in the late 19th century (nor indeed in the early twentieth) that it does today. The four class system of advancement did not exist. Petty officers were rated as first class, second class, third class but not every specialty was represented in each class. There were, for instance, no third

class boatswain's mates. Coxswain was a separate rating which specialized in operating boats and was represented only as a third class. Many of the specialist ratings were represented in only one class, a coppersmith, for instance, being rated second class, but having no prospect of advancing to first class as a coppersmith. Rating referred primarily to rate of pay. Petty officers were divided into two groups; "petty officers" which included all ratings in the engineering, artificer and special branches and "petty officers of the line"; master-at-arms, boatswains' mates, gunners mates, gun captains and quartermasters. The distinction was very much the same as that between line and staff in the officer corps. Petty officers only exercised authority within their special areas while petty officers of the line carried general military authority. Within the petty officers of the line the master at arms was senior followed by boatswain's mates, gunners' mates, gun captain and quartermaster. To one degree or another this distinction remained until 1949.

The creation of fixed term enlistments was one effort to create a degree of stability in an enlisted career. A second was the establishment of permanent petty officer appointments. At least until the 1880s the ratings on board were subject to the will of the commanding officer. Thus when a new captain assumed command all rated men on board were automatically reduced to non-rated status. It was the new commander's prerogative to re-affirm their appointments or to appoint new petty officers. Similarly, men transferred from one ship to another lost their ratings unless confirmed by the receiving command. To correct the inequities in this system, continuous service men were authorized to be appointed permanent petty officers and thus to retain that rate for re-enlistment and at transfer.

The changing technology of the 1880s and 90s contributed to instability as numerous ratings of the wooden sailing Navy were disestablished. Among those to disappear were the various topmen, captains of the fo'c'sle and afterguard, lamp lighters and some 20 other ratings. New ratings were created to meet the new needs, ratings which required high levels of technical or mechanical skills which forced the Navy into even more direct competition with the burgeoning industries of the nation. It was possible also to enlist for one year of special service operating tugs, barges and other small craft in and about Navy yards. The Navy department could also detail long service people to such billets. Sailors could also enlist for service in the Coast Survey for periods not to exceed five years.

Warrant Officers constituted a separate community with separate messing and distinct ratings, warrant officer cook and warrant officer steward, to serve them. The traditional view of the warrant officer is that of a long service enlisted man eventually promoted to warrant rank. Regulations and records of the time suggest differently. While there appears to have been a preference for people already in the service, it was not an absolute requirement. Appointment to warrant status was dependent on passing a professional examination. The regulations are less clear about the rate to be held at time of appointment as warrant. At least since the Civil War any enlisted man, ordinary seaman or above, could be promoted to warrant rank for heroism.

Although there were no provisions for retirement, sailors with ten years service who had been disabled in service could apply for a small pension and those with twenty years' service and disability could at age fifty apply for a pension of 50% of their pay. The Naval Home had also been established in Philadelphia (shifted to Gulfport, Mississippi in 1979) to provide shelter and food for any disabled naval veteran unable to support himself.

Aside from the promise of promotion for heroism the rewards and awards for heroism or other outstanding service were few. No service or campaign medals existed for any of the American armed forces until 1898.¹⁰ The Medal of Honor (old style), first authorized in the Civil War, was available for rewarding heroism, but its use was extremely rare in the late 19th century. A good conduct badge was awarded to continuous service men with good records. Other than these two awards the Navy could only award special privileges such as extra liberty or read public commendations.

The disciplinary system of the late 1800s was little changed from that of the previous hundred or so years of naval history. Flogging had been outlawed in 1850 limiting court martials or captains' masts to confinement, confinement in single or double irons, fines, reduced rations, bread and water, reduction in rating, extra duties or special punishments. The abolishment of flogging had led to more frequent sentences of confinement and most ships had permanent brigs instead of confining a sailor to a store room or a curtained section of the deck between two guns.¹¹

The uniform worn by both officers and enlisted people was essentially the same as that worn after 1900 although certain of the features appear to have been changed or to have changed meanings. In the famous picture "Old Timers" all four of the ancients posing aboard USS Mohican in 1888 wore four stripes on their sleeves instead of three. The significance, if any, is not known. Nonetheless wide legged blue pants with a flap fly topped by a jumper with striped sleeves and collar and a small flat blue hat with a ribbon was the basic uniform.

In summary, naval personnel policy in the late 1890s represented the accumulation of over three decades of short term adjustments and refinements of the 1862 reorganization, each of which responded to some technical, social, economic, cultural or political pressure. As is often the case, the cumulative effect began to become confusing and ambiguous as short term decisions of the 70s and 80s made their long term impacts in the 90s.

Perhaps the single most important event which precipitated the radical changes of the Naval Personnel Act was the short lived, but for the Navy particularly triumphant, Spanish American War. But, as is so often the case, war revealed the shortcomings of the peacetime system. This was seen in a number of areas other than personnel management. Lieutenant Alfred Sims, who had been a vocal advocate of improved gunnery techniques, was in a sense vindicated by the incredibly high percentage of misses in both the battle of Santiago and the battle of Manila Bay. The need for a permanent fleet train off Cuba became obvious. The issue of personnel expansion in time of war had to be faced. The war provided an opportunity for a relatively large number of officers and men to perform heroically and receive promotions with consequent disorganization in the system of seniority as well as the elevation of brave but technically unqualified people to positions of responsibility.

Perhaps the most important change which took place as a result of the Personnel Act was the incorporation of the engineers into the line. Many senior engineers deeply resented the change but, nevertheless, the separate branch became part of the line. The result was not, to be sure, a wholesale shift of deck officers into the engine rooms; quite the opposite in fact. Although engineer officers above the rank of commander were relegated to shore duty, others were expected to qualify for deck duties. The result was a sudden shortage of officers qualified to stand engineroom watches. In response, one hundred additional billets for warrant machinists were created. One hundred and seventy five people sat for the examinations, one hundred and nine earned a passing mark. Although a number of civilians had taken the exam, enough Navy men, of various ranks and lengths of service, earned passing marks to make it possible to appoint all the new warrants from the ranks; a situation apparently unusual enough to warrant its special mention in the annual report of the Secretary of the Navy. Fixed term enlistments were confirmed, short special service enlistments disappeared in favor of appointment of long service enlisted people, upon application, to such shore jobs. A retirement system was established for enlisted people. A new rating structure was approved, more in keeping with the demands of the modern Navy. The importance of recruiting American citizens instead of foreigners was reemphasized by the Secretary of the Navy and the foundations laid for an entirely different policy of recruiting and training.

Against this general background, which covers in the most summary manner the details of Naval personnel policy in the late 19th century, we can now present the more detailed data drawn from the decennial years under study. The format will be essentially that of the matrix with the "chapter" heading representing the time dimension while the chapter sub heads will represent the various environmental elements under study and will remain the same in each chapter. At the end of each chapter a summary will be presented suggesting the general trend of policy dynamics and the presumed relationships between the elements.

GENERAL SUMMARY OF NAVY DATA

Total Officers - Line	892	Staff	179		
	CWO 61	WO	246	Mates	9

Total Enlisted - 16,832

Total applying for enlistment: Men - 36,465; Apprentices - 4,389

Total enlisted into service: Men - 6,979; Apprentices - 1,144

More than 75% of the applicants were rejected for physical or "other" reasons. Unfortunately the "other" reasons were not recorded or reported in available documents.

Total ships on naval list: 348 (including vessels temporarily out of commission)

NAVAL OPERATIONS SUMMARY

The fleet was divided into five "stations" to which ships were dispatched. These were the Asiatic, North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Pacific and European Stations.

Asiatic

The vessels of this station were involved in active service against hostile forces on two fronts. In the Philippines the Navy assisted in landing troops to operate against insurgents, carried out a blockade to prevent smuggling arms, patrolled the waters in hostile areas, carried supplies and from time to time landed armed parties. One gunboat was attacked by rebels and lost with all hands and another suffered damage and wounded.

The disturbances in China which culminated in 1899 with the siege of the foreign legations in Peking by the so called "Boxers," required the presence of U.S. Naval forces acting in concert with those of Japan, Great Britain, Germany, France and Austria to suppress the fortifications at Taku land and support landing parties to the relief of Peking. U.S. Marines and Bluejackets were involved in lifting the siege.

North Atlantic

The ships of this station were involved primarily in training of officers and enlisted people. Apprentices and landsmen enlisted for training were assigned in large number. The vessels cruised from the West Indies to Maine, engaging in drills, fleet evolutions and gunnery practice and visiting all of the major east coast ports.

South Atlantic

Three vessels including U.S.S. Chicago, were assigned to this station ranging from Para in the north to Montevideo in the south, showing the flag and looking to the interests of the United States.

Pacific

The vessels in this station, including U.S.S. Iowa, ranged along the Pacific coasts from Central America to Puget Sound, engaging in drills, evolutions, gunnery practice and visiting all major cities.

European

No vessels were permanently assigned to the European station because the operational demands of the Far East precluded use of vessels in an area which was both peaceful and unthreatening to American interests.

The Navy was expanding and urging even greater expansion due to the already hot naval building race which was going on in Great Britain, Germany and Japan. The reports of the Secretary called presidential attention to the growing disparity in modern ships between the United States and these nations.

The Secretary also reported an extreme shortage of officers to man the expanding fleet and requested that the enlisted strength authorization be increased by 5,000.

It was in this year that the old classification of ships into "rates" based on the number of guns carried was finally abandoned in favor of categories which more nearly represented the types and capabilities of modern ships.

RECRUITING

The report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1900 informed the president of a new policy of training seamen from the ground up as it were. This was to be effected by expanding the rating of landsman to include "landsmen for training." These men, 18 to 25 without previous experience at sea or experience in a trade, were shipped to be trained as seamen. Some were recruited for training in a specific rating such as "landsman for yeoman," that is a landsman who claimed sufficient skill to be a yeoman and was enlisted specifically for that rate. If he did demonstrate sufficient skill he was promoted to yeoman third class without having to serve in the rating of ordinary seaman or seaman. Later entries in ships' logs until shortly before WWI show similar enlistments of "landsmen for."

Basic enlistment policy permitted first enlistments in the following rates and ages.

Landsmen	21-35	* Machinist first class	21-35
† Ordinary Seaman	18-30	* Machinist second class	21-35
† Seaman	21-35	* Electrician third class	21-35
Shipwright	21-35	* Coppersmith	21-35
* Blacksmith	21-35	Fireman first class	21-35
* Plumber and fitter	21-35	Fireman second class	21-35
* Sailmaker's mate	21-35		

† Seamen had to be ex-apprentices or have four years at sea. Ordinary seamen required two years at sea to qualify.

* Those ratings marked with asterisks were rated as petty officers. Hospital stewards rated as chief petty officers.

Coal Passer	21-35	Mess Attendant	18-30
* Hospital Steward	21-30	Musician first class	21-35
* Hospital Apprentice		Musician second class	21-35
first class	18-25	Buglers	21-35
Hospital Apprentice	18-25	* Painters	21-35
Officers Steward	21-35		

Enlistment at 14 was permitted for the rate of apprentice 3 /c.

When the rank and rate structure is presented it will be noted that a number of specialties which could be enlisted at the petty officer level appear not to have career advancement paths. A blacksmith, for example, could be recruited as a petty officer first class, but there was no provision for junior people to advance to blacksmith class nor for a blacksmith to advance to chief petty officer. The presumption then is that the Navy expected such people to be content with the exercise of their trade, receiving whatever increases in pay would come due them as they re-enlisted or, if they sought advancement, to learn a new trade.

It should be emphasized that at this time the new recruitment policy as it pertained to landsman was aimed primarily at the recruitment and training of seamen in the strictest sense of the word. The intent was to qualify these people as deck seaman and subsequently for advancement to petty officer in the deck and gunnery departments. The Navy still seemed content to depend on the civilian world for technical specialists. To use modern terminology, the service depended on lateral entry programs to fill its technical billets.

Recruiting was, at this time, still carried out in five ports where naval rendezvous were permanently stationed. Commanding officers of cruising (but apparently not training) ships, if in a port where no rendezvous existed, could recruit to fill vacancies.

As the figures on applications indicate, the Navy appeared to have no shortage of aspiring sailors but was forced to reject a high number for physical or for "other" reasons. There is little indication in the documents surveyed as to the nature of the rejected applicants. Literacy was a basic requirement, although imperfect reading ability could be overlooked in the case of promising apprentices but apparently not for a regular enlistment. This may have accounted for some of the rejections. It should be kept in mind that desertion from the armed forces was extremely high in the late 19th century (up to 50% in some army units in the west) and recruiters were repeatedly enjoined to be wary of deserters or people with a bad conduct, dishonorable or not recommended discharges attempting to re-enlist. These groups may have accounted for additional rejections. In any event it is clear that the problem was not a lack of potential recruits, but a matter of the quality of the applicants.

TRAINING

Landsmen and apprentices were trained, after some initial training ashore, in ships of the training squadrons for up to a year before being assigned to cruising ships. There were, however, some special schools being established to mend burgeoning technical demands.

A gunnery school had been established in Washington, D.C. in 1883 and a second at Newport, R.I. in 1885. In 1897 a school for Gun Captains had been established aboard U.S.S. Amphitrite. In 1899 an electricians school was established in New York City. Graduates from the gunnery schools who qualified as seamen gunners earned extra pay. There was, in addition, a school for petty officers.

There appear to have been no special Navy training manuals for these schools or for rate training at sea. The present Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy has put on display in his office the notebook of a student from the Washington D.C. gunnery school. It is a large sized commercial ledger book in which lectures were apparently recorded in detailed notes. It contains hand drawn diagrams of gun parts done from the actual weapons.

The log of U.S.S. Iowa records classes being held for apprentices in reading and mathematics. The instructor was the chaplain.

In summary, training, except in the cases noted, appears to have been conducted on board ship. For some classes of recruits (i.e., landsmen for training and apprentices) there was formal training ashore and in training ships but many people learned their duties through on-the-job training.

RATE AND RANK STRUCTURE

The commissioned rank structure had been simplified by the integration of line and engineering in 1899 but to modern eyes still appears extremely complex. In fact it was probably no more so than our present system of designators, line and staff. But unlike the present system it had greater impact on day to day behavior because of different rank titles for various staff communities requiring a complex system of determining precedence as well as an insignia system much more complex than that of today.

LINE

Congress had historically been reluctant to authorize the rank of Admiral and until the Civil War the Navy had been forced to contend with the clumsy application of "flag officer" for senior captains in charge of larger formations. The exploits of Farragut, Porter and others during that conflict forced Congress to recognize higher naval rank to parallel that of the Army but they had been extremely reluctant to confer it. Dewey fought the battle of Manila as a Commodore and no one flew more than two stars until after the Spanish American War when the higher admiral ranks were authorized.

With this exception, rank in the naval line had remained fairly constant since the reorganization of 1862.

Captain
Commander
Lt. Commander
Lieutenant
Lieutenant (jg)
Ensign

The Warrants in effect in 1900 included:

Boatswain (Chief)
Gunner (Chief)
Machinist (Chief)
Carpenter (Chief)
Sail Maker (Chief)
Pay Clerk (Chief)

1900 marked a period when the rank of midshipman did not exist in the Navy. Students at the U.S. Naval Academy were ranked as naval cadets, probably a bureaucratic legislative attempt to bring naval rank into strict comparability with that of the Army.¹² It is interesting to note that Admiral King and his contemporaries were never midshipmen.

ENLISTED RATING STRUCTURE

Determining the rating structure for any specific period is an extremely difficult procedure, particularly in the early part of the century. Throughout the period under study ratings have been frequently established, disestablished, renamed and combined. There appears to have been something of a time lag between the statement of official policy in this matter and its appearance in the logs of ships. This is particularly true when commanding officers were permitted to enlist people directly on board. Publications of the Bureau of Navigation (later, Bureau of Personnel, later Naval Military Personnel Command) frequently admonish commanding officers to enlist people only in authorized ratings. It would appear that commanding officers often shipped men into ratings which had existed in the past but which had been disestablished or combined or had had their names changed.

A second problem in working with the early records is that there appears to have been no standardized system of abbreviations for the various ratings with each yeoman or quartermaster of the watch exercising his own ingenuity in recording ratings so that the record changes, even from watch to watch.

To avoid time-consuming diversions into the history of a particular rating at any time, this report will present material drawn from two sources: official policy statements and ships' logs. For each period a list of authorized ratings based on official policy statements from the nearest year earlier will be presented. That is, the authorized ratings for 1900 are based on stated policy for 1899. The various possible official sources include Naval Regulations, reports of the Bureau of Navigation and United States Naval Uniform Regulations. In addition the actual ratings reported as on board the ships under examination in a given year will be presented.

This provides the reader with a basis for comparison of the "official" or overt Navy and the "unofficial" or covert Navy. That is not to say that the manning of a particular ship was unofficial but rather to demonstrate that the view of the system from a policy level is often different than actual events on the operational level and decisions made on a policy level do not translate into operational events for some time.

The authorized ratings in 1900 were:

	<u>Seaman Branch</u>		<u>Artificer</u>		<u>Special</u>	
CPO	MAA	65*	Electrician	60	YN	60
	BM	50	Machinist	70	Hospital Steward	60
	GM	50	CM	50	Bandmaster	52
	GC**	50				
	QM	50				
PO1	MAA	40	Electrician	50	YN	40
	BM	40	Machinist	55	Hospital Appr. 1/c	30
	GM	40	CM	40	First Musician	36
	GC	40				
	QM	40				
PO2	MAA	35	Electrician	40	YN	35
	BM	35	Machinist	40		
	GM	35	CM	35		
	GC	35				
	QM	35				
PO3	MAA	30	Water Tender	40	YN	30
	Coxswain	30	Oiler	37		
	GM	30	Electrician	30		
	QM	30				
<u>Non Rated</u>						
	SN	24	FN 1/c	35	Musician 1/c	32
	OS	19	FN 2/c	30	Musician 2/c	30
	Lands	16	Coal Passer	22	Bugler	30
	Appr 1/c	16	Shipwright	25	Hospital Appr	20
	Appr 2/c	12				
	Appr 3/c	9				

*The figures represent base monthly pay.

**GC abbreviates Gun Captain. We have attempted wherever possible to use current abbreviations.

It should be noted that all ratings did not have a consistent career path (i.e., from 3/c to CPO). Nor were pay scales equal within classes. The generally higher pay of artificers apparently represents something near the "market" for those skills in the late 19th century. The Pay of the Chief Master at Arms which is higher than any other CPO in the Seaman Branch represents very clearly his senior position. The Chief Master-at-Arms was the senior petty officer of the ship. Petty Officers of the seaman branch

represented the petty-officers-of-the-line (although the term does not appear at this late date), carrying both technical and military responsibilities. Petty officers and chief petty officers and special branches were specifically limited to the exercise of their authority within their departments. Ships cooks, officers and warrant officers' cooks and stewards and mess attendants were not considered as part of the rating structure but were recruited specifically for their jobs. They would not begin to find their way into the rating structure and thus have status as "sailors" until 1901.

This official rank and rate ranking structure must now be contrasted with the actual structure on board. The ranks and ratings reported in U.S.S. Iowa for 1900 included:

Commissioned: Line/WO

Captain
LCDR 3*
LT 3
Lt(jg) 2
Ens. 3

Warrants
Boatswain
Gunner
Cadets 4

Marine Corps
Captain
1st Lieutenant

Staff/WO

Surgeon
Paymaster
Passed Assistant Surgeon
Chaplain

Warrants
Machinist 4
Carpenter
Pay Clerk**

*Number represents actual number on board. Where no number appears, only one on board.

**The Pay Clerk, listed as a warrant Officer, is a curious anomaly. Persons serving in this billet were selected by the specific Paymaster for whom they would work. Upon the approval of the appointment the payclerk served as a warrant at the pleasure of the Paymaster.

Enlisted Ratings: The actual ratings on board U.S.S. Iowa provides us with a longer and more complex list than the official compilation presented above. A number of ratings not listed appear in the muster lists as well as some titles not officially approved. To be sure, these ratings were not "made up" by the Captain but apparently represent responses to various letters, general orders, etc., which established, disestablished and changed ratings subsequent to the publication of the list presented earlier or were disestablished but still used in the fleet.

Petty Officers

Seaman Branch		Artificer	Special	Cooks and Stewards
CPO	MAA	Machinist 4	YN 4	SC 1/c
	BM	CM	Apothecary	SC 2/c 2
	GM	Electrician		SC 3/c 2
	QM			SC 4/c 3
PO1	MAA	Machinist	YN 2	*Cabin Steward
	BM 4**	Electrician		Cabin Cook
	GM 5	CM		Wardroom Steward
	QM	Coppersmith		Wardroom Cook
		Blacksmith		Warrant Officer Stew
		Plumber and Fitter		Warrant Officer Cook
		Sailmakers' Mate		Steerage Steward
		Water Tender		Steerage Cook
		Painter		Mess Attendant
	P02	MAA	Machinist 3	YN
BM 4		Oiler 12		
GM 7				
QM				
P03		CM	YN	
		Painter		

Non Rated

SN	59	Shipwright		Hospital Apprentice
OS	31	FN1/c	15	Bugler
App	68	FN2/c	17	
Land	33	Coal Passer	44	

* Cabin cooks and stewards served the captain. Steerage refers to junior officers (Ens. Naval Cadets). Warrant officers berthed and messed separately.

** Numbers indicate number on board where no number appears only one person of that rating on board.

Keeping in mind that general military authority rested in the seaman ratings we have a situation wherein there were four CPOs in charge of 369 enlisted people. On a day to day basis obviously artificer and special branch CPOs exercised authority over the people in their divisions. Even with this adjustment we have a CPO/enlisted ratio of 1:23-24 junior people. The ratio of petty officers/non rated in the seaman branch was 1/7; in the engine rooms 1/3; among the artificers 15/1; and in the special branch 9/3. In short only on deck and in the engineroom do we see the classic military pyramid represented. And even here we note that there were no third class petty officers in the seaman branch, suggesting that these jobs were being performed by seaman strikers without petty officer authority. Inasmuch as many of the artificer ratings probably were direct enlistments in an advanced pay grade or lateral entry status, it is likely that any authority they exercised, other than that made legitimate by their technical expertise, rested rather lightly on their shoulders.

Muster lists from U.S.S. Chicago for the year 1900 are not complete. They do not, however suggest any major departure from the manning pattern of U.S.S. Iowa.

Although 16 destroyers (DDs 1-16) were authorized during the war with Spain there were few in full commission in 1900. U.S.S. Perry DD 11 was launched in 1900 but her log does not begin until 1902. Technically beyond the scope of this section, but for purposes of comparison her logs for 1902 were examined. During this period she was fitting out in San Francisco officered by two Lts(jg) and manned by 23 enlisted people. The senior enlisted rating aboard was a Chief Gunner's Mate (allowance 2). No Boatswains' Mates were recorded as being on board. In addition to the Chief Gunner's Mate, there were on board a second class quartermaster and three seamen. The enginerooms were manned by two Chief Machinists, two Machinists First Class, two Water Tenders, two Oilers and four Firemen First Class. No artificers or special branch ratings were reported. One cabin cook, a mess attendant and one ship's cook completed ship's company at that time. Although it is not noted in the log, official policy called for the appointment of a boatswain's mate or gunner's mate as chief Master at Arms. This pattern becomes common in smaller ships and predicts the eventual disappearance of the Master at Arms rating for over fifty years.

DISCIPLINE

The basic assumption of research in this dimension is that the number of offenses brought to captain's mast provide us with at least a rough index of the state of good order and discipline. To this end offenses recorded were tallied and classified. The figures for four ships examined are:

	IOWA Total On Board 396	CHICAGO Total On Board	PERRY(1902) Total On Board 25	WORDEN(1903) Total On Board 74
DRUNK ON BOARD	53	13	9	0
DRUNK ASHORE	75	2	9	2
DISOBEDIENCE	22	59	8	0
DISRESPECT/INSOLENCE	39	22	1	4
UNIFORM VIOLATION	11	2	7	3
THEFT OF CLOTHING	2	1	0	0
OTHER CLOTHING VIOL.	21	51	0	1
GOVERNMENT PROP.	1	1	0	0
DUTY-FAILURE/NEGLECT	125	71	10	7
INCOMPETENCE	1	0	0	0
FIGHTING	5	4	3	0
GAMBLING	0	5	1	0
LIBERTY CARD	0	0	0	0
SLEEPING	4	3	0	0
SMOKING	19	4	0	3
UA UNDER 1 DAY	338	0	34	42
UA OVER 1 DAY	249	5	68	38
MISCELLANEOUS	42	40	7	26
TOTAL	1054	283	157	126
TOTAL NJP% OF TOB*	206%		628%	170%
OVERALL TOTAL ON BOARD	495			
OVERALL NJP RATE	300%+			

* Less CHICAGO

One is immediately struck by the extremely high rates of unauthorized absence (although the charge, in those words, did not actually exist until 1949 with the adoption of UCMJ) and the numbers charged with being drunk on board. Although it was impossible in every instance to determine if a person charged with being drunk on board had gotten drunk on board, in general this is the case. This high rate of drinking on board, in spite of regulations, reflects, perhaps, patterns of the nineteenth century when smuggling liquor was one of the most frequent crimes.¹³ It must be kept in mind that until 1916 the officer's wine mess was a feature of the United States Navy. One is forced to speculate that regulations or no enlisted people refused to do without drink as long as it was available to officers. It should also be noted that few men were brought to mast for simply being drunk ashore. Unless they were brought back by the authorities or committed some offense to call attention to their condition when they returned from liberty, they usually did not appear before the mast.

The high rates of unauthorized absence should give pause to those who feel that today's sailors represent some low point in personal obedience and responsibility.

The astronomical rates on board U.S.S. Perry may be the result of a singularly poor leader or a few singularly disobedient sailors. On the other hand they do tend to support what is a commonly held truth: that ships undergoing prolonged periods in the yard tend to experience a breakdown of discipline. This data combined with that of U.S.S. Worden and subsequent data from new classes of ships suggest that a new type of vessel may well experience a period of undiscipline and confusion until a pattern of expectations for that particular ship type is set.

U.S.S. Chicago was cruising in foreign waters and appears not to have been in ports which invited staying overleave. The complete absence of cases of overleave for less than twenty four hours suggest the captain may have been experimenting with some other way of dealing with this -- the most common of offenses throughout the entire eighty year period of the study.

In summary we must admit that during the early years of the century the Navy was experiencing singularly high levels of captains' mast particularly for alcohol related offenses and overleave. This must be seen against an environmental backdrop of extreme transition. The contrast between the official and actual rating structure is but one indication of the magnitude of change the Navy was experiencing. Most of the ships and most of the ship types listed in 1900 were being rendered obsolete. The new recruiting policies were attracting a different type of non-rated man, thus making new demands on petty officers and officers and naval discipline itself.

It would require far more space than presently available to present in detail the complete data derived from the records of captains' masts. However two areas should be briefly addressed. The first is the fact that justice in one sense was more even handed. Not only were chief petty officers and petty officers brought to mast regularly but a surprising number of junior officers also found themselves brought to mast. It is doubtful that a CPO would long survive in today's environment if he was brought to mast twice. In some cases we recorded chief and first class

petty officers being brought to mast repeatedly for minor and some major offenses before the COs patience wore thin. It is also unlikely that a CPO would be brought to mast in today's Navy for minor infractions. The situation would in all likelihood be considered a matter for counseling and "reading out" by division officer or department head. The data will be reviewed to determine if petty officers of the non-military branches were brought to mast more frequently the those of the seaman branch. It may be that the Navy's position was that inasmuch as artificer and special branch petty officers did not exercise military authority in most situations, there was no reason not to bring them to account publicly.

The most common result of a captain's mast was a warning usually for what appear to be first offenders, particularly if they were non-rated. In addition to a warning the captain had a wide range of sanctions which he could legally impose. Restriction and extra duty were the next most common, followed by fines and reduction in rating. It should be kept in mind that most ratings were awarded by the commanding officer in relation to his ship's allowances and therefore could be restored as quickly as they could be removed. Confinement or confinement in single and double irons was common punishment for repeaters. Reduced rations or confinement on bread and water were also frequently used. In many cases the captain was able to make the punishment fit the crime. A sailor who was late in manning a boat might be required to spend his entire watch in the boat. A man who was apprehended smoking when the smoking lamp was out would be ordered to muster on the quarterdeck each time the lamp was lit for several days, thus missing out on a number of smokes.

The captain also had a potent weapon in the manipulation of "conduct classes." The conduct class system rated each man on board irrespective of rate in terms of his behavior or anticipated behavior ashore. Those in the highest classes were given special privileges and allowed as much liberty as the regulations allowed. Each lower class was restricted in the amount of liberty he could enjoy and also the amount of money he could draw at pay day. All sailors were required to keep a month's pay on the books but in theory could draw any amount due them over that which was reserved. However men in the lower conduct classes were not allowed to draw the full amount due thus effectively limiting their leeway for misbehavior ashore.

PAY, REWARDS AND RECOGNITION

The basic pay scales of enlisted personnel are presented in the previous section related to rating structure. It is interesting that rate does not always correspond to pay. An examples is the chief master-at-arms who earned \$65.00 per month as compared to \$50 for all other CPOs in the seaman branch. In general CPOs and POs in the artificer and special branches earned more than their running mates in the seaman branch despite the fact that the seaman petty officers carried greater authority. The disparity in pay was quite probably a result of the interaction of technological advance, the labor market and legislative/bureaucratic inaction. Specific pay scales were apparently set by law in Congress and those of the seaman branch were probably the longest so established. As new ratings were created it is likely that pay scales were set with some reference to the going wage in the

civilian world. Neither Congress nor the Navy saw fit to adjust the inequities which resulted. It should be kept in mind also that many, if not most, of the artificer and special branch people received their basic training and work experience in civilian life. Seamen on the other hand could be recruited as apprentices and landsmen and provided training in the Navy, training for jobs which were no longer in great demand in civil life.

In addition to basic pay there were a number of extra pay programs. Coxswains of motor driven boats were paid an extra \$5.00 a month as were coxswains of the O-in-C's barge. Seamen in charge of holds and landsmen detailed as jack-o-dust or lamp lighters also received an extra \$5.00, as did messmen and tailors. Men who had re-enlisted within four months of a previous discharge were rated as continuous service men and paid an extra \$1.36 per month per previous enlistment. Graduates of the gun captain school and seaman gunners school or holders of certificates in these specialties were paid from \$1.00-\$2.00 a month, based on the level of their proficiency.

Rations and initial clothing issue were also part of total compensation of the time. Enlisted people on independent assignment where government meals were not available were eligible to draw an extra \$9.00 per month.

Thus a long service chief petty officer fortunate enough to go to one or another of the special schools noted might after twenty years of service draw almost \$80.00 a month.

Officer pay was more complex and will not be reviewed in detail here. The range was from approximately \$1300 for a warrant officer on shore duty to \$3500 for a rear admiral on sea duty. There were special pay adjustments for service in rank. Ensigns with over five years of service as ensigns enjoyed an increase. Officers and warrant officers were also permitted to buy firewood, coal and kindling at a reduced rate, the amount authorized determined by rank. As a general rule government quarters were provided for officers ashore.

Beyond pay, rewards and recognition were extremely limited. Medals of Honor could be awarded for heroism, each recipient receiving \$2.00 a month. Good conduct, as noted earlier, earned a medal for enlisted personnel.

Promotion could be effected by heroism either by being directly promoted or for officers, having their names advanced on the list of lineal numbers. This reward was being vigorously attacked in 1900 as a result of a number of such promotions in the War with Spain. The major criticism was that such promotions passed over deserving officers who simply had not had an opportunity to display courage under fire through no fault of their own. The dissatisfaction in the officer's corps was apparently very high. The Secretary of the Navy urged that some alternative system of rewarding heroic officers be developed.

Promotion was also a means of rewarding enlisted people for heroic actions, outstanding service or superior competence. Promotion to Warrant was authorized and inasmuch as each commanding officer controlled promotion in his ship, the deserving sailor could be promoted with little administrative bother.

ADVANCEMENT

The promotion system for commissioned officers was, in 1900, simplicity itself. After graduating from the naval academy, serving a probationary period at sea and passing requisite examinations, the naval cadet became an ensign and entered the promotional flow. Junior officers were required to pass an examination to establish eligibility for advancement to Lieutenant but beyond this and the occasional promotion or advancement on the lineal list, only death, retirement, resignation, or dismissal impacted on the progression through the ranks. Ensigns with seven or eight years of service were not unusual. Most Lieutenants had entered the service before 1893 and a number of Lieutenant Commanders were commissioned in the early 1880s.

Enlisted promotion was potentially more rapid and less rigidly systematic. Although strict time requirements (in the Navy or in civilian vessels) were required for qualification as seamen or ordinary seaman there appear to have been no restrictions as to time in rate or time in service for promotion beyond those ratings. Thus apprentices 1/c in the last year of their enlistments (i.e., the fourth year) could be promoted to coxswain, or to third class coxswain, gunner's mate, quartermaster, electrician or yeoman. Apprentices were also eligible in their last year, along with seaman quartermasters third class and coxswains for admission to gun captain's school. Upon graduation, they would be promoted to gun captain, a rather anomalous rating, which could serve in any petty officer billet in the seaman branch except that of gunner's mate. Seamen were apparently promoted to petty officer third class at the commanding officer's discretion.

Appointment as a petty officer or to any higher petty officer rate were first made in an "acting" status. After twelve months satisfactory service, the acting appointment could be converted to a permanent appointment. Twelve additional months of service in permanent status was required before one was eligible for promotion to the next higher acting rank. A permanent appointment could not be reduced except by court martial. As noted under recruiting, no first enlistments in the rate of CPO were permitted, except that of hospital steward (all promotions in the hospital branch were governed by the Medical Corps). Other deserving petty officers had to be in their second enlistment before becoming eligible for promotion to CPO. In theory, because no seaman branch petty officers could be enlisted, a man would have to serve at least four years before being appointed to acting CPO. In practice, however, no one could be promoted except to the next higher rate which could require a seaman to progress through third, second and first class levels in both acting and permanent appointments before being eligible for CPO. Thus a man enlisting as a seaman might be eligible for promotion to CPO in seven years.

As noted earlier, some formal training for specific jobs was offered. The nature of the training does not appear to be as rate specific as it became in later times, although graduation from gun captain school did qualify a person to hold that rate. Most training after the initial basic training ashore and on training ships was gained on the job. Examinations appear to have been matters of practical demonstration rather than pen and paper instruments. It would appear that if a sailor performed his duties well and was judged competent by his commanding officer no formal examination was required for promotion.

Except in the special circumstances mentioned earlier, promotion to officer ranks was technically impossible for an enlisted man. Promotion to warrant rank on the other hand was always an alternative for enlisted people. Seaman and ordinary seaman were also eligible for promotion to the rather mysterious rank of mate, a position which fell below warrant officer in precedence but ranked ahead of all petty officers.¹⁵ Mates could be promoted to warrant rank.

Promotion to warrant officer was not dependent on holding petty officer status or having any specific time in service. The determining factor was passing a rather stringent professional examination. Of the 316 chief warrants, warrants and mates on active service in 1900, 66 had had no naval experience prior to receiving their warrants.¹⁶ Of the remaining 250, the time in service prior to receiving the initial warrant ranged from eleven months to twenty six years.

RETIREMENT

The Navy Personnel Act established a non-availability retirement system for enlisted personnel who could retire on seventy-five percent of base pay after serving thirty years and attaining the age of fifty.

LEAVE AND LIBERTY

Shore leave and shorter periods of liberty ashore were in a general sense privileges granted to those sailors demonstrating reasonably good behavior. Ships' logs indicate regular liberty parties being sent ashore in most ports. There does not appear to have been any policy directing either leave or liberty as a right. (It should be kept in mind that the six day week and ten or twelve hour day were the general pattern of work in civil life and that paid vacations were at best a very rare innovation.) The procedures for granting liberty were that a list was posted naming those men eligible to go ashore. Those wishing to take advantage of liberty signed the "liberty book" and when the liberty party was called away fell in on the quarterdeck for inspection. Those passing the inspection were sent ashore.

UNIFORM AND GROOMING

The detailed history of the naval uniform during the period under study would require much more space than it can be accorded here. The uniform regulations of 1899 reveal that the basic uniform was not markedly different from that worn previously and subsequently. A long blouse with a flap collar, trousers with a flap fly and belled bottoms,¹⁷ a peakless flat blue hat with the name of the owner's ship on the ribbon, and a black silk neckerchief was the basic pattern.

A complete sea bag included:

- One set: dress blues
- undress blues
- dress white (blue collar and cuffs)
- undress whites
- and working dress

In addition a sailor was issued a pea coat, a watch cap (knitted) and black high topped shoes. The hat worn with dress and undress whites was the partly evolved forerunner of the present day white hat: a rather floppy, soft brimmed cotton canvas garment. Old sailor's accounts, supported by pictures from the period, indicate that sailors would pay quartermasters and other shipmates with access to a sewing machine to add stitching to the brim thus making it stiffer and more like its modern counterpart.

Dungarees were not a regular issue item and were authorized only for use in engine and firerooms and their use topside forbidden. Submariners were also allowed dungarees, but torpedo boat crews were sternly warned that they were not authorized to wear dungarees.

Service stripes for continuous service had been awarded prior to 1899 and have remained unchanged (save for smaller size for women's uniforms) since.

The basic pattern of rating badges had been established although there were some interesting departures from modern practice. There were, for instance, far fewer specialty marks than there were ratings, particularly in the artificer department. The regulations establish the following marks:

An Open Book;	Printers and Schoolmasters ¹⁸
A Ship's Propeller;	Machinist, boiler maker, water tender, coppersmith and oiler
Crossed Axes;	Carpenter's mate, plumber and fitter, painter
Crossed Hammers;	Blacksmith
Lyre;	Musician
Sailor's Palm;	Sailmaker's mate
Crossed Quills;	Yeoman first, second and third class
Crossed Keys;	Chief Yeomen

Marks for boatswains' mates, coxswains, quartermasters and gunner's mate were the same as they are today.

The master-at-arms rating was identified by a star, identical to that worn by Navy, Fleet and Force Master Chief Petty Officers; the shield and star worn by today's master-at-arms is an adjustment to the introduction of the MCPON etc., insignia.

Seaman gunners were identified by a lighted bomb, but apparently without chevrons. Gun captains wore a perpendicular anchor in addition to any other rating for which they might have been eligible. Electricians were identified, then as now, by the globe; and hospital stewards with a Geneva Cross, once again without chevrons. Non-rated men wore a "watch mark" around their upper arm. this consisted of a red stripe for firemen and coal passers and a white stripe for seamen. The arm on which the stripe was worn indicated the watch, port or starboard, to which the sailor was assigned. Non-rated men of the special branch were not identified by a watch mark.

Grooming standards were simple; hair was to be kept neat and short. Photographs of the period suggest that Navy men followed the basic civilian styles of the time and that they were not noticeably different from their

civilian counterparts. Beards were permitted with only the provision that they should be neatly trimmed and short. Photographs of the period suggest that beards were relatively rare except, as was the case in civil life, among older men. A study of photographs of former Chiefs of Naval Personnel (Bureau of Navigation) from the Civil War period to present suggests that facial hair was fashionable in the Navy in the same cycles as in civilian life. About fifty percent of these senior officers wore beards, mustaches or both. Admiral E. W. Eberle, the third CNO, wore a full beard in the Naval style, a mustache and relatively long hair. The first totally clean shaven CNO was Admiral W. H. Standley who took office in 1933.

The data from 1900 reveal a tension in the uniform policy which continues until today; one between the official desire to look "uniform" and "military" on one hand and the desire of the individual sailor to look "salty" on liberty. Salty can best be defined as slightly rakish with an exaggeration of those elements of the uniform which have a particularly nautical nuance; bell bottoms, the size of the flat hat, the manner of wearing the sailor's tie, etc. Salty also includes touches of individualist decoration or adornment. The regulations of 1899, for instance, strictly forbade the use of embroidery or fancy stitching on the uniform. It was, apparently, a fairly common practice to sew on rating badges using fancy stitches which demonstrated an individual's ability with the needle, that being a traditional sailor's skill. The United States Navy historical museum at Washington Navy Yard has on display a flat hat, salvaged from the U.S.S. Maine, which has been quilted in elaborate patterns on its top, in violation of the regulations. The placement of rating badges appears to have been another area in which individual "saltiness" was expressed with badges being placed only a few inches above the elbow. Until major changes in uniform regulations after WWII most specialty marks and qualification badges (submarine, sharpshooter, gun captain, gun pointer, etc.) were worn on the lower right arm.

This conflict between "military" uniformity and "salty" individualism was not simply a matter of enlisted people violating regulations. The accounts of veterans repeatedly refer to commanding officers who permitted, encouraged (and in some sense conspired with their enlisted force in) the wearing of non-regulation uniforms ashore. On the other hand other commanding officers sternly forbade variations.

At this period of the study it should be remembered that many sailors made their own uniforms, following patterns which were published in uniform regulations, or had them made by a ship's tailor. Thus standardization of all details was difficult. Division officers were charged with granting permission to wear such tailor made garments but the final judgment as to whether a uniform was in accordance with the regulations rested with the individual officer and thus permitted quite some latitude.

Throughout the period of the study it is clear that a culturally defined esthetic has influenced both official and unofficial policy in regard to enlisted uniforms. In short, what senior officers felt looked "good" was acceptable and in many cases gradually became official. The conflict can be summed up in the comment of a naval officer discussing the decision in the mid 1960s to permit civilian clothes to be worn ashore. "I guess it made a

lot of sense to do it. But damn it...it's not the same. The ship looked so damn good with the liberty party all coming over the brow in their whites."

LEADERSHIP AND AUTHORITY

Determination of patterns of authority and leadership is a difficult task. Nonetheless data available are sufficient to draw certain tentative conclusions and suggest means of testing them.

In the officer corps it is clear that authority rested in, and was jealously held by, the line. The degree to which military authority was delegated to enlisted people and in what manner is far less clear. The number and type of offenses brought to captain's mast in 1900 suggests that many issues which in later times would have been considered a matter for resolution at the departmental or divisional level or by the CPO or leading petty officer were referred to the formal, if non-judicial, system. The authority of the Captain was in many senses greater than it is today, inasmuch as he held the power to rate and disrate acting petty officers without review. In addition it would appear that he was less constrained by the matter of granting or withholding liberty than are his modern counterparts. Nor was the court martial process, particularly the summary court martial, as complex and as surrounded by safeguards as it is today. Summary courts martial could disrate even a permanently rated petty officer or award a bad conduct discharge.

Among enlisted men it does not appear that the modern concept which accords military authority to all petty officers regardless of rating was in force. The master-at-arms rating clearly was assigned the responsibility of enforcement of regulations, maintenance of good order and discipline and general oversight of cleanliness throughout the ship.

It is in these areas, maintenance of cleanliness and preservation of order, that petty officers are most likely to exercise non-technical authority in the modern Navy. Precedence of ratings indicates very clearly that there was a distinct hierarchy of authority with the masters-at-arms being senior followed by boatswains mates, gunner's mates, gun captains, and quartermasters, in that order. In practice it would appear that in general even these petty officers tended to be limited to the exercise of authority within the limits of their particular technical domain unless detailed to carry out some evolution requiring that they take charge of men from other divisions and departments such as being coxswain of a boat or petty officer in charge of a working party, etc.

Chief petty officers of the artificer and special branches were not put in charge of bodies of men which included petty officers of the seamen branch. If this did occur, the seamen branch petty officers were to be considered senior in all matters of a military nature. The possibility of conflict and confusion in such a situation are obvious, inasmuch as the principle of rank must have inevitably come into collision with that of military precedence.

Instructions to petty officers found in the 1902 edition of the Bluejackets manual stress to emphasize the petty officer's influence on subordinates because of longer service and greater technical skill and experience. They seldom mention positional authority, although it is implied in some passages. No clear statement as to overall authority based on appointment as a petty officer can be found. Instructions to petty officers tend to be very detailed and specific governing their responsibilities in each situation, cleaning, painting, scrubbing clothes, standing a particular watch, etc.

This is not to say that petty officers did not have legal military authority. Rather, it would seem that it was viewed very differently than it is today. The number of petty officers in the artificer ratings who were clearly skilled workers with few if any subordinates created a population of people rated as petty officers with little expectation that they would be in a position to regularly exercise leadership. This, coupled with the clear distinction between left and right arm rates, strongly suggests that the modern concept of petty officers in any rate having dual responsibilities had not yet fully evolved. The base from which this development was occurring is ably described by Valle, speaking of the lot of the average sailor in the early and mid 19th century. "He faced a collection of aristocratic officers". . . "an equally narrow minded group of petty officers". . . "and a devious hard bitten band of veteran 'topmen or sheet anchormen' who formed a society that excluded or ridiculed the newcomer". . . "withholding from them whatever knowledge and skills they possessed."²⁰ The technical environment for this situation was based in the nature of the man-o-war. "The warship crew was extremely large in relation to her tonnage because of the tremendous amount of manpower required to work the guns. Half a thousand men typically manned a frigate that could be sailed by one tenth that number. The men who did sail the ship, the artisan petty officers topmen, and prime seamen were the only members of the crew who had really significant jobs to perform under normal conditions."²¹

It is true that Valle was describing the Navy as it existed before the Civil War, but we must remember that this was the period during which the senior officers of the service in 1900, admiral, rear admirals and some captains, had entered the service. Technical changes had reduced the number of people required to work modern vessels (although coal burners required considerable numbers to feed the boilers as coal passers and coaling itself required the efforts of all hands) and increased the number of significant occupations in a man-o-war. Nonetheless, it would appear that the patterns of the 19th century had not been totally abandoned at the beginning of the twentieth and that authority was rather jealously held by commissioned officers and delegated primarily to the ratings which represented the descendants of "artisan petty officers topmen and prime seamen."

The ratios of senior enlisted people in the seaman branch to artificer petty officers and non-rated people was well over twenty to one in most cases. This suggests that authority and leadership resources were stretched very thin in 1900, and were not enough to adequately control a crew composed increasingly of Americans with relatively better educations, increasingly valuable technical skills, and above all career ambitions fostered by the Navy's continuing policies to encourage retention of enlisted people by

developing a career path which could lead to promotion and eventual retirement.

One further note of interest in the matter of discipline and authority is to be found in the Naval regulations of the period:

"1082(1) In the event of a riot or quarrel between persons belonging to the Navy within the limits of a naval command, it shall be the duty of the senior line officer present, belonging to that command, to suppress the disturbance and, if necessary, to arrest those engaged in it, even though they may be his superiors in rank..."

"(2) Should there be no line officer of the command present, the senior officer of the Navy or of the Marine Corps who may be present and belonging to that command shall exercise the same authority and be entitled the same obedience." (Emphasis added.)

Only in the case of a disturbance outside the limits of a command did seniority alone confer the authority to interfere and suppress.

These articles suggest very strongly the jealousy with which the line community held authority and, even further, the singular importance in the chain of authority of the individual commanding officer.

Article 1099 authorizes petty officers to use force if necessary to suppress a riot or disturbance.

As noted earlier, this analysis is only tentative. However, the basic hypothesis: that the attitude toward enlisted authority was in the process of evolving in response to new technical demands, the desire of the Navy to recruit Americans, thus increasing the number of people in service without either military or sea experience, and the development of the concept of an enlisted naval career is amenable to more detailed testing. A more detailed examination of captain's mast records and the transcripts of courts martial over shorter periods of time would be one important element in such a test. A study of naval official correspondence, both official and unofficial, and a careful review of professional publications would also yield light on this issue.

GENERAL SUMMARY OF NAVAL DATA

Officers: Line; 1503	CWO/WO; 685
Staff; 690	
Total Enlisted: Petty Officers	13,173
Other rates	30,956
Total Continuous Service	8,058
Applied for enlistment	91,588
Rejected for physical reasons	38,782
Rejected for other reasons	31,786
Total accepted and enlisted	18,713
Total re-enlistments	4,030
Total serving in first enlistment	32,798
Total serving in second enlistment	6,483
Total serving in third enlistment	1,749
Total serving in fourth or more enlistment	1,831
Total ships on Naval list	359
(including ships not in commission)	

NAVAL OPERATIONS SUMMARY

Atlantic Fleet: This force, which contained the bulk of our naval power, was engaged primarily in repair and refit following the round the world cruise of the battle fleet. Experiences during this tour had demonstrated the need for many alterations and improvements which were being put into effect.

Pacific Fleet: This force was made up of five armored cruisers and devoted much of its time to showing the flag from San Francisco to Chile. Unsettled conditions in Central America had caused the annual target practice to be cut short and the ships diverted to stations in that area.

The Caribbean Squadron: Five cruising vessels were on station in the Caribbean because of unsettled political conditions in that region.

Asiatic Squadron: Naval operations in the western Pacific included showing the flag on the China Coast, in the Philippines and in Japan. Other vessels patrolled the Yang-tze River.

Bases: The round the world cruise had demonstrated the need for a more self sustained Navy. Naval bases in Hawaii, Cuba and the Philippines were being constructed.

Fleet Train: The lessons of the world cruises had convinced the Navy that a number of auxiliaries were needed for servicing the fleet. The Secretary of the Navy requested authorization of a repair ship. Several naval colliers were already under construction. A program of steaming competitions had been implemented throughout the Navy as a means of improving engineering efficiency and economy.

Personnel Issues: The incorporation of engineers into the line in 1899 resulted in a reduction in the number of officers qualified as engineers. The Secretary of the Navy recommended the establishment of a post graduate school of engineering for officers.

Another growing concern was the age of the force. Acquaintance with the officers of other Navies during the world cruise had dramatically illustrated that personnel of the U.S. Navy were much older than other Navies, particularly that of Japan.

The average age of rear admirals in the battle fleet was sixty years, Captains fifty-six. The youngest American commander was forty. The oldest fifty-four.

The concern with the age of the officers corps was also expressed by the Secretary of the Navy in his recommendation to lower the age of entrance to the U.S. Naval Academy to fourteen. It was felt that the graduation age of twenty-three or twenty-four was too old because by that age an officer should have had several years of sea duty. A concern with age and fitness was also demonstrated by the implementation of a physical fitness test for officers which required that an officer either walk 50 miles, bicycle 100 miles or ride a horse 90 miles within certain prescribed times.

Recruiting: The cruise of the "White Fleet" had done much to increase the prestige of the Navy and applications remained high. Additional recruiting stations had been opened across the country enabling the service to draw on a much wider population base. The ratio of applications to final acceptance was still high.

The Secretary complained of the practice of judges offering to dismiss a charge if a youngster would agree to enlist. The Navy was also losing recruits to the Army because of a requirement that a birth certificate be produced, a requirement not imposed by the Army. The basic problem of recruiting remained: that of finding enough recruits of quality.

The apprentice program had been discontinued and that rating disestablished. In its place the rating of apprentice seaman was created. Recruits without previous experience at sea were enlisted as apprentice seamen or landsmen for training. These latter were enlisted for training in various artificer or special branch ratings. All new recruits without previous experience at sea or experience in a trade were assigned to Apprentice Training Stations located at Yerba Buena Island in San Francisco Bay and at Norfolk, Virginia. A third training station was being built outside of Chicago.

The normal training period was four months, however the demands of the fleet often required that apprentice seamen be transferred to sea duty earlier.

Apprentice seamen of "good physique" were permitted to volunteer for duty in the engineer force and transferred to sea as coal passers, the lowest rating in that branch. Schools to which enlisted personnel could be assigned included:

Electrical School
 Machinist School
 Artificer School
 Musician's School¹⁹
 Commissary; Cooks; Stewards and Bakers School
 Yeoman's School
 Seaman Gunner School

This last, seaman gunner school, provided training in all forms of ordnance, guns, torpedoes and mines and also trained hard hat divers. Only one hundred and six men graduated in 1909.

In 1902 the first Bluejackets Manual had been produced by Lieutenant Ridley McClean, published by the United States Naval Institute and adopted by the Navy for issue. Another manual, the Recruit's Handy Book was published in the same year.²⁰

The decision to emphasize the recruiting of American citizens had reduced the number of experienced seamen available and it would appear that the number of experienced artisans who were both American citizens and willing to enlist had also dwindled. This coupled with the increasingly complex technology of the naval service had created, in ten years, a need to provide in-service training on a scale never before attempted. The shortage of yeomen was particularly noted by the Secretary of the Navy. This may have been the result of larger numbers of women entering the clerical fields in the early twentieth century, thus reducing the number of men experienced in such work.

RANK AND RATE STRUCTURE

The commissioned officer structure was essentially unchanged from that of 1900. The old engineering ranks had, as of 1900, disappeared, but the staff designations remained the same.

The warrant specialties remained unchanged except for the fact that, while there were no chief machinists in 1900, the Navy listed eighty-five in 1910. Only four chief sailmakers remained on active duty, a clear reflection of changing technology. The percentage of warrants and chief warrants with previous enlisted service had increased during the decade. All chief boatswains and boatswains had served as enlisted men (six of the CBSNs had previously been mates). The CBSNs had been appointed between 1881 and 1903 after serving from 5 to 24 years. Boatswains on active service had all been appointed subsequent to 1902 with a minimum of seven and a maximum of sixteen years previous service.

Warrants on active duty and the minimum and maximum previous enlisted service:

CBSN	89 5-24
BSN	82 7-15
CGN	78 2-14(4)*

*Numbers in parenthesis indicate number with no previous enlisted service.

GN	77	9-14
Ccarp.	66	1-11(21)
Carp.	49	1-11(23)
CSmkr	4	(4)
CMach.	85	1-21(1)
Mach.	131	1-15(3)
Pharm.	25	7-26

It is interesting to note that while almost all chief warrant officers were on shore duty or aboard vessels attached to stations in 1900, a much larger number were in cruising ships in 1910.

ENLISTED RATING STRUCTURE

In the seaman branch, the rating of gun captain had been disestablished to be replaced by that of turret captain, which was held only in the rate of chief and first class.

In the artificer branch, the rating of water tender was expanded to include chief petty officer. A number of ratings which had occurred in only a single class were expanded. These included painter, which was now held in both second and third class. Shipfitter had been similarly expanded to include first and second class. Mess attendants were ranked from third to first class. The rating of commissary steward was created, as was that of baker in rates of first and second class.

The authorized ratings in 1900 were:

	<u>Seaman</u>	<u>Artificer</u>	<u>Special</u>	
CPO	MAA	Machinist	Com. Steward	70
	BM	Electrician	Yeoman	60
	GM	CM	Hospital Steward	60
	TC	WT	Bandmaster	52
	QM			
P01	MAA	Boiler Maker	YN	40
	BM	Machinist	First Musician	36
	GM	Electrician		
	TC	Coppersmith		
	QM	Blacksmith		
		Shipfitter		
		Plmb & fitter		
		Slmakers Mate		
		CM		
		Water Tender		
		Painter		

PO2	MAA	Machinist	40	YN	35
	BM	Electrician	40		
	GM	Shipfitter	40		
	QM	Oiler	37		
		CM	35		
		Printer	35		
		Painter	35		
PO3	MAA	CM	30	YN	
	Coxswain	Electrician	30	Hosp. Apprent. 1/c	30
	GM	Painters	30		
	QM				

Non Rated

SN	26	FN	1/c	35	Musician 2/c	30
OS	19	FN	2/c	30	Bugler	30
AS	17	CP		22	HA	20
Landsmen	17					

A notable difference between 1910 and 1900 is the increase in the numbers of ratings rated first and second class. This probably represents the Navy's response to the labor market for skilled artisans. Both carpenter's mate and electrician now had a career path from third class to chief. Firemen first class could be advanced to second class petty officer. The increased emphasis on recruiting U.S. citizens, with the result that fewer skilled artisans enlisted, may have created the pressure to develop a promotion path from coal passer and shipwright for semi-skilled artisans.

The muster lists of USS Iowa show the following manning in 1910.

Comissioned and Warrant Officers

<u>Line</u>	<u>Staff</u>
Captain	Surgeon
Commander	Passed Assistant Surgeon
Lt Commander 5	Passed Assistant Paymaster
Lieutenant 9	
Ensign 2	
Warrant Officers	
Boatswain	
Gunner	
Carpenter	
Machinist 3	
Pay Clerk 2	

Enlisted Manning - Battleship 1910

	<u>Seamen</u>	<u>Artificer</u>	<u>Special</u>	<u>Other</u>
CPOs	MAA	Machinist 4	YN	Comm. Steward
	BM 2	CM	Electrician(w)**	Band Master
	GM 2	WT 4	Hosp. Stewards	
	TC (0 on board 1 allowed)	Electrician		
	QM (n)*			
	QM (s)*			
P01	MAA 3	Machinist	YN	Ship Cook 2
	BM 4	Water Tender		Baker 2
	GM 4	Electrician 4		1st Musician
	TC(0,1 allowed)	Sailmaker		
	QM	CM		
		Shipfitter		
		Blacksmith		
		Boilermaker		
		Coppersmith		
P02	MAA 3	Oiler 12	YN 2	
	BM 5	Machinist 8		
	GM 4	CM		
	QM 2	Electrician 5		
P03	MAA 2	CM	Electrician(w)	Ship Cook 2
	COX 6	Painter		
	GM 4			
	QM 3			

Non Rated

	<u>Seamen</u>	<u>Artificer</u>	<u>Special</u>	<u>Other</u>
	SN 50	FN 1/c 16	Hosp. Apprent. 4	Ship Cook 3
	OS 70	FN 2/c 16	Bugler 2	(4/c)
	AS 0	CP 50		
	Land 33	Shipwright 2		

In addition 18 cabin stewards, wardroom stewards, cooks and mess attendants were shipped.

The flag complement included 1 CQM, 1 CYN, 1 COX, 4 SN, 1 Printer, 2 YN, a steward, cook and mess attendant plus the Marine detachment and Band.

* (n),(s) indicate navigation and signals.

** (w) indicates wireless (radio).

Destroyer Manning - 1910

Officer

Lieutenants 2 Ensign 2 Midshipman 1

Enlisted

	<u>Seamen</u>	<u>Artificer</u>	<u>Special</u>	<u>Other</u>
CPO	BM GM	Machinist Mate 4 Water Tender 2		
P01	GM QM	MM WT 2	YN 2	
P02	GM 2 GM 7 QM	CM MM 3	YN	
P03	COX	CM Oiler 4		

Non Rated

SN 5	FN 1/c 11	Ship Cook 1/c
OS 6	FN 2/c 9	Ship Cook 4/c
		Cabin Steward
		Cabin Cook
		Mess Attendant

The destroyer did not have a Master at Arms aboard. The practice of not assigning an MAA to smaller vessels appears to have been the norm at the time. The duties of ship's police officer then devolved onto the shoulders of the senior seaman branch petty officer. In the case of the Perry, a BMC. If no BMC was on board the job would be held by the GMC. If no GMC was present, the QMC.

The differences in manning patterns between seaman and artificer is significant. In both the battleship and the destroyer, the number of CPOs in the machinist mate and water tender ratings suggests these men served as engine and fireroom watch supervisors, while the senior enlisted men on deck were supervisors on a broader level. It should be noted that the battleship muster lists refer to machinist petty officers while the muster lists of the destroyer for the same year list them as machinist's mates. The change in title had taken place in 1904, reflecting a six-year lag in usage in the battleship. The change, of course, distinguished between warrant machinist and his enlisted petty officer helpers.

Undermanning is noted in three deck ratings on the Perry: GM1, GM2 (although a GM3 was on board without an allowance at that pay grade), SN and OS.

Only one artificer rating, MM1, was under manned, although this was balanced by an over-allowance of MM2. Overmanning is noted in the case of oilers FN1, FN2. Perry was also two men under allowance in the coal passer rating. She had one more cook than was allowed and an extra YN.

DISCIPLINE

There were no changes in statutes or regulations governing naval justice during the period 1900-1910. The captain's mast record of destroyers, cruisers and battleships is presented in the following table.

	BATTLESHIP Total On Board 462	CRUISER Total On Board 52*	DESTROYER Total On Board 77
<u>CHARGES</u>			
DRUNK ON BOARD	8	3	1
DRUNK ASHORE	10	3	2
DISOBEDIENCE	15	1	0
DISRESPECT/INSOLENCE	17		
UNIFORM VIOLATION	3		
THEFT OF CLOTHING	5	1	
OTHER CLOTHING VIOLATION	5		
GOVERNMENT PROPERTY	7		
DUTY-FAILURE/NEGLECT	56	2	1
INCOMPETENCE	0		1
FIGHTING	1		
GAMBLING	0		
LIBERTY CARD	0		
SLEEPING	5		
SMOKING	7	1	
UA UNDER 1 DAY	130	1	22
UA OVER 1 DAY	88	1	10
MISCELLANEOUS	38		
TOTAL NJP	395	13	37
NJP RATE	<u>85%</u>	<u>25%</u>	<u>48%</u>
OVERALL TOTAL ON BOARD	591		
OVERALL RATE	75%		

*Chicago was station and training ship at USNA, Annapolis.

The trend between 1900 and 1910 is significantly down in all classes of ships. Overleave continued to be the largest class of violations. Drunkenness, while remaining relatively high in relation to other specific charges, dropped remarkably from the 1900 figures.

Whether these changes are a result of recruiting or training policy changes cannot be determined. The practice of recruiting large numbers of young men without previous experience and putting them through a standardized training program may have resulted in the Navy accessing people before drinking habits were well inculcated and, in at least some cases, discouraging heavy drinking among young crew members.

Punishments were generally not different from those of 1900. Bread and water was still a common sentence. Confinement in irons may have been less frequent. As in 1900, punishments often took on a rather specific or personal cast as in the case of a seaman on Chicago who was AWOL and sentenced to ten days restriction and to report to the captain every two hours.

In general the drop in disciplinary cases, if indeed this is an accurate index of good order and discipline, was probably affected by the general attitude toward the Navy which was, after the world cruise, extremely positive. Within the service, morale was exceedingly high, according to the report of the Secretary of the Navy, a condition he attributed to the world cruise.

ADVANCEMENT

Advancement policies and procedures appear to be, in general, unchanged. The disestablishment of the rating of apprentice abolished the promotional path from that rating. Apprentice seamen were promoted to ordinary seamen after their initial four month training period. Requirements for time in rate or time in service were essentially the same as those established in 1900. The wider range of technical schools available provided a greater opportunity for inexperienced sailors to obtain valuable skills, qualifying them for promotion much earlier, no doubt, than if they had had to learn their trade entirely from on the job apprenticeships. The practice of enlisting landsmen for training in a specific rating, especially yeoman and electrician, also increased the possibility of early promotion.

The number of skill areas particularly in the engineering/artificer force for which a youngster could strike had greatly increased.

A second enlistment and sea service were still required for advancement to chief petty officer, although promotion to other petty officer rates appears to have been governed by the existence of the vacancy and the degree of expertise demonstrated.

Although a considerable number of warrant officers had entered the service directly from civilian life, the pattern of the warrant becoming an ultimate stepping stone for enlisted men appears to have been developing. As noted earlier, in some specialties all warrants had previously been

enlisted men. The short enlisted service records of some suggest that they had entered the Navy with considerable experience simply to wait for the warrant examination.

In 1905, Congress had authorized the promotion of warrant officers to the rank of ensign, opening for the first time in almost a century a clear path from recruit to commissioned status. A cursory survey of the Naval Register for 1910 does not reveal any ensigns who had been so advanced.

Whether a consequence of the need to compete with the civilian labor force for skilled artisans or the result of enlisting greater numbers of inexperienced but ambitious American citizens, the enlisted force structure displayed a much clearer career pattern than it did at the end of the 19th century. The provisions for promotion to warrant, and the increasing practice of filling warrant vacancies from the ranks (plus the possibility of earning a commission and the enlisted retirement program) had, by 1910, clearly changed the enlisted Navy from one of several seagoing alternatives to a potentially lifetime career with distant but achievable goals.

PAY REWARDS AND RECOGNITION

The authorized rating table for 1910, when combined with the table for 1900, provides a picture of the pay structure for enlisted personnel. Pay scales were dictated by Congress or executive order at the time each rate or rating was established. The result was that some first class petty officers were earning more than chief petty officers in older ratings. Clearly the artificer and engineering branch, rate for rate, out-earned people in the seaman and special branches. There is little evidence of resentment of this fact, but one must wonder if the situation did not offend the general principle that the "boss" must earn more than his juniors. The separation of military authority and its concentration in the seaman branch may have worked to minimize the disparities. On the other hand, administration of the system must have become increasingly complex.

Awards for heroism or outstanding service were still rare and limited to the Medal of Honor and the Good Conduct Medal, both for issue to enlisted personnel only. Between 1905 and 1908 Congress had authorized the issue of campaign medals for personnel, commissioned and enlisted, who had served in the Spanish-American War, but who were not eligible for the Sampson or Dewey Medals. Persons who held either of these medals were still eligible for the Spanish Campaign Medal. Another medal was authorized for those who served during the relief of Peking, and yet another for service in the Philippines from 1899 to 1905.

At the same time medals were authorized for Civil War Service (at least some admirals eligible were still on active duty). An Indian War medal was also approved for post Civil War Service in the west but no naval units were involved in those campaigns (although the Navy did see service in pre-Civil War campaigns against Indians and some few naval officers may have been eligible for the Indian Wars Medal by virtue of detached service with the Army).

The logs of several ships under study recorded the ceremonial awarding of these campaign medals to officers and enlisted persons.

Letters of commendation were also issued both to individuals and to units. Special liberty and privileges constituted a means of rewarding good performance, as did advancement and being elevated in the conduct class system.

The Secretary of the Navy was urging the President and Congress to authorize the award of medals for heroism to commissioned officers as an alternative to promotion or elevation on the lineal list.

ASSIGNMENT

Sea service was still the primary condition of both officers and enlisted people in the Navy. Initial service for officers after commissioning was almost always one or more tours in the fleet to gain experience. After this initial period, service on a flag staff or ashore might be expected. The old practice of sending an officer home to await orders on reduced pay until a billet became open apparently had been abandoned. The number of potential billets ashore, in a Navy which was becoming administratively as well as technically more complex, had increased.

There were apparently a greater number of shore and station ship billets for enlisted personnel but no system of rotation seems to have existed. Long service enlisted men were still authorized to request shore duty but otherwise shore duty appears to have been a matter of chance and personal connections.

LEAVE AND LIBERTY

There were no obvious variations in leave and liberty policy in this period. The frequency of liberty, the hours of liberty and the ease of obtaining leave were at the discretion of the commanding officer. Neither leave nor liberty were at this time considered "rights." The practice, it would appear, was to accord as much shore leave as considered reasonable as a morale and health issue. Nonetheless, one veteran of this period recalls that operational demands precluded liberty for a period of "eight or nine months."

RETIREMENT

The effect of the thirty year retirement policy was gradually beginning to have some impact. Forty-eight enlisted men retired in 1909 and a list of retired enlisted personnel totalled over one hundred. The actual number of enlisted men with more than twenty years service was in fact rather small: less than one percent.

AUTHORITY

Military authority in the enlisted force remained primarily a function of petty officers of the seaman branch. Enlistment policies and promotion policy tended to assure that a master at arms, boatswain's mate, turret captain, gunners mate or quartermaster who achieved the rate of chief petty officer, had served a number of years. This resulted in a concentration of naval experience in these ratings. The artificer ratings on the other hand still contained large numbers of petty officers with relatively little military experience due to advanced placement enlistments. Promotional paths were also less clear in many of the artificer ratings with the skill in question being presented only on the first and second class petty officer levels without either direct subordinate ratings or a direct promotional opportunity to CPO. The fire rooms and engine rooms were beginning to develop the classic military rank pyramid and a clear cut path of advancement from coal passer to chief petty officer, as had carpenter's mate and electrician.

The increase in number of smaller vessels, particularly destroyers, had demonstrated that the police function of the master at arms could be assumed by other petty officers, notably gunners' mates and boatswains' mates.

It should be noted that the rate of CPO had, by 1910, been in place for almost twenty years, so that patterns of behavior had begun to develop and also patterns of delegation of authority to CPOs had appeared. In contrast to 1900, CPOs rarely appear in the captain's mast records, which suggests that these senior people had adopted a mode of behavior different from that expected of non-rated men or formal public punishment for minor infractions was already considered inappropriate.

The size of the Navy and the relatively small size of the chief petty officer community probably contributed to a rather close knit and well acquainted group of senior enlisted personnel holding a crucial position between enlisted and commissioned people and possessed of a fund of experience and knowledge much greater than that of the junior officers with whom they related.

GENERAL SUMMARY OF NAVAL DATA

Total Officers (Line, Staff and warrant)	USN	8,765
	USNR	967
Total Enlisted	USN	107,601
	USNR	1,349
Total First Enlistment		58,340
Total Re-enlistments		12,005
Transfers - USNR to USN		1,989

Of the roughly 108,000 enlisted men in the service in 1920 approximately 91,000 had served less than one year. The Secretary of the Navy's annual report details serious shortages of CPOs and POs. There were, at the beginning of 1920, only 3,000 Chief Petty Officers of all ratings on active duty. This contrasts with a wartime high of 31,000 and 3,500 in January 1917, four months prior to our entry into WWI. Of these 3,000 a considerable number were men who had been promoted to fill vacancies but who were not at that time considered fully qualified.

In November of 1918 the Navy had on active duty 93,000 first, second and third class petty officers. As of the first month of 1920 only 19,000 remained. Thus, each chief petty officer, on a Navywide basis, was balanced by more than thirty subordinates and each petty officer, of whatever level of authority and experience, was responsible for five non-rated sailors with less than a year's service. It is obvious that many of the petty officers themselves had less than a year's service; a fact which can only have increased the burden on the more experienced rated people.

The Navy was composed of 960 ships, of all types, in service as of January 1920. Of these, over three hundred were destroyers, a type the Navy had decided to stop building as of 1910.

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

With the end of WWI the primary job of the Navy had been to return the AEF to the United States. This was substantially completed by 1920 and the bulk of the fleet withdrawn to the United States. Some forces remained in the Adriatic and on at least one occasion were required to put landing parties ashore to maintain peace between Italians and Austrians. A naval force was also in place in Turkey because of the disturbed conditions in the eastern Mediterranean and Aegean between Turkey and Greece. Naval personnel were included in the United States forces in northern Russia and Siberia. Marines and some naval personnel were occupying and governing Haiti.

WWI had placed demands on the Navy which were clearly not anticipated in 1910. Although some of our modern battleships did serve with the Royal Navy, our principal task had been to escort troops and supplies across the Atlantic. This job required large numbers of escort types, destroyers, submarine chasers, and the so called "Eagle" boats. While battleships and

cruisers had participated in convoy protection, the smaller vessels had borne the brunt of the anti-submarine duty. Laying, and later clearing, a mine barrage in the North Sea had been another major task accomplished by the Navy which also required smaller more specialized vessels. Thus, a Navy which in 1910 had been envisioned as composed of a large number of battleships with relatively few other combat types to be supported by a fleet train, had become an extraordinarily large number of smaller vessels operating in contexts other than the line of battle.

The major issue in 1920 was the reorganization of the Navy into two roughly equal forces, the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. The opening of the Panama Canal in 1915 had made these divisions practical. The creation of the Pacific Fleet required the expansion of naval bases and support facilities on the west coast at Puget Sound, San Francisco Bay, San Pedro, and San Diego.

RECRUITING

Recruit intake for 1919 fell 4,000 short of the Navy's goals. This, and the shortages of petty officers and Chief Petty Officers, forced the Navy into a recruiting posture quite different from that of previous years.

The Secretary of the Navy's report emphasized the need to persuade young Americans that the Navy was an honorable profession and to emphasize opportunities for education and advancement as well as travel. To this end, the Navy began to produce special recruiting films and other materials designed to "sell" the Navy. In addition the Secretary announced a number of policy changes designed to make the service more attractive and recommended a number of others.

An additional recruiting device was the establishment of "summer schools" at Great Lakes NTC and in Hampton Roads. Young men from 16 to 20 were recruited for a six week period of orientation and training with the hope that their exposure would convince them to enlist.

To encourage re-enlistment of veterans, the period during which a sailor could re-enlist and retain continuous service status was extended from four months to one year. An intensive program of athletic competition was initiated throughout the fleet as a morale builder and the Navy, in cooperation with the American Red Cross, initiated the "Home Service" to assist Navy families. It should be noted that the issue of families was brought up several times in the Secretary's report indicating perhaps the nature of the sailor was changing and at least the older sailors and chief petty officers were becoming family men.

The Secretary's summary was that the Navy was in danger of "going stale" after the high point of WWI.

Most enlistments at this time appear to have been at the rating of apprentice seaman. Informants questioned about their service during this period report rapid assignment to petty officer or striker status if they had civilian experience in a technical field, but there appear to have been relatively few direct enlistments as petty officers, although many such were

relatively few direct enlistments as petty officers, although many such were apparently authorized during the war. American citizenship was required for first enlistments.

<u>RATING</u>	<u>AGE</u>
Seamen	21 to 30
Seamen, 2nd Class	18 to 30
Apprentice Seamen	17 to 25
Landsmen (Not for seaman branch)	18 to 25
Shipwrights	21 to 30
Blacksmiths	21 to 30
Plumbers and Fitters	21 to 30
Sailmakers' mates	21 to 30
Machinists' mates, 1st Class	21 to 30
Machinists' mates, 2nd Class	21 to 30
Electricians, 2nd Class	21 to 30
Electricians, 3rd Class	21 to 30
Boilermakers	21 to 30
Ship fitters, 2nd Class	21 to 30
Coppersmiths	21 to 30
Firemen, 1st Class	21 to 30
Firemen, 2nd Class	21 to 30
Firemen, 3rd Class	21 to 30
Hospital Apprentices, 1st Class	21 to 28
Hospital Apprentices, 2nd Class	18 to 25
Bakers, 2nd Class	21 to 30
Mess attendants, 3rd Class	18 to 30
Ship's cooks, 4th Class	18 to 30
Musicians, 1st Class	21 to 30
Musicians, 2nd Class	21 to 30
Painters, 3rd Class	21 to 30
Native seaman	18 to 25
Native seaman, 2nd Class	18 to 25
Native machinist's mate, 1st Class	21 to 35
Native machinist's mate, 2nd Class	18 to 25

Native fireman, 1st Class	18 to 35
Native fireman, 2nd Class	18 to 25
Native fireman, 3rd Class	18 to 25
Native cook	19 to 35
Native mess attendant	16 to 25 *

DISCIPLINE

With the exception of the new USS Arizona and the ancient USS Chicago, all ships report an NJP rate of less than 100%. The pattern of offenses appears to have changed from pre-war days. Charges of drunkenness dropped considerably. This may be the result of the type of people attracted into the service and the training they received. There are, however, two other factors which most certainly impacted upon drinking. The nation had been totally dry since 1919, which at least inhibited drinking ashore or buying liquor to smuggle on board. It is also possible that the Navy preferred to bring other charges against a drunken sailor rather than admit to large scale violations of federal law. A second point is that the abstemious Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, had abolished the time honored officer's wine mess, thus prohibiting any but medicinal consumption of alcohol for anyone on board a naval vessel. It is entirely possible, given American attitudes toward equality, that since officers were no longer allowed to drink on board, it was easier to enforce the same regulations for enlisted people.

Offenses which, taken collectively, may give us some indication of the state of discipline and professional competence show a marked increase over either of the previous decennial periods. Disobedience, insolence/disrespect, duty/failure and neglect and incompetence constituted only 17% of the charges brought in a battleship as of 1900. That had risen to 22% in 1910. In 1920, USS Arizona reports that 36% of the charges brought involved these offenses.

The scope accorded a commanding officer for awarding punishment at mast continued to be restricted. Confinement in irons was forbidden in 1916 and those instruments permitted only to restrain a prisoner who was otherwise uncontrollable. Reductions in rate, fines, restriction and extra duty were the most common punishments. Short terms of confinement on reduced rations or bread and water were also fairly common.

The Navy had adopted, as a permanent part of the institution, the Shore Patrol which extended the scope of discipline and direct supervision to off duty situations.

	1920					
	<u>BB</u>	<u>CA/L</u>	<u>DD</u>	<u>COLLIER</u>	<u>AO</u>	<u>ATF</u>
DRUNK ON BOARD	43	2	1	1	7	
DRUNK ASHORE	--	9	2	4	7	
DISOBEDIENCE	130	17	3	10	11	
DISRESPECT/INSOLENCE	70	5	3	4	9	1
UNIFORM VIOLATION	30	3	--	3	--	
THEFT OF CLOTHING	37	8	--	--	2	
OTHER CLOTHING VIOL.	94	20	--	3	7	
GOVERNMENT PROP.	46	3	--	--	3	
DUTY-FAILURE/NEGLECT	322	31	--	7	28	
INCOMPETENCE	7	--	--	1	--	
FIGHTING	10	5	11	--	2	
GAMBLING	13	1	--	1	11	
LIBERTY CARD	12	--	--	--	--	
SLEEPING	15	1	--	--	1	
SMOKING	36	--		--	--	
UA UNDER 1 DAY	264	32	10	39	60	
UA OVER 1 DAY	183	27	1	30	25	
MISCELLANEOUS	111	13	4	3	26	
TOTAL NJPS	1461	177	35	107	198	1
TOTAL ON BOARD	1330	126	37	182	250	24
NJP RATE	109%	140%	94%	59%	79%	4%
OVERALL TOTAL ON BOARD	1939					
OVERALL NJP RATE	102%					

TRAINING

World War I had seen the Navy expand to almost 436,000 men, the majority of whom were without experience at sea or in a military organization and most of whom did not have a trade or profession.

At the same time new technical demands were made upon the Navy. Convoy duty and submarine hunting had developed the first crude underwater detection devices and the depth charge. Naval aviation units, which had operated against submarines and had bombed German bases, required pilots and aviation mechanics. There was a tremendous expansion of radio. The need to communicate with merchant ships in convoy required large numbers of signalmen. Some of these needs had been anticipated before the war as with the opening of a School of Aeronautics at Pensacola, Florida, in 1915.

Between 1911 and 1918 twelve schools had been established including machinist mate, gasoline engine, messman, hospital corps, coppersmith, deep sea diver and signalman.

In 1918 no less than 30 schools were established, many to train specialists and technicians in various skills related to aviation. Others specialized in mine sweeping, signaling, radio telephone, storekeeper, "listener" (forerunner of sonarman), etc. Many of the schools anticipated the formal establishment of ratings. For instance, the aviation ratings and storekeeper ratings were not made official until 1920 although schools were established two years earlier.*

The war's end did not bring an end to this expanded training effort. Eighteen schools, many of them teaching the same courses as schools established earlier but located on the opposite coast, were established in 1920. A new policy concerning eligibility for entrance into the Naval Academy led to the establishment of the Naval Academy Preparatory School in 1919.

The grafting of an educational element into the basic concept of the Navy in order to encourage the ambitious to enlist and at the same time prepare the experienced for advancement also led to the development of a correspondence school system. By 1920, 56 special correspondence courses in a wide range of subjects from basic arithmetic to higher mathematics were being circulated through the fleet for both officers and enlisted personnel. A number of ships established "schools" on board utilizing these courses and reported enthusiastically on their acceptance and their impact on morale.

The Blue Jackets Manual continued to be published and issued to recruits using a format which remained largely unchanged until after WWII. Subjects A to N covered those subjects which all enlisted men were required to know. The other parts of the book dealt with seamanship and gunnery, special sections of instructions for chief petty officers and petty officers of the seaman branch. A final chapter dealt with the duties of petty officers in the special and artificer branches. The Manual, although issued to recruits, was clearly intended as a guide throughout an enlisted career.

*Harrod

Recruits were given the O'Rourke aptitude test and counselled as to career opportunities by the chaplain. The majority of sailors went to sea after four months of recruit training and could qualify for school assignment after having proven themselves on deck or in the engine or firerooms. Formal policy required that a sailor had to serve at least four months at sea to be eligible for school. Most rates could be learned on the job so that school attendance was not yet a requirement for advancement. Some people were still being recruited for training in special fields such as radio and yeoman. Although the "rating" landsman for training had been disestablished in 1904, ships' logs in 1920 still record "landsmen for" various ratings particularly electrician(r). The rating of landsmen, however, was still authorized giving the mustering yeoman some authority for the entry. The various bureaus had begun to issue manuals for training various procedures and skills.

The decision to recruit young American citizens without experience at sea and to train them, which was made in 1900, had by 1920 expanded to cover virtually all naval occupational specialties and skills. The requirement that advancement could be made only one rate at a time, when coupled with the idea that the Navy would train from "scratch," had an additional impact on the rating structure.

RANK AND RATING STRUCTURE

The commissioned officer structure of the Navy had, by 1920, taken on an essentially modern appearance. Officers of both line and staff were identified in the Navy Register and in ships' muster lists by rank with the staff corps identification appended for members of the Medical, Supply, Chaplain and other corps in the style with which we are familiar today. Dentists, who previously had been part of the Medical Corps, were identified separately.

Warrant ranks had been expanded to include chief pay clerks, pay clerks and acting pay clerks as well as chief pharmacist and pharmacist. Sailmaker and chief sailmaker were disestablished (or at least none remained on active duty).

Chief gunner and gunner had been subdivided into three separate commissions/warrants: ordnance, electricity and radio electricity.

The report of the Secretary of the Navy and the Naval Register reveal a great deal of instability in the officer corps. Many officers, particularly junior officers, were serving in temporary wartime ranks and faced reversion to their permanent ranks. The Navy Register lists:

RANK (LINE)	NUMBER	DATE OF 1ST COMM	NUMBER TEMPORARY	PERM RANK
Rear Admirals	69	1872 to 1890	--	--
Captains	239	1874 to 1896	--	--
Commanders	410	1885 to 1905	330	LCDR 80
Lt. Commanders	777	1895 to 1909	700	LT 700

RANK (LINE)	NUMBER	DATE OF 1ST COMM	NUMBER TEMPORARY	PERM RANK
Lieutenants	1764	1910 to 1918	1764	418 Lt(jg) 333 Ens. 491 CWO 449 WO* 60 Enlist
Lieutenants(jg)	892	1917 to 1919	892	229 Ens. 12 WO 651 Enlist
Ensign	1230	1918 to 1919	792	792 Enlist**

The various staff corps demonstrated much the same situation. Rear Admirals had been appointed to command the various staff corps: four for the Medical (includes Dental Corps), three for Supply and two Naval Constructors.

The warrant officer community was somewhat more stable, many warrants and chief warrants who had served as temporary officers during the war having already reverted.

By 1920 all boatswains and chief boatswains had prior enlisted service of from two to sixteen years. Gunners and chief gunners had served from 1 to 23 years as enlisted men. Of the seventeen chief carpenters, only four had no enlisted service and only 8 held permanent warrants, the rest having permanent enlisted status. All chief pharmacists had been enlisted men but only 22 of the 83 listed were permanent, the rest being permanent pharmacists. Only six of the 111 pharmacists were permanent in that rank the rest being temporarily promoted enlisted. Only one of the 14 chief pay clerks held permanent rank, the remainder being enlisted. The 8 serving pay clerks, on the other hand, were all permanent with previous enlisted service (although one had only three month's such service prior to being warranted). All acting pay clerks were temporary promotions.

*Of this number a very few were permanent WOs.

**This is not a result of wholesale promotion from the ranks. Rather, it would seem young men were recruited as apprentice seamen for the duration of the war, sent to officer's training and given temporary commissions -- the famous "90 day wonders."

ENLISTED RATING STRUCTURE

The Navy had entered and weathered WWI, despite a dramatic increase in technology and the expansion of naval warfare into unexpected directions, without any major change in the rating structure. Those changes which did in fact occur seem to be logical progressions of patterns previously established. The creation of a chief water tender and the establishment of third, second, first and chief rates in other specialties are examples.

The authorized rates and ratings were:

	<u>Seaman Branch</u>		<u>Artificer</u>		<u>Special</u>	
CPO(P)	MAA	71.50	Mach. Mate	77	Chief Yeoman	66
CPO(A)	BM	55	Electrician	66	Ch. Pharm. Mate	66
	GM	55	Printers	66	Bandmaster	57
	TC	66	Water Tender	55	Ch. Comm. Stew.	77
	QM	55	Storekeeper	55		
P01	MAA	44	Boilermaker	71.50	YN	44
	BM	44	Mach. Mate 2/c	60.50	Pharm. Mate	44
	TC	55	Coppersmith	60.50	1st Musician	39.60
	GM	44	Shipfitters	60.50	Comm. Stew.	66
	QM	44	Electrician	55	Ship's Cook	60.50
			Blacksmith	55	Baker 1/c	49.50
			Plmbrs. & Fitt.	49.50		
			Printers	44		
			Sailmks. Mates	44		
			Carp. Mates	44		
			Water Tender	44		
			Painters	44		
			Storekeepers	44		
P02	MAA	38.50	Mach. Mates	44	Yeoman	38.50
	BM	38.50	Electrician	44	Pharm. Mate	38.50
	GM	38.50	Shipfitters	44	Ship's Cook	44.00
	QM	38.50	Oilers	40.70		
			Carp. Mates	38.50		
			Printers	38.50		
			Painters	38.50		
			Storekeepers	38.50		
P03	MAA	33	Electrician	33	Yeoman	33
	Cosswain	33	Carpenters	33	Pharm. Mates	33
	GM	33	Painters	33		
	QM	33	Storekeepers	33		
S1/c	SG	28.60	FN 1/c	38.50	Musician 1/c	35.20
	SN	26.40	Shipwright	27.50	Ship Cook 3/c	33
					Baker 2/c	38.50
					Hosp Aprntc. 1/c	26.40

S2/c	SN	20.90	FN 2/c	33	Musician 2/c	33
					Buglers	33
					Hosp. Aprntc. 2/c	20.90
					Ship Cook 4/c	27.50
S3/c	Apprc.	17.60	FN 3/c	24.20	Landsmen	17.60

Insular Force*

MSMN	Cabin Stewards	55.00	Native Coxswains	15
	Cabin Cooks	49.50	Native Seamen	12
	Wardroom Stew	55.00	Native Firemen 3/c	10
	Wardroom Cooks	49.50	Native Mach. 1/c	28
	Steerage Stewards	38.50	Native Mach. 2/c	20
	Steerage Cooks	33.00	Native Firemen 1/c	18
	WO's Stewards	38.50	Native Firemen 2/c	15
	WO's Cooks	33.00	Native Coal Passers	11
If	Mess Att. 1/c	33.00	Native Stewards	15
U.S.	Mess Att. 2/c	27.50	Native Cooks	13
Citizen	Mess Att. 3/c	22.00	Native Mess Att.	8
If not	Mess Att. 1/c	26.40		
U.S.	Mess Att. 2/c	22.00		
Citizen	Mess Att. 3/c	17.60		

The master lists of USS Arizona reveal the following manning pattern:

Officers

Captain	1
CDR	2
LCDR	4
LT	11
Lt(jg)	2
Ens.	18

Staff

CDR (MC)	1
LCDR (SC)	1
LT (MC)	2
LT (DC)	1
LCDR (Chc)	1

BSN	1
GNR	4

Pay Clerk	2
Carpenter	1
Pharmacist	1

Enlisted manning reported for the same year was:

SEAMAN			ARTIFICER		SPECIAL		AIR	
CPO	BM	12	MM	12	YN	8	MM	1
	GM(t)	1	WT	12	Ph. M.	1	QM	1
	GM	4	EM(g)	5	SK	2		
	TC	6	CM	3	Bndmstr.	3		
	QM(n)	2			CS	2		
	QN(s)	1						

*These were Filipinos enlisted for service in the Islands. A similar force of sailors and marines (the Fita-Fita Guard) was later formed in Samoa. Their uniform consisted of white lava-lava with rank insignia worn on that garment.

P01	BM	9	MM	12	EM(r)	1		
	GM(t)	4	WT	17	YN	3		
	GM	5	EM(g)	10	SK	2		
	QM		Blacksmith	2	Ph. M.	1		
			Boilermkr.	3	1st Mus.	3		
			Molder		1		CS	1
			Shp Fitter	2	SC	5		
			Pat. Mkr.	1	BKR	4		
			Sail Mkr.	2				
			Printer	2				
			Painter	1				
P02	BM	7	EM(g)	4	YN	5	MM	1
	GM	10	CM	1	SK	2		
	QM	3	Shp.Fitter	3	Pharm.	3		
					SC	7		
					BKR	3		
P03	COX	30			YN	5	GM	1
	GM(t)	3			SK	4		
	GM	8			SC	3		
	QM	4						

Non Rated

SN	93	FN 1/c	15	Hosp.Appr.	4		
S2/c	48	FN 2/c	5	Mus	16		
AS	315	FN 3/c	98	Bugler	1		
		Shipwright	4	Lnd (for	1	AS	2
				EM r)			
				SC 4/c	6		

The flag division was made up of a CMM and a CQM, 3 QM(s) 1, 2 QM(s) 2, 1 QM 3 and 12 seaman signalmen.

The steward's branch was composed of 46 stewards, cooks, and mess attendants.

The continued growth of the artificer ratings and in particular the establishment of various classes of petty officer are a reflection of two factors. The most obvious is the increasing technical complexity of naval warfare. The other is a product of the recruiting and training policy which increasingly tended to seek potential technicians from the ranks of apprentice seamen and landsmen. Inasmuch as these youngsters were not fully qualified, some means of recognizing their increasing knowledge and skills as they learned their trade had to be developed. This changed the nature of the artificer force to the degree that it was no longer composed of a group of relatively mature and experienced craftsmen and came to have a personnel profile more like the deck force or the prewar engine room with larger numbers of non-rated people and petty officers third class. One consequence was the creation of chief petty officers in more specialties.

Yet another factor appears to be that of according greater responsibilities to chief petty officers in the engine and firerooms. The Naval regulations in force in 1910 specifically charged warrant machinists with the responsibility for supervising engineering watches. By 1920 this was no longer the case; the job was more frequently accorded to junior officers of the line with CPOs as immediate and expert supervisors. This is reflected in the fact that no machinists appear in the Arizona's muster lists. On the other hand CMM and CWTs total twenty-four or roughly four times as many, proportionally, as were the USS IOWA ten years earlier.

The absence of third class petty officers in the machinist mate and water tender specialties reflects the recruitment of the majority of first enlistments as apprentice seamen or landsmen. If these ratings shifted from deck to engineering, they, in effect, were promoted one class so that fireman third class, while the lowest ranking engineer, was paid more than the lowest ranking seaman. Thus, progression to fireman first class placed an engineer one step above a seaman first class. He was not however accorded the same precedence as a coxswain or the other third class petty officers of the deck. To correct this imbalance, firemen first class were promoted to machinist mate or water tender second class thus "catching them up" with their deck division counterparts.

We can see the impact of technology in both the electrician's mate rating and the gunner's mate rating. The first was divided to accommodate the need for radio operators and the second to provide for specialists in the use and maintenance of torpedoes (GM[t]).

The division of the quartermaster rating, which appeared in 1910, into navigation and signals at the CPO level had not extended to the petty officer first and second classes and a new type of non-rated man appeared, the seaman signalman. These later were trained in visual signaling techniques and paid up to \$5.00 above base pay.

An additional change in manning is the absence of the rating MAA. The rating was disestablished in 1920 and the practice, which began in torpedo boats and destroyers, of assigning seaman petty officers to MAA duties was adopted throughout the Navy.

This also marks the appearance of an Air Division, in the case of the Arizona to maintain and operate her scout planes. As of 1920 the division was manned by traditional ratings which had graduated from aeronautical school.

ASSIGNMENT

There appears to have been no official system of rotation for enlisted personnel. Assignment to shore duty appears to have been a matter of availability and chance from the point of view of the average sailor. The expanded use of radio had created a number of billets ashore for radio electricians operating radio stations. Men with twenty-five year's service were eligible to apply for shore duty but other than these particular classes of people, it would seem that sailors served primarily at sea.

LEAVE AND LIBERTY

Shore leave and liberty remain, as before, privileges accorded by the commanding officer in response to the needs of the service and the conduct of the individual sailor. Conduct classes governed the amount of liberty and the time one was permitted to report back on board. Naval regulations specified that not more than one half the crew be allowed on shore at one time except when a ship was alongside a wharf in a Navy Yard, when only one quarter of the crew had to remain on board. In practice, however, the average sailor, in port, could expect one or two nights a week ashore and, if well behaved, occasional weekend liberty. Leave appears to have been granted upon request if the needs of the service permitted and a man's behavior recommended it.

RETIREMENT

The basic retirement policy established in 1899 remained unchanged. After thirty years of service, an enlisted man could retire on three quarters of his base pay at the time of retirement. However, the establishment of the Fleet Naval Reserve had created a situation which was, in effect, very little different than it is today. An enlisted person could re-enlist in the Fleet Naval Reserve and receive a retainer of \$50.00 for people with four years of service, \$72.00 for people with eight to twelve years, and \$100 for those with 12 to 16 years of service. For those with sixteen years of service or more, one third of base pay was paid as a retainer. Those entering the NRF after 20 years of service received one-half pay. During a Fleet Reserve enrollment of four years, a member was required to undergo a total of three months of training or have the retainer reduced. Fleet reservists, after 30 years of combined regular and reserve service, were eligible to retire and draw the pay they were receiving at the time of retirement plus any allowances to which they were entitled. Service in the Civil War and Spanish War was counted as double time in reckoning retirement eligibility.

Only .4% of the regular Navy on active duty had more than twenty years of service. On the other hand, 4.4 percent of members of the USNRF on active duty were serving in the post twenty year period. This suggests that the ability to retire at twenty years tended to drastically reduce the number of senior enlisted people who might have otherwise served the additional ten years and taken advantage of a thirty year retirement.

PAY, AWARDS AND RECOGNITION

The base pay of enlisted men is presented in the section on rate and rank structure. In addition to this base pay, regular re-enlistment allowances were paid at the rate of \$5.50 per month in the second enlistment and \$3.30 per month for each enlistment. Subsequently men who earned the Good Conduct Medal received \$.82 a month for each award.

Enlisted men detailed aboard submarines received \$5.00 a month and if qualified in submarines, \$1.00 for each day during which the submarine submerged. Jack-o-dusts, lamplighters, and seaman in charge of holds, all relatively archaic billets which had not yet been disestablished, were paid

\$5.00 as were messmen for the crew. Seamen and seamen second class detailed as firemen received \$.33 per day while so detailed. Gun pointers and gun captains received from \$2.00 to \$10.00, depending on the size of weapon they served.

Men detailed as ship's tailors received from \$10.00 to \$20.00 per month. The tailor's helper was paid \$10.00 per month.

A man holding a continuous service certificate and enlisting within four months of discharge was considered to be on leave and given full pay and allowances for the four months as well as an extra \$1.50 per month.

CPOs who were detailed to train apprentice seamen at Naval Training Centers received \$10.00 a month. Apprentice seamen detailed as apprentice petty officers in training were paid from \$1.50 to \$2.50 per month. Mail clerks and assistant mail clerks earned from \$5.00 to \$25.00 per month. Navy divers were paid \$1.20 an hour while submerged.

The Distinguished Service Medal and Navy Cross had been created during WWI to accompany a redesigned Medal of Honor. (Note the DSM-NC precedence was the opposite of today's precedence.) In addition, gold and silver life saving medals were available, as well as campaign medals for Haiti, Mexico, and WWI. Sharpshooters badges had also been authorized.

Service overseas or in hostile waters during WWI was recognized by gold lace chevrons worn on the lower left sleeve and wounds were recognized with goldlace stripes.

The Meritorious Mast was introduced as a formal means of recognizing superior performance. And, as always, good behavior could be rewarded by advancing a man in the conduct classes and thus according him special privileges.

ADVANCEMENT

The basic process of advancement remained unchanged: after four months of service as an apprentice seaman a sailor was promoted to seaman second class. Promotions beyond that point depended largely on the opinions of superiors as to the sailor's ability. One year of service at a lower rank was required for promotion to the next higher rank. No one could be appointed chief petty officer while still serving in his first enlistment. And for permanent appointment as CPO, an acting chief had to have one year of service in a cruising ship of the Navy. This last requirement created hardships for acting chief electrician's mates (r) who were often assigned to shore radio stations and could not find a sea billet.

Advancement beyond enlisted ranks was possible through two mechanisms. Petty officers first class and chief petty officers with requisite service in the Navy at sea could apply for advancement to warrant by examination. After six years of service, a warrant officer could be promoted to chief warrant officer. Warrant officers and chief warrant officers under 35 with at least four years of service as a warrant could apply for promotion to ensign. Twelve such promotions a year were authorized.

In addition to this career path, a limited number of enlisted men were admitted to the Naval Academy each year after passing an examination and in most cases attending the Naval Academy Preparatory School.

UNIFORMS

Uniform regulations had not, over the first twenty years of this century, changed greatly. In a number of cases where changes did occur the observable insignia remained the same (form) while the meaning (function) changed. The watch mark worn by non-rated men is a case in point. Officially known as the branch mark, it was now worn to indicate whether one was in the deck of engineer/artificer force. White (on blue uniforms) or blue (on white uniforms) worn on the right shoulder seam indicated seaman of the deck division. Red (on either color) worn on the left shoulder seam indicated a fireman from the "black gang." Non-rated personnel in the special branch (and, one presumes, aviation although the regulations are not clear) wore no branch mark. Despite the official change, this device continued to be referred to as a watch mark until it disappeared in 1949.

Seaman ratings wore their rating badges on the right arm. All other ratings on the left (with the eagle facing aft, oddly enough).

A number of special devices were worn on the lower right arm, including service chevrons, wound stripes, and specialty devices. Sailors trained and qualified to work with torpedoes wore an embroidered torpedo, gun captains and gun pointers were also identified by special devices.

An enlisted man who was an ex-apprentice wore an embroidered overhand knot at the V of his dress jumper. If a CPO was an ex-apprentice he wore the knot on his lower right sleeve.

Dungarees were not yet general issue and their use was still restricted, although somewhat less so than in 1910.

Style called for a flat hat which was wider than regulation and the uniform regulations warn against wearing such non-approved items although it was apparently quite common. The flat hat itself, even in regulation sizes, seems to have become larger than that authorized in 1900 or 1910.

Civilian clothes were not permitted on board and uniforms were required in all foreign ports, although civilian clothing could be worn while on leave.

Grooming regulations remained unchanged, with beards and mustaches permitted "at discretion." Photographs of the time suggest that the Navy was roughly in step with civilian styles, beards being rare but mustaches fairly common, particularly among senior officers.

The required seabag in 1920:

1 suit blue dress	2 white hats
1 suit white dress	1 neckerchief
2 blue undress jumpers	1 overcoat
1 pair blue undress trousers	1 jersey
3 suits white undress	2 towels
2 suits underclothes (heavy)	1 pair rubber boots
2 suits underclothes (light)	1 pair gymnasium shoes
2 pairs shoes	1 shoe brush and blacking
4 pairs socks	1 jackknife
1 mattress and 2 covers	1 pair gloves
1 pair blankets	1 pair leggings
1 blue cap, complete	1 watch cap

AUTHORITY

Although no official statement was found to formally limit the authority of commissioned officers, particularly that of commanding officers, there is little doubt that there was a gradual narrowing of the scope of authority. The range of punishments available to a captain was reduced and the number of references to higher authority directing certain aspects of day-to-day management of ships and commands increased.

On the other hand, there is little question that the Navy's attitude toward the authority of enlisted people was changing. The 1917 Bluejacket's Manual, which was still being issued in 1920, discusses the responsibilities of petty officers in an entirely different tone. While earlier versions tend to emphasize the responsibility of petty officers as specialists, giving secondary import to their strictly military authority, the new approach stressed in no uncertain terms the dual nature of petty officer authority and the dual symbolism of the rating badge. Although the master-at-arms rating still existed, all petty officers were urged to assume military authority by enforcing law and regulations both ashore and afloat.

Although the seaman ratings were considered the senior ratings and petty officers of the seaman branch the primary military petty officers, those of the artificer branch were instructed as to their military responsibilities. A chief machinist mate, for instance, should be expected to drill a squad of riflemen. Even a chief yeoman was supposed to be meticulous in wearing of the uniform and punctilious in observing military courtesies.

The authority of petty officers of the engineer, artificer and special branches was clearly less than that of a seaman branch petty officer. Officers were cautioned not to put a "left arm" chief in charge of a detail in which there was a seaman petty officer. If this was unavoidable, the left arm chief would retain authority in technical matters within the purview of his specialty and the seaman petty officer, of whatever rate, would be responsible for all military matters.

A precedence of ratings was established in all branches with the master-at-arms (which would be disestablished by the end of the year) being senior followed by boatswains' mates, gunners' mate, turret captains and quartermasters. The senior rating in the left arm branches was the machinist mate and the most junior was a first class hospital apprentice (actually a third class petty officer). Third and fourth class cooks, second class bakers, all stewards, messmen, and officers' cooks were not petty officers but were considered to be rated men, an indication of the evolution of the term "rated."

Chief petty officers were instructed as to the duties of junior division officers and because a chief petty officer was eligible for promotion to warrant, deck CPOs at least were admonished to become familiar with the duties of officer of the deck.

The introduction of the Shore Patrol provided yet another area in which all petty officers might be required to exercise authority quite separate from their occupational specialty. Emphasis was given to the status of all petty officers. No petty officer, for instance, was allowed to serve as a mess cook. Petty officers were reminded that they had not been promoted in order to do manual labor but rather to supervise others -- this later, of course, being aimed more directly at the seaman branch petty officers than at the artificers, who were craftsmen by trade.

Chief petty officers were confined in a separate mess and berthing area. First class petty officers, on the other hand, were messed with the crew; each serving as senior man in a particular mess and as such responsible for cleanliness, orderliness and good behavior.

Officers were admonished to leave the day-to-day direction, discipline and training of the crew to the chief petty officers and other senior POs. In his annual report Secretary Daniels referred to the chief petty officer as the "backbone" of the Navy. This was certainly not original with him but reflects a dramatic change in attitude toward the enlisted ranks as a group.

GENERAL SUMMARY OF NAVY DATA

Officer (Line and Warrants)	6,806
Total Enlisted	85,000
Under four years service	47,819
Four to eight years service	14,205
Eight to twelve years	13,740
Twelve to sixteen years	6,825
Sixteen to twenty years	2,129
Twenty or more years	220

There were in commission 141 vessels of all classes.

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

The bulk of the United States Fleet was in home waters engaged in routine exercises.

The Asiatic Fleet continued patrols on the Yangtze and in South China Rivers. Increasing political turbulence among the various contending Chinese political factions and warlords forced the Navy to provide convoy for merchant ships in the river trade. Armed guards were stationed on American flag ships. American ships, merchant and naval vessels alike, were regularly fired upon and naval personnel suffered casualties.

The Special Service Squadron was stationed in Panama providing support for the government of Nicaragua and the detachment of naval personnel and marines ashore there.

Naval personnel and marines were also ashore in Haiti acting as a provisional government.

In addition naval vessels and personnel provided disaster relief in the Dominican Republic following a severe hurricane.

The size of the navy and its operations were restricted by the limitations created in the several naval conferences of the 1920s. The Secretary reported generally high morale as evidenced by a 71% re-enlistment rate. At the beginning of the year there was a shortage of 2,700 petty officers but by the end of the year there were 838 petty officers in excess.

Of the 85,000 enlisted men, 78,549 were native born and 1,842 naturalized. In all, 79,570 were white. Of the non-whites 4,375 were Filipinos and 462 were black.

RANK AND RATE STRUCTURE 1930

RANK	NUMBER	ENTR.
Rear Admiral	57	1882 - 1893*
Captain	243	1891 - 1896
Commander	409	1898 - 1906
Lt. Commander	759	1905 - 1913
Lieutenant	1,764	1913 - 1922
Lieutenant(jg)	1,281	1918 - 1922
Ensign	827	1923 - 1929

Of these, one captain had thirteen years of service as an enlisted man and warrant officer. One commander had previous enlisted service. Fifteen lieutenant commanders had previous service of from two to twelve years as enlisted and/or warrant officers. Two hundred and nine lieutenants had been enlisted and warrant officers and two hundred and twenty had been enlisted and presumably had entered the USNA from the fleet. A considerable number of lieutenants had previous service in the National Naval Volunteers or Naval Reserve Force as temporary officers during WWI. Only 33 of the 1281 lieutenants(jg) had previous enlisted or warrant officer experience. One ensign had been a warrant officer in the NRF or NNV.

Chief Boatswain	199	1898 - 1927**	
		Prior enlistment	64 (2-15 years)
		Prior temp. off.	57
		No prior	78
Boatswain	50	1924 - 1929	
		Prior enlistment	46 (6-15 years)
		No prior	4
Chief Gunners	146	1899 - 1927	
		Prior enlistment	51 (8-20 years)
		Prior temp. off.	37
		No prior	58
Gunners	21	1926 - 1929	
		All enlisted	(7-15 years)
Chief Electricians	66	1908 - 1923	
		Prior enlistment	11 (10-12 years)
		Prior temp. off.	16
		No prior	39
Electricians	40	1924 - 1929	
		All previous enlisted	(3-13 years)

*Date of entry into service (USNA)

**The earliest and latest dates of appointment.

Chief Radio Electrician	72	1913 - 1923 Prior enlistment 10 (7-13 years) Prior temp. off. 19 No prior 43
Radio Electrician	31	1925 - 1929 Prior enlistment 30 (7-12 years) No prior 1
Chief Machinist	233	1905 - 1923 Prior enlistment 102 (2-12 years) Prior temp. off. 71 No prior 60
Machinist	80	1924 - 1929 All prior enlisted (5-12 years)
Chief Carpenter	104	1904 - 1925 Prior enlistment 39 (1-16 years) Prior temp. off. 10 No prior 55
Carpenter	13	1925 - 1927 All previous enlisted (7-13 years)
Chief Pharmacist	122	1907 - 1923 Prior enlistment 92 (7-25 years) No prior 30 (Virtually all of those with prior service had been temp. officers)
Pharmacist	15	1927 - 1929 All prior enlisted (9-15 years)
Chief Pay Clerk	215	1915 - 1924 Prior enlistment 20 (3-23 years) Prior WO 10 Prior temp. off. 24 No prior 161
Pay Clerk	44	1925 - 1926 All previous enlisted (6-12 years)
Acting Pay Clerk	9	1929 All previous enlisted

The chief warrant officer and warrant officer communities present a puzzling profile. Although regulations had, for over twenty years, called for warrants (particularly boatswain and gunner) to be drawn from among CPOs and

POs first class with at least seven years of sea duty, only chief machinist and chief pharmacist report a majority of the people holding those commissions had come up from the ranks. All other chief warrant officer groups had more non-prior enlisted or former temporary officer service than prior service.

Virtually all the holders of warrants however were prior service enlisted with relatively long service. This suggests that during the 1920s certain manpower problems, perhaps a shortage of expertise, had been resolved by offering commissions as chief warrant officers. Perhaps a number of people who had served as temporary commissioned officers during WWI had remained in the Navy by reverting to CWO. Whatever the explanation it remains clear that the commonly held view that chief warrant officers have historically been long service enlisted people is subject to question. The 1930 figures at least suggest that this may have been a goal toward which the service was working. On the other hand it is possible that warrant officers chose to retire rather than remain in service long enough to earn promotion to chief warrant.

ENLISTED RATE STRUCTURE

The most dramatic shift in enlisted rate structure is the change of the focus of pay from a combination of rate and rating to one based entirely on rate or class. As will be noted in the section on pay, the variations in pay between various specialties has virtually disappeared and all people of a class were paid the same. This reflects the increased emphasis on military duties and responsibilities of petty officers which will be discussed in the section on authority.

The basic rating structure was essentially the same as in 1920 except for the developemnt of a class-by-class career path from the entry level rates to CPO in all specialties.

The rating of torpedoman was created in 1921 from gunner's mate; signalman had been separated from quartermaster and the seaman signalman rating discontinued. This marks the return to the structure of the last quarter of the 19th century when quartermaster and quartermasters of signals were separate ratings. Radioman and photographer were also created in 1921.

The time honored rate of master at arms had been disestablished in 1921.

A number of aviation ratings had been created. These were:

ACM

AMM

Amtlsmth

Aviation rigger (combined with ANM in 324)

(All established in 1921)

Aerographer

Aviation pilot (both established in 1924)

Aviation Ordnanceman

A number of ratings were disestablished in 1921 including:

Cook to Commandant of the Yard
 Cook to CinC
 Coxswain to CinC
 Oiler
 Plumber and fitter
 Seaman Gunner
 Steward to Commandant of Yard
 Steward to CinC
 Ship's cook fourth class

Changes of ratings included:

Electrician to Electrician's Mate
 Sailmaker to Sailmaker 1,2,3
 Seaman to Seaman first and second class
 Shipwright included in Seaman.*

The various special stewards and cooks ratings based on who they served were abolished and a basic officers cook and steward rating established. The rating of fire control man had been created.

The muster lists of USS Arizona in 1930 record:

OFFICERS

<u>Line</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Marines</u>
Captain		
CDR	Lt(MC)	
LCdr 3	Lt (jg) (SC)	1st Lieutenant
LT 5	Ensign (SC)	
Lt(jg) 3		

WARRANT OFFICERS

CBSN	CElec
CGNR	CMach
	CCarp
	CPayclk
	Mach

Enlisted manning reported for the same year was:

SEAMAN	ENGINRG	ARTIFICER	SPECIAL	COMM	AIR	OTHER
CPO BM 4	MM 7	EM 5	YN 2	CS		
GM 2	WT 3	CM	RM			10
TC 2			SK 2			Off. Cks
QN			Ph.M.			and
FC						stewards

*Harrod

PO1	BM	3	MM	15	CM	2	YN	2	SC	
	GM	4	WT	6	EM	7	Printer	2		
	TM		Eng	2	Cprsmth		RM			
	QM				Blksmith	2	SK	3		
					Shpftr		Ph.M.			
					Molder					
PO2	BM	4	MM	17	EM	4	SK	3	SC	2
	GM		WT	4	CM	2	YN	2		
	QM	2	Eng		Shpftr	2	Bugler			
							Ph.M.			
PO3	Cox				CM	2	YN		SC	3
	QM				Shpftr		SK	3		
	GM	2					Ph.M.			

Non-rated

S1/c	54	F1/c	39
S2/c	69	F2/c	25
AS	2	F3/c	40

Enlisted manning was 100% for some submarines, 90% for others. Manning for surface ships was from 86.9% for destroyers to 90.7% for battleships. Ships in overhaul were stripped to make up complements of active ships.

DISCIPLINE

The captain's mast rates of the ships studied in 1930 reveal a continued downward trend. The overall rate of 60% would in fact have been lower had it not been for the appearance of a new charge; liberty card violation. The use of liberty cards was the result of a new policy and on the larger ships it is obvious that the program was not implemented well. Liberty card violations included letting another person use your card, the most common offense; loss of liberty card; carrying an altered or mutilated card; theft of a liberty card. Testimony of veterans of that period indicates that smaller ships -- destroyers, tugs and the like -- tended to allow each person to carry and retain his own card rather than turn it in at the end of each liberty or leave period. The low figures for cruisers indicate either the same practice in a larger vessel or a more thorough orientation to and administration of the program.

If liberty card offenses are discounted the overall captain's mast rate is only 54%.

Veterans of service in destroyers recall that captain's mast was infrequent and that many problems were "solved on the fo'csle": that is, sailors with differences which might have otherwise resulted in charges of disobedience, disrespect or insolence were allowed to fight it out on the fo'csle with boxing gloves.

The lowered rates throughout the fleet also suggest that many disciplinary problems were being resolved on lower levels and not being referred to the formal system. Veteran CPOs are unanimous in reporting that a CPO forced to put one of his own people on report was the butt of jokes and ridicule in the chief's mess for not being able to handle his job. In this situation the liberty card program provided a perhaps illegal, but effective, means of control on the divisional level. A chief or leading petty officer could simply "put the liberty card in his pocket" and not distribute it. The offender could, of course, demand it, but the alternative was being put on report, going to captain's mast.

In general the powers of the commanding officer were greatly restricted as compared to earlier times. A commanding officer was empowered to award the following punishments at mast.

For minor offenses which do not warrant one of the three courts-martial the commanding officer will punish, the regulations were as follows:

- 1) Reduction of any rating established by himself.
- 2) Confinement, not exceeding 10 days unless further confinement be necessary in the case of a prisoner to be tried by court-martial.

The use of irons, single or double, is abolished except for the safe custody or when imposed as part of a sentence by general court-martial.

- 3) Solitary confinement on bread and water, not exceeding five days.
- 4) Deprivation of liberty on shore.
- 5) Solitary confinement not exceeding seven days.
- 6) Extra duties. (BJM 1930)

1930

	BB 437	CA/L 493	DD 109	CV 1910	AO 138	ATF 19**
DRUNK ON BOARD	6	7	1	24	3	
DRUNK ASHORE	1	6	--	25	--	
DISOBEDIENCE	12	19	2	37	1	
DISRESPECT/INSOLENCE	9	6	4	37	1	
UNIFORM VIOLATION	9	--	1	26	--	
THEFT OF CLOTHING	6	2	--	9	1	
OTHER CLOTHING VIOL.	7	3	--	102	--	
GOVERNMENT PROP.	5	--	--	12	--	
DUTY-FAILURE/NEGLECT	51	15	7	77	2	
INCOMPETENCE	--	2	--	--	--	
FIGHTING	2	2	2	2	--	
GAMBLING	6	16	--	8	--	
LIBERTY CARD	161	1	--	54	--	
SLEEPING	14	2	--	6	--	
SMOKING	3	5	1	80	--	
UA UNDER 1 DAY	95	147	24	321	16	
UA OVER 1 DAY	33	49	4	102	3	
MISCELLANEOUS	41	30	--	94	9	1
TOTAL NJPS	461	306	46	1016	36	1
NJP RATE	105% **	62%	42%	53%	26%	5%
OVERALL NJP	1867					
OVERALL NJP RATE	60%					

*Minus library card NJP rate: BB - 68%; CV - 50%

**Only 6 months available - Annual rate extrapolated.

RECRUITING

The practice of making first enlistments in advanced pay grade had almost disappeared by 1930. Although provision was made for such enlistments if certain skills were needed, virtually all first enlistments were made at the rating of apprentice seaman. If advanced pay grade enlistments were authorized they were generally in the artificer ratings and only in the lowest petty officer grades.

First enlistment ages were 17 to 25 and from time to time the minimum age was raised to 18. Seventeen-year-olds, with the consent of a parent or guardian, could enlist until they were twenty-one. Those eighteen or over could enlist for four or six years.

In 1930 some 95,000 young men applied for enlistment, of which approximately 55,000 were rejected for physical and some 10,000 for other reasons. Of the remainder almost 13,000 actually enlisted.

TRAINING

The development of a career path from apprentice seaman to chief petty officer in virtually all ratings, coupled with the decision made three decades earlier to recruit only American citizens, committed the Navy to an ever expanding training and educational function. No longer able to draw on training received in civilian occupations, it was necessary to develop rated specialists from raw recruits over a long period of training.

Recruit training was conducted in Hampton Roads, Virginia; San Diego, California; and Great Lakes, Illinois. With few exceptions, men went to sea after completing the four month course of instruction.

Training for the lower pay grades in virtually all ratings was primarily on-the-job, supported by a number of training courses and manuals. General education courses and special rating training courses were available aboard ship.

The following table outlines the school opportunities for enlisted men.

CLASS A	CLASS B	CLASS C	CLASS D
Bugler	Optical	Submarine	Fuel Oil
Musician	Sound	Aviation Pilot	Ford fire-control
Radio operator	Radio material	Pigeon training	instrument
Electrical	Gyrocompass	Parachute	Motion picture
Machinist's mate	Torpedoman	Recruiter	Underwater cut-
Artificer	Pharmacist's mate	Naval Academy	ing torch
Hospital Corps	Cook & Baker	Preparatory	Gas mask
Aviation mech.	Aviation mach.		Aircraft armament
1)Chief machist	mate		Gas chamber
2)Metalsmith	Aviation Instrum.		instruction
3)General Utility	Photographer		
Aerographer	Stenographer		
Torpedoman	Fire Control		
	Bugle Master		

Nonrated men only were eligible for Class A schools, except that a few individual requests or blacksmiths and coppersmiths would be considered for electroplating instruction in the aviation metalsmith course.

Petty officers only were eligible for Class B schools, except in the case of fire-control school and photographer's schools.

In Class C, the recruiter's school was for petty officers only; in Class D, the underwater cutting torch school was for qualified divers; and gas mask school for petty officers only.

The manner of making out requests to these schools was to be obtained from the division officer. The length of the courses was given in a Bureau of Navigation circular letter or in the Bureau of Navigation Manual. (BJM 1930)

A complete list of all enlisted schools, basic and advanced included:

Aerological	Optical
Artificer	Pharmacist's mate
Aviation:	Photographer
General utility	Radio
Metalsmith	Radio material
Carpenter's mate	Recruiter
Instrument	Sound
Parachute	Stenography
Bugle	Submarine:
Bugle master	Electrical
Cook and baker	Diesel
Electricians	Training
Gyro electrician	Torpedoman
Fire-control man	Officers, stewards, and
Hospital Corps	cooks
Machinist mate	Lighter-than-air training
Musician	

The total graduated was 4,895.

PAY, REWARDS AND RECOGNITION

The complex system of assigning specific pay schedules for each rating had been simplified to one, utilizing pay grades into which each of the various ratings fell.

The following is the distribution of all ratings to the eight pay grades:

GRADE	PAY PER MONTH	CLASS OR RATING
1	\$ 126.00	Chief petty officer (permanent).
1-A	99.00	Chief petty officer (acting).

2	84.00	Petty officers, first class; officers' stewards and cooks, first class; musicians, first class (Naval Academy Band).
3	\$ 72.00	Petty officers, second class; officers' stewards and cooks, second class; musicians, first class.
4	60.00	Petty officers, third class; firemen, first class; officers' stewards and cooks, third class; musicians, second class (Naval Academy band).
5	54.00	Nonrated men, first class (except firemen, first class and musicians, first class); firemen, second class; musicians, second class; mess attendants, first class.
6	36.00	Nonrated men, second class (except firemen, second class, and musicians, second class); firemen, third class; mess attendants, second class.
7	21.00	Nonrated men, third class (except firemen, third class); mess attendants, third class.

ADDITIONS TO PAY -- EXTRA ALLOWANCES

In addition to the base pay shown in the table above, the men received further increases in pay as follows:

(a) For length of service the base pay is increased 10 percent after the first four years of service and 5 percent additional for each four years service thereafter, the total not to exceed 25 percent.

(b) For awards of the Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Medal, or Navy Cross, \$2 per month is added to the pay, beginning at the time of winning the medal and lasting during the service of the man.

(c) Other additions to pay were--

Crews' messmen	\$5 per month.
Gun captains	\$1 to \$5 per month.
Gun range-finder operators	\$5 per month.
Gun pointers	\$1 to \$5 per month.
Sharp shooters	\$1 per month.
Expert riflemen	\$3 per month.
Mail clerks	\$10 to \$30 per month
Divers	\$1.20 per hour.
Submarine crews	\$5 per month.

Men qualified for submarines got \$1 additional pay each day on which they were submerged in a submarine while under way, but this additional pay could not exceed \$15 per month.

Men who were designated as naval aviation pilots and detailed to duty involving flying, when endorsement to that effect was made upon their records, received 50 percent of their pay when under flight orders.

Men who qualified could have their ratings changed to chief aviation pilot or aviation pilot first class and receive the pay of such ratings plus 50 percent of their pay while engaged in duty involving flying under flight orders.

ENLISTMENT ALLOWANCE ON REENLISTMENT

An enlistment allowance was paid to enlisted men (including members of the insular force) who had been discharged under honorable conditions and who reenlisted within three months from the date of such discharge (reenlistments under continuous service).

The enlistment allowance was computed as follows:

(a) A man whose pay falls within the first, second, or third pay grades shall receive \$50 for each full year served in the enlistment from which he was last discharged, but the total shall not exceed \$300.

(BJM 1930)

This system established the "foggie," or time in service payment, as part of monthly earnings and created a separate one time per re-enlistment payment or bonus. This clarified a rather confusing situation which had developed during the previous thirty years wherein the traditional \$1.36 a month was added to in the amount of \$5.00 a month, a policy which required clarification in the courts.

Medals and awards available to naval personnel were the same as those listed in 1920. In addition, distinguishing marks were worn on the uniform for sharpshooters and expert marksmen. Approximately 10,000 men were awarded good conduct medals.

ADVANCEMENT

The requirements for advancement had become more systematic. Time in service and grade requirements as well as performance and conduct mark requirements were established by regulation. Commanding officers were empowered to promote to third class petty officer (acting) and to second and first class petty officer (acting). Once a second or first class petty officer had earned a permanent appointment made by the Bureau of Navigation, however, only a court martial could reduce him in rank.

Requirements for advancement are shown below.

From	To	Service
Any nonrated man...	Lowest petty officer rating, except to TC 1c.	16 months in naval service.
Officers' cooks; officers' stewards.	Next higher ratings in messman branch.	12 months in lower rating.
Petty officer, third class...	Petty officer, second class	Do.
Petty officer, second class..	Petty officer, first class.	12 months in lower rating and hold for permanent appointment therein.
Petty officer, first class	Chief petty officer..	12 months in lower lower rating and hold permanent appointment therein; at least 1 year's sea service as petty officer, first class.

ADVANCEMENT IN RATING-QUALIFICATIONS IN MARKS

Men are qualified for advancement when they fulfill the requirements in marks as prescribed below:

To--	Proficiency in Rating	Conduct
Seaman, second class..	No requirements as to marks.	No requirements as to marks.
Fireman, third class	Do.	Do.
Other nonrated grades except officers' stewards and cooks.	No mark less than 2.5 for preceding 6 months and not less 3.5 for quarter preceding advancement.	No mark less than 2.5 and an average of not less than 3.5 for 6 months.

To--	Proficiency in Rating	Conduct
Officers' stewards; officers' cooks.	No mark less than 2.5 for preceding 12 months and not less than 3.5 for quarter preceding advance- ment.	No mark less than 3 and an average of not less than 3.5 for 1 year.
Lowest petty officer rating from non- rated grades.	Do.	Do.
Petty officer, second class, from third class.	No mark less than 3 and an average of not less than 3.5 for 1 year.	Do.
Petty officer, first class..	Do.	Do.
Chief petty officer	Do.	Do. (BJM 1930)

Technically, a sailor could advance to the rate of acting chief petty officer in a little over five years. The requirement that advancement to CPO could not be made in the first enlistment had been abandoned, which made it possible for six year enlistees to achieve chief in the first enlistment. In fact, authority to advance petty officers was given by the Bureau of Navigation and this authority was graded in terms of analysis of existing vacancies. Therefore a sailor might well be eligible for a long period before such advancement was authorized. Time requirements had been adjusted to permit any petty officer first class with one year's sea duty in rate to be eligible for CPO.

Continuous Service CPOs and PO first class with five years of sea duty, one of which was served while holding chief or first class, could apply to take the professional examination for warrant officer. Men over thirty five were not eligible for promotion to warrant.

Warrant officers and chief warrant officers with at least four years service as warrants or chief warrant and who were not over thirty five years of age could apply for a commission in the line.

Under the law, 100 enlisted men could be appointed midshipmen at the USNA each year. These men first took a basic examination and if found eligible went to the Naval Academy Preparatory School to prepare for the formal entrance examination.

A multiple score system had been implemented which combined marks for; examination, proficiency, ability as a leader, time in rate, time in service.

ROTATION AND ASSIGNMENT

In general, no one was eligible for shore duty until they had served six years at sea. At that time they were eligible to apply for shore duty and request a location. For many ratings, particularly those in the seaman branch, there were very few shore billets and as many as twelve or more years of sea duty might pass before a shore billet became available.

Aviation ratings transferred ashore from carriers annually.

In ratings where the shore/sea billets ratio was greater than 1:3 special rotation schedules were in effect.

RETIREMENT

A thirty year retirement system continued to be in effect with no minimum age requirements. In fact only a very few enlisted people appear to have aspired to a full thirty-year career. Two thousand one hundred and twenty-nine, roughly 2.5% of the force, were serving in their sixteenth to twentieth years. Only two hundred and twenty or .25% were serving beyond the twenty year mark.

The Naval Reserve Act of 1925 had regularized the Naval Fleet Reserve Force and perpetuated the policy which permitted transfer to the Fleet Reserve. Men serving prior to July 1, 1925 were allowed to reenlist in the Fleet Reserve after sixteen years of service--with a monthly retainer of \$73.30 for a CPO (permanent appointment). Those who enlisted after July 1, 1925 were not accorded the sixteen year privilege but could transfer to the Fleet Reserve after 20 years of active service with a monthly salary of \$62.80 for a CPO(PA). A total of 2,103 sailors retired and approximately 1,200 transferred to the Fleet Reserve.

After a total of thirty years combined service had been accumulated, a man could apply for retirement which paid a CPO(PA) \$110.05, a figure which differed slightly depending on the class of Naval Reserve Service.

Disability pensions were paid to men with ten years service. Men with twenty years service were eligible for a pension equal to one-half their active duty pay in lieu of being provided with a home at the Naval Home in Philadelphia.

The Secretary of the Navy estimated a sailor served ten years after advancing to CPO.

UNIFORM

The sea bag issued to an apprentice seaman in 1930 is listed below.

Blankets, pair	1	Jumper, undress white	1
Broom, whisk	1	Jersey	1
Blacking outfit	1	Leggings, pair	1
Brush, scrub	1	Mattress	1
Brush, tooth	1	Mattress covers	2

Brush, hair	1	Neckerchiefs	1
Cap, complete	1	Overcoat	1
Cap, watch	1	Overshirt	1
Clothes stops, package	3	Pillows	1
Comb, hair	1	Raincoat	1
Drawers, heavy	2	Sewing kit, as required	1
Drawers, lightweight or medium	4	Shoes, pair	2
Dungarees, suits	2	Socks, cotton	4
Gloves, pair	1	Toilet article, outfit	1
Handkerchiefs	12	Towels	2
Hat, white	3	Trousers, blue	2
Jackknife	1	Trousers, white	4
Jumper, undress blue	2	Undershirt, heavy	2
Jumper, dress white	1	Undershirts, light or medium	4

Except for changes in rating badges (which reflected the changes in the rating structure) and the shift of the eagle's head on left arm rates from aft to forward, uniform regulations had remained quite stable.

Enlisted styles had shifted from the pattern of pre-WWI toward one in which the overall picture was less bloused and more apt to be tailored to fit. Sailors were cautioned not to buy or wear non-regulation tailormade uniforms but photographs and memories of veterans indicate that when sailors could afford such uniforms they bought them.

On liberty, white hats were apparently never worn in a regulation manner; either they were worn cocked and very low on the brow or pushed back on the head.

Grooming regulations remained essentially unchanged. Hair was not to exceed 1-1/2 inches and was to be neatly trimmed, but sailors were cautioned not to have their hair so short as to give the appearance of being shaved. Beards and mustaches were permitted but apparently were not a matter of style in the Navy, as was the case in civilian life as well.

LEAVE AND LIBERTY

The Bluejackets' Manual of 1930 treats the subjects of leave and liberty more fully than any previous document reviewed.

Leave not to exceed thirty days per calendar year (exclusive of travel time) was authorized. Commanders-in-Chief, Senior Officers Present and Commanding Officers could grant leaves at their discretion. Emergency leave in excess of thirty days was also permitted. In neither case was leave guaranteed. Leave was clearly defined as authorized absence from duty for more than forty-eight hours. Liberty was defined as authorized absence from duty for less than forty eight hours. No person was to be deprived of liberty for more than twelve days unless exigencies of the service or the unhealthiness of the port prevented it, or unless under sentence of court martial or under arrest and awaiting trial.

AUTHORITY

As with the 1920 instructions and manuals the dual nature of naval service was emphasized. Petty officers in particular were lectured on the military responsibilities they carried, which extended beyond their particular technical sphere.

The elimination of master at arms had thrust police and military duties onto a number of different ratings, particularly the boatswains' mates and gunner's mates and, to a lesser extent, on all right arm rates.

All petty officers were required to serve as shore patrol and thus exercise purely military responsibilities.

There was a precedence of ratings as before. In practice, military and supervisory duties were assigned to right arm ratings even though in some cases they might be put in charge of a working party containing left arm ratings of a higher class. The anomaly created by this precedence was avoided primarily in practice rather than in policy. Officers simply avoided putting higher rated left arm rates in situations where they would be under the charge of a lower ranked right arm rate unless it was absolutely necessary. Within his own sphere of technical expertise the chief of each rating reigned supreme. The institutionalization of the CPO mess made it possible to work out matters of precedence and control informally among the CPOs without reference to higher authority. In practice, the precedence of the ratings could be preserved without violation of the chain of command by giving orders and directions through the CPO or leading petty officer of a gang or division. Thus, if the chief boatswain's mate had occasion to give direction to the carpenters mates, custom called for him to give them to the chief carpenter's mate, whom he outranked by virtue of precedence. The chief carpenters mate could then convey them to his own people, thus preserving his authority.

The position of CPO was further enhanced by the practice of their filling junior or assistant division officer billets. Almost all direct orders passed to the enlisted force came through the CPO.

GENERAL SUMMARY OF NAVAL DATA

Officers: Line: 7145 CWO/WO: 2119
 Staff: 2251

Enlisted
 Total 139,554
 Less than four years 80,377
 Four to eight years 22,541
 Eight to twelve years 13,449
 Twelve to sixteen years 12,434
 Sixteen to twenty years 8,565
 More than twenty years 2,188
 Number of ships (in commission) 459

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

The Navy was undergoing expansion due to the obvious threats to peace which developed in the mid-1930s.

The United States Fleet, as it was then called, had shifted from the West Coast to Hawaii during 1940 and was engaged in tactical exercises. The Navy was deeply involved in the development of bases in the Pacific, Guam, Samoa, Wake and Midway as well as the upgrading of facilities in Hawaii. The Naval Transportation Service was totally involved in transporting supplies, men and material to these areas.

The Asiatic Fleet was operating in China and the Phillipines on what was virtually a war footing. USS Panay had been sunk in the Yangtze in 1937 by Japanese aircraft and our marine and naval detachments were tasked with guarding American citizens and property and the neutral area of the International Settlement in Shanghai.

The Atlantic Squadron was assigned the task of neutrality patrol and was also on a war footing in terms of operational tempo.

The Special Service Squadron remained on station in Panama, although our forces had been removed from operations ashore in Central America and the Caribbean.

Squadron Forty T was a special force assigned to the waters off southeastern Europe based in Lisbon. Only ten years before in 1930 the last ship formally on station in Europe had been withdrawn.

RANK AND RATE STRUCTURE

Officers (Line)

Rear Admirals 79 1895 to 1902
 Captains 364 1894 to 1910

Commanders	759	1907 to 1921	
		Previous enlisted	66
		Previous W.O.	39
		A few remaining NRF, NNV Nav Mil temp off.	
Lt. Commanders	1493	1911(1) 1915 to 1922	
		Previous enlisted	80 1 to 2 yrs.
		Previous W.O.	21 5 to 19 yrs.
Lieutenants	1897	1921 to 1929	
		Previous Enlisted	31 1 to 17 yrs.
		Previous W.O.	5
		Approximately 50 prev. Temp off NRF	
Lieutenants(jg)	1311	1923 to 1933	
		Previous enlisted	1
Ensigns	1242	1934 to 1936	

In 1940 the officer corps reached perhaps its "purest" in the sense that almost all members were graduates of Annapolis. A review of entry dates indicates that the level of experience at any rank was relatively great. Ensigns, in some cases had six years experience including their time at the Academy and at least some Lts(jg) had been in that rank since 1927.

Warrant Officers:

Chief Boatswains	149	1912 to 1934	
		Roughly half had no recorded prior naval service	
Boatswains	106	1934 to 1940	
		6 prior enlisted service	
		10 prior temporary officers	
Chief Gunners	94	1909 to 1940	
		6 prior enlisted service	
		10 prior temporary officers	
Gunners	36	1934 to 1940	
		All prior enlisted service	
Chief Electricians	88	1908 to 1934	
		2 former enlisted, 9 prior temp. off.	
Electricians		1934 to 1940	
		All prior enlisted	
Chief Radio Electricians	60	1921 to 1934	
		4 prior enlisted	
		13 prior temp. off.	

Radio Electricians	60	1934 to 1940 All former enlisted
Chief Machinists	202	1906 to 1934 11 prior enlisted 20 prior temp. off.
Machinists	153	1934 to 1940
Chief Carpenters	68	1907 to 1934 A few prior enlisted and prior temp. off.
Carpenters	67	1934 to 1940 All prior enlisted
Chief Pharmacists	93	1915 to 1934 45 prior enlisted
Pharmacists	38	1934 to 1940 All prior enlisted
Chief Pay Clerk	184	1915 to 1934 Majority, prior service
Pay Clerk	92	1934 to 1939 All prior enlisted
Acting Pay Clerk	11	1939 to 1940 All prior enlisted.

Thus the 1940 CWO/WO profile repeats the patterns of 1930 and suggests a policy issue which is not immediately apparent concerning advancement to CWO status and a program of CWO accessions which did not depend upon the enlisted force as a source.

ENLISTED RATE STRUCTURE

The authorized ratings and rates in 1940 were almost unchanged from those of 1930.

Sailmaker had been combined with Boatswain's mate. Commissary Steward and Engineman had been disestablished. Blacksmith and Coppersmith had been combined into a single rating of Metalsmith.

With the exception of the creation of an entirely new field of ratings, aviation, in the 1920s, the rating structure in the seaman, deck and special branches had been almost totally stable since 1921.

The muster lists of USS Arizona reveal the following manning for 1940.

Officers

<u>Line</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>Marines</u>
Capt.	Cdr (MC)	
Cdr.	Cdr. (MC)	
	Lt(jg) (MC)	Capt.
	Lcdr. (DC)	
LCdr. 6	Lt(jg)(ChC)	1st Lt.
Lt. 14	Ens. (SC)	2nd Lt.
Lt(jg) 4		
Ens 20*		
CBSN	CElec	
Gunner	CR Electrician	
	CCarn	
	CPC	
	Machinist	

This staffing pattern is one with a relatively broad lower level but a very narrow upper level. Lieutenant Commanders obviously served as department heads with the bulk of the watch standing, division officer, assistant department head duties being held down by Lts. who, we have seen, had a minimum of six years active service since graduation and who could have had as much as fifteen years commissioned service.

Enlisted

Seaman			Engineering	Artificer	Special
CPO	BM	3	MM 7	CM	YN 2
	QM	3	WT 6	EM 2	SK 3
	TC	3		SF	RM
	QM	1		Blmkr	PhM
	SM	1		Metsmith	CS
	FC	1			Bandmaster

* A large number of ensigns are identified as various classes of naval reservists possibly on board for training or possibly called up for active service to meet the growing needs of the Navy.

Seaman			Engineering		Artificer		Special
PO1	BM	8	MM	19	EM	11	YN
	GM		WT	10	SF	4	SK 3
	TC	2			Mldr		RM 5
	QM				Pttnmkr		Phm 3
	SM				CM		Bkr
	FC	3					SC 5
							1st MU 5
PO2	BM	8	MM	17	Blmkr		YN6
			WT	7	EM	10	SK 5
	GM	9			SF		RM 3
	SM	3			Metmsth		PhM 3
	FC	3			Pttnmkr		Bkr 2
					CM	4	SC 5
PO3	COX	34	MM	4*	CM	4	YN 5
	GM	9			SF	10	SK 7
	QM	4			EM	9	RM 11
	SM	7					Bkr 2
	FC	15					SC 4

Non Rated

S1/c	188	FN	1	60		HA1	2
S1/c	207	FN	2	23	**		
AS	127	FN	3	16			

In addition there were on board 10 Officers cooks and stewards and 30 mess attendants.

* The listing of MM3 is something of an anomaly. Engineering ratings did not have the third class rate because fireman third class was essentially a promotion from apprentice seaman thus placing firemen first class on an equal pay level with PO 3. This musterlist may be in error or the result of a short lived experiment.

** Some of the nonrated men listed in the seaman branch may have in fact been strikers in various artificer ratings.

DISCIPLINE AND GOOD ORDER

Charges and punishments recorded in the log of USS Arizona 1940

	BB 1208	CV 1350	CA/ L 562	DD 142	AO 156	ATF 42
<u>CHARGES</u>						
DRUNK ON BOARD	5	2	7	5	4	-
DRUNK ASHORE	4	5	7	6	4	-
DISOBEDIENCE/	7	6	17	2	1	4
DISRESPECT/INSOLENCE	10	4	21	3	3	1
UNIFORM VIOLATIONS	6	3	11	2	-	1
THEFT OF CLOTHING	1	5	6	1	1	-
OTHER CLOTHING VIOL.	6	1	3	-	-	-
GOVERNMENT PROP.	3	4	-	1	-	-
DUTY-FAILURE/NEGLECT	16	12	23	12	6	1
INCOMPETENCE	-	-	-	-	-	-
FIGHTING	7	11	14	3	-	1
GAMBLING	-	15	3	-	-	-
LIBERTY CARD	5	4	2	-	-	2
SLEEPING	2		2	-	-	
SMOKING	-	3	-	-	-	-
UA UNDER 1 DAY	66	55	106	9	20	18
UA OVER 1 DAY	25	25	13	1	7	1
MISCELLANEOUS	25	39	37	10	5	6
TOT NJP	197	241	277	55	54	42
NJP RATE	16%	18%	49%	36%	35%	81%

Overall NJP Rate 25%.

1940 is at once noteable for the dramatic reduction in charges when compared to any previous period. Only the fleet tug shows an increase and that so sharply out of line with the patterns for that class in previous years to be considered an anomaly created by a particularly inept commanding officer or a peculiarly unruly group of men. The ship in question did represent a new class of fleet tug and was transferring from the Atlantic to the Pacific; situations which might well have contributed to such a high level of indiscipline.

No changes in the laws or procedures had been put into place during the previous decade. Nonetheless the figures suggest that shipboard practice had indeed begun to change. Of over 3400 charges brought before the mast in this sample, not one involved incompetence. One is led to speculate that, for practical purposes, incompetence was no longer an offense in the sense it had been in the past. Reduction in rating for incompetence could in fact be effected by the commanding officer making recommendation for such action to the Bureau of Navigation. Liberty card violations which had loomed so large in 1930 represented only three cases in the sample which suggests that the practice was now well institutionalized and sailors thoroughly understood the system and accepted it as part of naval life.

Possible explanations for such a high level of discipline and good order are discussed in the appendix.

RECRUITING

Between 1930 and 1940 the enlisted strength of the Navy expanded from approximately 85,000 to almost 140,000. Economic conditions clearly influenced the numbers of people applying for enlistment, as well as the number of men who re-enlisted. One hundred and ninety-four thousand young men applied for enlistment in 1940 of which slightly over 86,000 were rejected for physical reasons and nearly 40,000 for other reasons. Of these, 557 disqualifications were waived, over twice the number waived in the previous year, which may reflect the increasingly tense international situation. Similar increases in waivers appear in the record in 1916, 17 and 18.

One veteran of the period recalls that when the Navy recruiters visited Omaha, Nebraska, men were waiting four abreast in a line which stretched completely around a city block.

While advanced placement enlistments could be made in some ratings it would appear that these were very rare and almost all enlistments were in the rating of apprentice seaman. Although the situation would change dramatically with the advent of war, as yet the Navy had made no changes in physical, mental or character requirements.

Recruiting literature of the period indicated that the minimum enlistment age was eighteen, and that, as had been the case for the past three decades, U.S. Citizenship was required.

The basic appeal of recruiting literature was opportunity for steady employment and training in a trade. While travel was noted in illustrations, it was not the basic appeal.

TRAINING

Recruit training covered a twelve week period followed by assignment to sea duty. The theme; "The Ship as a Training School" which first appeared in the 1920s was heavily stressed in the Bluejacket's Manual. Approximately five thousand enlisted men completed a technical school during 1940.

CLASS-A SCHOOLS

Group I	Electrical Ordnance	Group II	Communications Clerical
Group III	Machinists Metalworkers Woodworkers	Group IV	Aviation Machinists Aviation Metalsmiths Aviation Ordnancemen Radioman
Group V	Bugler Hospital Corps School of Music Diesel		

CLASS-B SCHOOLS

Aviation Machinist's Mates (Primary)	Gyro Compass
Aviation Metalsmith	Officers' Cooks and Stewards
Bombsight School	Optical
Cooks and Bakers	Radio Operator
Diesel Engine (Surface)	Sound Motion Picture Technicians
Fire Control (Advanced)	Stenography
Gas Mask	Torpedoman

CLASS-C SCHOOLS

Aerographers	Bombsight Mechanics
Airship Training	Color Photography
Automatic Pilot	Buglemaster
Aviation Pilot Training	Deep Sea Divers
Aviation Instrument	Dental Technicians
Aviation Machinist's Mates	Diesel Engines
Aviation Ordnanceman	Electrical Interior Communication
Bombsight (Advanced)	Pharmacist's Mates
Link Trainer	Photographer
Mine Warfare	Photographer (Slidefilm)
Naval Academy Preparatory	Radio Material
Optical	Recruiting Training
Parachute Material	Submarine Training
Parachute Troop School	

Class-A provided elementary instruction to recruits and gave them the groundwork necessary for the lowest petty-officer ratings and were the only schools to which men were eligible on completion of recruit training, and before going to sea, except the stenography, Diesel, and submarine schools.

Class-B schools were designed to supplement the training afloat by giving enlisted men advanced instruction. Men were sent to these schools from the ships of the fleet and on completion of the course were usually returned to the ships from which received.

Class-C schools provided advanced training for particular duty assignments to enlisted men in special subjects not normally a part of shipboard instruction.

It should be noted that officer training and education had expanded apace with enlisted training. The 1940 Naval Register lists over 100 courses of instruction or special qualification for which officers were eligible.

ASSIGNMENT

Assignment appears to have changed little in the period 1930 to 1940. In most ratings a minimum of six years of sea duty was required for shore duty eligibility. Recruits generally were assigned to squadrons or divisions by fleet commanders and sent in draft to the flagship where they were divided into groups to be sent to individual ships. Veterans of this period generally report three and four year tours in a single ship and often speak of re-enlisting in order to remain on board.

PAY, REWARDS AND RECOGNITION

The pay for enlisted men remained unchanged from the scales shown in the 1930 section. Essentially the basic pay was that of 1908 with some adjustments made during and immediately after World War I.

In 1932 the Purple Heart was authorized for war wounds and awarded to veterans of prior hostilities. In addition, the Silver Star was created in the same year. This award stemmed from a small silver star worn on the suspension ribbon of the WWI Victory Medal by those mentioned in dispatches. The Flying Cross, originally authorized for Army personnel, was now awarded to members of the naval service. Additional campaign medals for operations in the Caribbean and China had also been authorized. Promotion to warrant officer for heroism remained an official policy.

ADVANCEMENT

Time in service and in rate requirements remained unchanged. Advancement examinations were held by boards of not less than three officers, one of whom had to have no less than two years service in the regular Navy. The subjects to be covered in each rating examination were determined and promulgated by the Bureau of Navigation. A man desiring to study for advancement obtained a list of required subjects and a bibliography of manuals and training courses from his division officer.

Examinations for chief petty officer were held by a board of three officers above the rank of Lt.(jg) at least one of which had to be a Lt. or above.

In situations where enough qualified officers could not be assembled, a man wishing to be examined could be sent, at his own expense, to another ship or station for examination.

RETIREMENT

The retirement policy remained unchanged; three quarters pay after thirty years of service. Transfer to the Fleet Reserve was authorized after twenty years of service. A few men who were serving in July 1925, when the Naval Reserve Act was made law, were still eligible for such transfer after sixteen years.

The number of men serving over twenty years in 1940 had increased ten fold over 1930 and almost trebled over 1939, suggesting that the national emergency had caused them to be retained past the twenty year mark. The muster lists for this year also suggest that men were being recalled from the Fleet Reserve.

LEAVE AND LIBERTY

Leave and liberty policies remained unchanged. Leave up to thirty days a year could be granted if the needs of the command permitted. Liberty was granted on a port and starboard basis or in a three or four section arrangement. That is either every other day, two days out of three or three days out of four, depending on operational needs area or district regulations. Veterans of service in Hawaii at the time recall being given liberty but being restricted to the naval base because of lack of transportation to Honolulu.

UNIFORM AND GROOMING

Uniform regulations remained essentially unchanged save for the addition of new rating badges and the disappearance of those for disestablished ratings (although some sailmakers, disestablished in 1931 were still wearing their rating badges in 1944). On the other hand, uniform style remained quite dynamic. Official publications warned against the wearing of tailor made uniforms but photographs and the memory of veterans indicate that they were regularly purchased. Tailored uniforms tended to fit tighter, particularly the jumper. The regulation, and previously stylish, bloused sleeve was reduced in width. Trousers were altered to create true and often immense bells. The regulation flat hat, which had become much smaller after WWI, appears not to have been the subject of stylish alterations except for shaping the sides to fold downward. Despite regulations sailors on liberty simply did not wear their hats squared. Two liberty styles were common: wearing the hat lower on the forehead than was called for in the regulations or wearing it on the back of the head, a style which was considered more offensive by most shore patrolmen.

Hair and beard regulations remained unchanged. The beard had, by 1940, gone out of style. Photographs of naval personnel of all ranks reveal few if any bearded men and only a few with mustaches. Some senior marines, officer and enlisted, still boasted bristling Prussian style "handlebars."

Many restrictions were applied to the wearing of dungarees; they could be worn only by engineers and men performing dirty work topside. Dungarees were never authorized as uniform of the day, nor for off duty wear, nor for wear on a naval shore station, except for dirty work. These regulations could be interpreted widely and the term "dungaree Navy" was already in use to indicate types of ships where dungarees were, if not uniform of the day, worn by everyone during working hours. On the other hand some commanding officers chose to consider some rather dirty work as not requiring dungarees and many sailors of the thirties can remember painting in undress whites or blues. Restrictions as to dungarees were applied more rigorously in port than at sea. Nonetheless in many ships "knock off work" meant shifting into undress blues or whites or being denied access to the mess decks.

Seabag 1940:

Outfit	All other enlisted men	Outfit	All other enlisted men
Aprons, cooks	2 ^a	Leggings, pair	1
Belt, woven, black	1 ^b	Mattress	1
Blankets, pair	1	Mattress covers	2
Blacking outfit	1	Neckkerchiefs	1
Broom, whisk	1	Overcoat	1
Brush, scrub	1	Overshoes	1 ^c
Brush, tooth	1	Pillows	1 ^d
Brush, hair	1	Pillow covers	2 ^e
Cap, complete	1	Raincoat	1 ^f
Cap, covers, blue and white		Rating badges, as required by petty officers	
Cap, watch	1	Sewing kit, as required	1
Clothes, soap, package	3	Shirts, chambray	2 ^g
Coat, blue		Shirts, flannel	
Coat, white		Shirts, white	
Comb, hair	1	Shoes, pair	2 ^h
Cravat		Shoes, gymnasium	
Drawers, heavy	2 ⁱ	Socks, cotton	4
Drawers, light or medium	4	Socks, woolen	2 ^j
Dungarees, suits	2 ^k	Specialty marks, as required	
Gloves, woolen, pair	1 ^l	Toilet articles, outfit	1
Gloves, working, pair	1 ^m	Towels	2
Handkerchiefs	12	Trousers, blue	2
Hat, white	1	Trousers, white	4
Jacket, white	4 ⁿ	Trunks, bathing	1
Jacket, blue	1	Undershirts, heavy	2 ^o
Jumper, dress blue	1	Undershirts, light or medium	4
Jumper, undress blue	2	Waistcoat	1
Jumper, undress white	3		
Jeans	1		

^a Officers' mess attendants only.

^b One pair to be high.

^c As required.

^d Possession optional.

^e Possession optional except in rigorous climate, where issue may be directed in the discretion of the commanding officer.

^f For such ratings as are required to have.

^g For all ratings required to have dungarees.

^h For cooks, officers' cooks, bakers, and messmen.

AUTHORITY

By 1940 the military authority of petty officer and chief petty officers was well developed. With the exception of officers, cooks, and stewards all rated men were considered petty officers. Officially the distinction between petty officers of the line and petty officers had long since been erased. A strict precedence of ratings did, however, exist with boatswain's mate being the most senior rating. The precedence was no longer published in the Bluejackets Manual nor was information emphasizing this distinction. Seaman petty officers continued to wear their rating badges on the right arm.

All petty officers were subject to assignment as shore patrol and at least occasionally a machinist mate or water tender was assigned maste -at- arms duty. The disestablishment of masters at arms twenty years before had thrust many of the daily police and cleaning responsibilities on the senior petty officers of various parts of the ship so that they were the major representatives of authority for their subordinates.

The numbers of chief machinist mates and water tenders on board the sample vessels and the reduced numbers of warrant machinists suggests increased watch supervisor responsibilities had fallen on the shoulders of CPOs.

The Bluejackets' Manual continually and repeatedly stressed the importance of military duties over technical duties and constantly instructed recruits as to the importance of their petty officers.

GENERAL SUMMARY OF NAVAL DATA

Officers: Line: 26,220 CWO/WO: 3643
 Staff: 7,558
 Enlisted: 331,860

Serving Less than four years	192,125
Serving Four to eight years	60,693
Serving Eight to twelve years	47,465
Serving Twelve to sixteen years	19,700
Serving Sixteen to twenty years	6,636
Serving More than twenty years	5,041
Ships: as of June 30, 1950	671; as of June 1951
	1,102

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

At the beginning of 1950 the Navy was facing the need to maintain post-war commitments in the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Western Pacific. To maintain forces on station, ships were deployed for periods of four to six months. At the same time post war reductions in defense spending caused reductions in ships and in personnel. The personnel target for fiscal 1950 was 375,000 officers and enlisted people. The actual number as of June 30, 1950 was 381,538. Nonetheless, operational shortages of both officers and enlisted people were noted in the Secretary of the Navy's annual report. Especially severe was the lack of experience among junior officers.

Five days after the submission of SECNAV's annual report, the Korean War began and the Navy was committed to carrying out its missions in relation to that conflict which included:

1. Transport of Americans from the War zone and the transport into the zone of personnel and material.
2. Providing support for the land forces engaged in combat.
3. Maintaining a blockade on the entire Korean coast.
4. Insuring that no attacks were made on Formosa from the mainland of China and that the forces on the island made no attacks on the mainland.

Units from the Atlantic were shifted to the Pacific and vessels from the reserve force called up to augment the depleted Atlantic forces. At the same time a number of mothballed ships were hurriedly reactivated.

By January 1, 1951 the total personnel of the Navy numbered almost 800,000. This increase was affected by involuntary extension of enlistments, refusal to accept officer resignations, a refusal to permit retirements of persons with under thirty years service, recall of naval reservists (both voluntary and involuntary), inducting recruits from selective service and an aggressive recruiting campaign.

RANK AND RATE STRUCTURE

Officers (Line)

Fleet Admirals	3	1897 to 1907
Admiral	6	1910 to 1917
Vice Admiral	21	1912 to 1923
Rear Admiral	174	1912 to 1921
Captains	1807	1912 to 1931
Commanders	2903 1025	1922 to 1942 permanent appointment
Lt. Commanders	4879	1930 to 1943 Approx 1/4 permanent CWO or Enlist
Lieutenants	7707	1942 to 1944 Over 1000 permanent CWO, Enlist
Lieutenants(jg)	6411	1943 to 1944 Approx. 1/3 permanent CWO/Enlist
Ensigns	2811	1947 to 1949 Very few permanent CWO/Enlist

The staff corps had, during WWII, taken on the structure we have today. Supply Corps was headed by a vice admiral; Medicine, Chaplains, Civil Engineers and Dental all had rear admirals in charge. The Nurse Corps was headed by a captain and the senior member of the Medical Service Corps was a commander.

Warrants and Chief Warrants:

Chief Boatswains	435	1939 to 1947 59 Perm CWO; 9 Perm BSN; Remainder Perm. Enlisted*
Boatswains	95	1944 to 1945 34 Perm. BSN Remainder Perm. Enlisted
CGNR	262	1925 to 1947
Gunners	61	1944 to 1947
CTORP**	25	1943 to 1947
TORP	12	1944 to 1945

Chief Electricians	207	1942 to 1947
Electricians	65	1944 to 19a5
Chief Radio Electricians	298	1931 to 1947
Radio Electricians	65	1944 to 1945
Chief Machinists	536	1930 to 1947
Machinists	159	1930 to 1947
Chief Carpenter	357	1930 to 1947
Carpenter	18	1938 to 1945
Chief Ship's Clerk	133	1942 to 1947
Ship's Clerk	71	1944 to 1946
CAERO	133	1943 to 1947
AERO	3	1944
CPHOTO**	35	1942 to 1947
PHOTO	3	1945
CWOHC*	180	1942 to 1947 4 Perm WOHC 6 Perm enlistments
WOHC	20	1944 to 1945 All Permanent
Chief Pay Clerk	428	1943 to 1947
Pay Clerk	6	1944**
PACT	122	1944 to 1945 All Perm. enlisted.

*Unless noted otherwise the ratio of permanent appointments are relatively the same in all other CWO/WO categories.

**New Warrants; Torpedoman, Ship's Clerk, Aerographer, Photographer, Pharmacist has become Warrant Officer, Hospital Corps.

ENLISTED RATE STRUCTURE

The authorized ratings in 1950 were:

Boatswain's Mate (BM)	Machinery Repairman (MR)
Quartermaster (QM)	Interior Comm. Electrician (IC)
Sonorman (SO)	Pipefitter (PF)
Torpedoman's Mate (TM)	Damage Controlman (DC)
Gunnerymate (GM)	Metalsmith (ME)
Fire Controlman (FC)	Patternmaker (PM)
Fire Control Technician (FT)	Moulder (ML)
Radarman (RO)	Surveyor* (SV)
Mineman (MN)	Construction Electrician** (CE)
Electronic Technician (ET)	Construction Mechanic** (CM)
Instrumentman (IM)	Construction Draftsman* (CD)
Opticalman (OM)	Driver** (CD)
Teleman (TE)	Builder** (BU)
Radioman (RM)	Steelworker** (ST)
Cryptological Technician (CT)	Utilities Man** (UT)
Yeoman (YN)	Aviation Elect. Technician (AT)
Personnelman (PN)	Aviation Electronics Man (AL)
Storekeeper (SK)	Aviation Ordnanceman (AO)
Machine Accountant (MA)	Air Controlmen (AC)
Disbursing Clerk (DK)	Aviation Boatswain's Mate (AC)
Commissaryman (CS)	Aviation Electricians Mate (AE)
Ship's Serviceman (SN)	Aviatn. Structural Mechanic (AM)
Journalist (JO)	Aerographer's Mate (AG)
Lithographer (LI)	Aviation Machinist's Mate (AD)
Printer (PI)	Parachute Rigger (PR)
Draftsman (DM)	Training Deviceman (TD)
Musician (MU)	Aviation Storekeeper (AK)
Photographer's Mate (PH)	Hospital Corpsman (HM)
Machinist's Mate (MM)	Dental Technician (DT)
Engineman (EN)*	Steward (SD)

Non-rated

Airman (AN)
Seaman (SN)
Fireman (FN)
Hospitalman (HN)
Dentalman (DN)
Constructionman (CN)
Steward's Man (TN)

On Board Manning of USS New Jersey - 1950 - Officers

Captain	1		
Commander	6	Supply	1
LCdr.	4	Dental	1
Lt.	17	Chaplain	1

*Note EN has been re-established

**SeaBee ratings

Lt(jg) 33
 Ensigns 11

CWO/WO
 Gunner Chief Machinist
 Boatswain Chief Electrician
 Machinist
 Carpenter
 Radio Electrician
 Ship's Clerk
 Electrician
 Pay Clerk (ACT)

Enlisted

CPO	BM	3	MM	6	IC	3	YN	2	CS	
	QM		BT	10	FP		PH		SD	
	GM	7	EN	2	ME	3	DK			
	FC	3			ML	2	SK			
	FT				EM	6	PN			
	RD				ET	4	HM			
	QM(s)	2					RM			
							SH			
PO1	BM	5	MM	4	YN		ML	9	CS	7 AC
	GM	12	BT	10	PN	3	MR	2	SD	
	FC	5	EN		DK	2	EM	7		
	FT				SK	2	IC	2		
	QN(s)	2			SH	2	ME	3		
	RD	3			HM	3	ET	4		
					RM	2	FP			
					TE	2	DC			
PO2	BM	4	MM	9	ML	8	YN	2	CS	2 AK
	GM	13	BT	10	MR	6	SK	3	SD	2
	FC	9	EN	2	EM	9	DK	4		
	FT	3			IC		LI			
	QM	3			ET		TE	3		
	QM(s)	4			ME		PN			
	RD	5			FP		SH	6		
					DC		HM	2		
					ME	3				
PO3	BM	8	MM	3	MMR	2	HM	3	CS	5 AF
	QM	2	BT	7	MML	22	YN	3	CS(b)*	
	GM	24	EN	2	EM	2	SH	8	SD	2
	FC	12			DC	2	DK			
	QM(s)	3			EM	13	SK	3		
					ET	8	RM	2		
					FP		PN			
					ME	3	IC	3		
					TD					

*CS(b); Baker

Non Rated

<u>Strikers</u>	BM	5	MM	3	IC			
	GM	9	BT	4	MML	2	RM	2
	QM	4			IE	5	DK	CS 2
	FC	5			EM	2	SK	
	RD	7			PM		DN	
					SH	2	HN	
					ET	10		

Non-designated

SA/SN 197

FA/FN 199

TA/TN 30

The 1950 decennial point is extremely difficult to summarize. The National Defense Act of 1949 laid the ground work for a rather complete reorganization of the enlisted classification system. During WWII traditional ratings had been assigned to many specialized skills. An example was the use of the gunner's mate rating for CB powdermen. The expansion during the war years was so large, however, that it became necessary to create many new ratings. Some of these were conceived of as purely new war time or emergency ratings (a partial list included below). Others represented skill sub-categories in the more traditional ratings. Attempts to regularize the system were made more difficult with the recall of WWII veterans to meet the manpower needs created by the Korean War. Many men recalled still carried ratings which were no longer authorized, having been disestablished, changed or combined with other ratings. Thus the actual muster lists do not in every instance agree with the authorized ratings which appeared in standing publications such as uniform regulations, etc. 1950 is the first time that strikers are listed separately.

Ratings were no longer grouped in the older Deck, Engine, Artificer and Special branches. Officially the groupings were Deck, Ordnance, Electronics, Precision Equipment, Administration and Clerical, Miscellaneous, Engine and Hull, Construction, Aviation, Medical, Dental and Steward.

The last vestige of the "petty officer of the line" disappeared and precedence was no longer accorded to ratings, all petty officers taking precedence in terms of rate.

One must note a great expansion of ratings in the area previously categorized as artificer and in the administrative and clerical group, which reflected the increasing complexity of managing the modern fleet.

An example of combined ratings is that of the amalgamation of quartermaster, signalman and bugler. Given the fact that prior to the reorganization these were three distinct ratings (quartermaster and signalman having somewhat similar requirements but quite separate duties) it was necessary to continue to identify the actual skills held by each man using a parenthetical letter s or n to indicate signalman or navigation. Similar transitional devices were required in many other rating areas.

Emergency Service Ratings (Partial List)

Specialist C	Chaplain's Assistant
Specialist A	Athletic Instructor
Specialist F	Firefighter
Specialist H	Harbor Defense
Specialist I	Instructor
Specialist X	Miscellaneous
Specialist K	Telecommunications Censor

1950

Discipline non-Judicial Punishment

<u>CHARGES</u>	<u>BB</u>	<u>CV</u>	<u>CA/L</u>	<u>DD</u>	<u>AO*</u>	<u>ATF</u>
Total on Board	1349	2159	1004	257		63
DRUNK ON BOARD	10	1	19	--		-
DRUNK ASHORE	18	103	27	4		1
DISOBEDIENCE/	52	110	36	1		2
DISRESPECT/INSOLENCE	55	91	36	1		1
UNIFORM VIOLATIONS	7	57	18	4		1
THEFT OF CLOTHING	-	3	3	-		-
OTHER CLOTHING VIOL.	3	8	2	-		-
GOVERNMENT PROPERTY	5	2	3	-		-
DUTY-FAILURE/NEGLECT	69	156	42	1		7
INCOMPETENCE	-	1	-	-		-
FIGHTING	25	33	25	-		-
GAMBLING	7	--	-	-		-
LIBERTY CARD	12	48	9	-		-
SLEEPING	11	--	2	-		1
SMOKING	3	18	-	-		-
UA UNDER 1 DAY	175	330	71	32		16
UA OVER 1 DAY	149	150	74	10		1
MISCELLANEOUS	77	209	90	17		3
TOT NJP	668	1382	457	70		26
NJP RATE	50%	64%	46%	27%		41%

Overall NJP Rate 53%.

*Not Available.

The relative number of charges of fighting appear to have gone up as contrasted to earlier years. This may be a result of commands being less willing to let two disputing sailors "fight it out" or it may represent an actual increase in interpersonal friction on board during this period. Similar speculations may be in order when addressing charges of disobedience insolence or disrespect.

The range of punishments continues to narrow with fines, reductions in rating, and restriction on board being the most common. Confinement and confinement on bread and water or reduced rations appear much less frequently.

RECRUITING

Despite a decreasing overall strength the Navy, as of June 1950, fell approximately five thousand people short of its recruiting goals. The primary appeals were those which had worked in the past, skill training and job security. All enlistments were made in the ratings of seaman recruit for general service with those going into construction, aviation, engineering, dental, medical or steward branches being redesignated at the E-2 level.

Statistics on enlistments or re-enlistments have relatively little value after the beginning of the Korean War. Those in the service were involuntarily extended, reservists were extended and recalled. Many voluntary enlistments were in fact draft motivated, the Navy being a better alternative than the Army for many draft eligible males. A special one year emergency enlistment was authorized during this period which corresponded to the one year reserve call-up and one year involuntary extension.

TRAINING

Recruit training continued to be twelve weeks. The post recruit expectations were, however, far different from those in the years immediately before WWII. Ninety percent of A school students came directly from recruit training as contrasted to the pre-war policy of requiring sea service to establish A school eligibility. This practice had begun during WWII when manpower requirements did not permit the Navy to send large numbers of seamen apprentices to sea and then return them from their ships.

Although the training establishment had expanded almost astronomically during the war, it had now begun to retract. The Secretary of the Navy report for 1950 remarked on the loss of training services. The Korean War necessitated the reactivation of many recently abandoned training programs. There were however still many opportunities for a sailor to earn his rate at sea without "A" school training. In fact, the war had created two classes of petty officers recognized informally on the berth decks if not in formal policy; the "school" petty officers, those who earned their ratings while in school (usually about 10% of each class) and the "sea" petty officers who had earned their rates on the job without school background. Regular correspondence courses supervised by division CPOs or leading petty officers were available for all ratings and their satisfactory completion was required for advancement.

A complete list of Navy schools would be far too long for this context and in all probability would be incomplete.

ADVANCEMENT

Time-in-rate, and time-in-service requirements remained the same as those promulgated in 1940. During the war years these had been temporarily eased. Many petty officers were given temporary or acting appointments and in many cases both temporary and acting appointments.

The advancement process called for satisfying the time requirements and satisfactory completion of a correspondence, course at which time the sailor was recommended for advancement and declared eligible to take fleet-wide examinations. The examinations were made up and graded by the Bureau of Personnel.

Requirements for advancement to warrant officer status were unchanged as were the paths to commissioned status.

PAY AND RECOGNITION

Enlisted pay scales for 1950 were:

PASIC MONTHLY PAY OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL (BLUEJACKETS MANUAL 1950)

Cumulative Years of Service	PAY GRADE							
	E-7 (CPO)	E-6 (PO1)	E-5 (PO2)	E-4 (PO3)	E-3 (SN)	E-2 (SA)	E-1 ¹ (SR)	E-1 ² (SR)
Under 1	\$606.39	\$173.81	\$143.24	\$122.30	\$99.37	\$85.00	\$63.20	\$78.00
Over 1	\$606.39	\$173.81	\$143.24	\$122.30	\$107.02	\$85.00	\$63.20	—
Over 2	\$614.02	\$183.48	\$150.32	\$127.39	\$114.08	\$101.40	\$78.00	—
Over 3	\$621.68	\$191.10	\$158.17	\$134.21	\$122.30	\$109.20	\$85.00	—
Over 4	\$629.32	\$198.74	\$165.81	\$141.88	\$129.85	\$117.00	\$92.00	—
Over 5	\$636.96	\$206.39	\$173.48	\$149.32	\$137.39	\$124.80	\$99.00	—
Over 6	\$644.61	\$214.02	\$181.10	\$156.17	\$144.21	\$132.00	\$106.00	—
Over 7	\$652.25	\$221.68	\$188.74	\$163.81	\$151.88	\$139.00	\$113.00	—
Over 8	\$659.90	\$229.32	\$196.39	\$171.48	\$159.39	\$146.00	\$120.00	—
Over 9	\$667.54	\$236.96	\$204.02	\$179.10	\$166.88	\$153.00	\$127.00	—
Over 10	\$675.18	\$244.61	\$211.68	\$186.74	\$174.21	\$160.00	\$134.00	—
Over 11	\$682.82	\$252.25	\$219.32	\$194.39	\$181.88	\$167.00	\$141.00	—
Over 12	\$690.46	\$259.90	\$226.96	\$202.02	\$189.39	\$174.00	\$148.00	—
Over 13	\$698.10	\$267.54	\$234.59	\$209.68	\$196.88	\$181.00	\$155.00	—
Over 14	\$705.74	\$275.18	\$242.25	\$217.32	\$204.21	\$188.00	\$162.00	—
Over 15	\$713.38	\$282.82	\$249.90	\$224.96	\$211.88	\$195.00	\$169.00	—
Over 16	\$721.02	\$290.46	\$257.54	\$232.61	\$219.39	\$202.00	\$176.00	—
Over 17	\$728.66	\$298.10	\$265.18	\$240.25	\$226.88	\$209.00	\$183.00	—
Over 18	\$736.30	\$305.74	\$272.82	\$247.89	\$234.21	\$216.00	\$190.00	—
Over 19	\$743.94	\$313.38	\$280.46	\$255.54	\$241.88	\$223.00	\$197.00	—
Over 20	\$751.58	\$321.02	\$288.10	\$263.18	\$249.39	\$230.00	\$204.00	—
Over 21	\$759.22	\$328.66	\$295.74	\$270.82	\$256.88	\$237.00	\$211.00	—
Over 22	\$766.86	\$336.30	\$303.38	\$278.46	\$264.21	\$244.00	\$218.00	—
Over 23	\$774.50	\$343.94	\$311.02	\$286.10	\$271.88	\$251.00	\$225.00	—
Over 24	\$782.14	\$351.58	\$318.66	\$293.74	\$279.39	\$258.00	\$232.00	—
Over 25	\$789.78	\$359.22	\$326.30	\$301.38	\$286.88	\$265.00	\$239.00	—
Over 26	\$797.42	\$366.86	\$333.94	\$309.02	\$294.21	\$272.00	\$246.00	—
Over 27	\$805.06	\$374.50	\$341.58	\$316.66	\$301.88	\$279.00	\$253.00	—
Over 28	\$812.70	\$382.14	\$349.22	\$324.30	\$309.39	\$286.00	\$260.00	—
Over 29	\$820.34	\$389.78	\$356.86	\$331.94	\$316.88	\$293.00	\$267.00	—
Over 30	\$827.98	\$397.42	\$364.50	\$339.58	\$324.21	\$300.00	\$274.00	—

¹ Over 4 months.
² Under 4 months.

Quarters Allowances

Enlisted Pay Grade	B Monthly Basic Pay		C Enlisted Member's Minimum Contribution Less from Basic Pay	D Base Quarters Allowance (or Dependents)			E Minimum Amount of Monthly Allowance to Dependents C + D + E		
	Min.	Max.		1	2	over 2	1	2	over 2
E7 (CPO)	1406	1586	150	\$77.10	\$77.10	\$00.00	\$167.10	\$167.10	\$170.00
E6 (PO1)	173	150	0	\$77.10	\$77.10	\$0.00	\$137.10	\$137.10	\$138.00
E5 (PO2)	144	120	0	\$77.10	\$77.10	\$0.00	\$107.10	\$107.10	\$108.00
E4 (PO3)	114	100	0	\$77.10	\$77.10	\$0.00	\$77.10	\$77.10	\$78.00
E3 (SN)	80	134	0	\$11.30	\$77.10	\$65.80	\$11.30	\$117.10	\$134.00
E2 (SA)	53	144	0	\$11.30	\$77.10	\$65.80	\$11.30	\$117.10	\$134.00
E1 (SR)	7	8	0	\$11.30	\$77.10	\$65.80	\$11.30	\$117.10	\$134.00

Petty officers second class and petty officers third class with seven years service were eligible for allowances. In addition, incentive and hazardous duty pay was paid for participation in aerial flights, submarine service, glider flights, duty involving parachute jumping, intimate contact with lepers, explosive demolition, Navy Deep Sea Diving School or Navy Experimental Diving Unit. The rates of pay for these duties ranged from \$30.00 per month for E-1 to \$75.00 for E-7. All other hazardous duties were paid at the rate of \$50.00 per month regardless of rate.

Enlisted people also received extra pay for sea duty or foreign duty. This special pay had originally been computed as a percentage of base pay but in 1950 it was established as flat rate ranging from \$8.00 per month for E-1 to \$22.50 for E-7.

With commencement of hostilities in Korea combat pay was paid to personnel serving in the combat zones.

Medals and decorations for naval personnel included:

- Medal of Honor
- Navy Cross
- Distinguished Service Medal
- Silver Star
- Bronze Star
- Air Medal
- Navy Commendation Medal
- Purple Heart

Service medals had been authorized for:

- American Defense Service (pre-December 7, 1941)
- American Theater
- European, African Middle Eastern Theater
- Pacific, Asiatic Theater
- Occupation Service
- Navy Expeditionary Medal (Wake Island)
- China Service (Pre-war service)

A campaign medal was authorized for Korean Service and American servicemen were, for the first time, authorized to wear a foreign service medal; the United Nations Medal.

WWII had also seen the birth of unit citations which in 1950 included the Presidential Unit Citation and the Navy Unit Citation.

RETIREMENT

Retirement policy remained unchanged. However the option of the twenty year transfer to the fleet Reserve was at least temporarily closed because of the Korean emergency. The number of enlisted personnel serving more than twenty years was in 1950 still a very small percentage (1.5%) of the total force.

ASSIGNMENT

Basic policy still called for six years of sea duty before a sailor was eligible for shore duty. The number of ratings created to meet wartime needs which were essentially administrative or support oriented had forced the development of a number of exceptions. CBs of course did not rotate sea to shore but from CONUS to foreign bases.

A number of ships were permanently home ported in Japan and in Europe and their crews were permitted to extend on board indefinitely in the manner of the old "China Fleet."

The drastic reductions in both manpower and ships and the intense post war operational schedules often required that sailors with sufficient obligated service be transferred from ship to ship in forward areas or be transferred from ships in CONUS to man those beginning a deployment. The Korean conflict tended to exacerbate these situations.

UNIFORM

In the main, the decade between 1940 and 1950 saw little observable change in the design of the enlisted uniform. The practice of cutting off the old style jumper finally became official and the uniform was issued in this style. The trousers however remained the same; full legged, drop fly with thirteen buttons. The wearing of insignia, however, was very different and reflected the organizational changes in enlisted classification.

The red and white branch or watch marks, which had existed since the turn of the century, were abandoned in favor of short stripes worn on the upper left arm of non-rated personnel. Seamen, hospital men, dental technicians and stewardsmen wore white stripes. The latter three with a "striker's badge" or specialty insignia above.

Airmen wore green stripes; Constructionmen, blue; and firemen, red. All non-rated people wore specialty marks when they were designated as strikers.

In the past the first three pay grades had been indicated by the number of stripes on the cuff.

The most dramatic and probably impactful change was the abandonment of the left and right arm distinctions. All rating badges were worn on the left arm. Service stripes or "hash" marks were worn as in the past on the lower left sleeve. As in the past, first class and chief petty officers, with a record of twelve years good conduct, wore gold lace rating badges and stripes. (As compared to the present time, gold chevrons were relatively rare in 1950.)

There were twenty-four enlisted distinguishing marks ranging from sonar operator and expert lookout to master diver and mount captain. These were worn on the lower right sleeve as in the past. The practice was already changing, however, inasmuch as the old style distinguishing mark for submariners had been converted to a pin-on device to be worn on the left breast. A similar device had been developed during WWII to identify combat air crewmen.

Since the close of WWII various experimental uniforms had been suggested and some had been tested but none met with approval of enlisted personnel nor the naval establishment.

Dungarees were issued to all recruits and worn in most working situations at sea and ashore. They had not generally made their appearance as uniform of the day in offices and most larger ships and shore stations required donning undress blues for evening meals and after working hours, at least while in port. Their almost universal use during WWII had made them considerably more accepted than in the pre-war years.

Grooming regulations remained unchanged. Mustaches and beards were permitted with the proviso, as before, that they be neatly trimmed and short and non-eccentric. Facial hair had gone out of style in both civil and military life. Facial hair is seldom seen in illustrations from the period. The growing of full beards had become fashionable in the Southwest Pacific during WWII but did not long survive once the wearers returned to the clean shaven CONUS.*

It should be noted that although recruits were no longer issued hammocks, as was the practice up to and during WWII, they were still given the traditional regulation seabag which, because of its size, required that uniform items be folded, rolled and tied.

Non-regulation uniforms were still forbidden, although sailors continued to buy and wear them on liberty. Civilian clothing could be worn ashore in CONUS but could not be kept aboard ship.

AUTHORITY

The reorganization of enlisted classification had great impact on the distribution of authority. The abandonment of rating precedence meant that all authority stemmed from rate, for the first time separating rating and rate as determiners of authority in the enlisted force. In addition many new ratings were created, some of which specialized in tasks which had not heretofore been considered as "rated" (e.g., ship's serviceman, which included tailoring, barbering, laundry operation, and other jobs which had previously been delegated to non-rated men and in some cases carried on as quasi-free enterprises). The sudden loss of precedence rules at a time when many new ratings were created left no time to develop an informal system. Nonetheless the old system operated informally long after the reorganization as neither enlisted people nor officers surrendered old habits easily. In 1950 one rarely saw an MAA, for example, who was not a boatswain's mate or gunner's mate or at least one of the traditional right arm rates.

One is forced to speculate that the high incidence of charges of fighting and of disobedience, insolence and disrespect may have been expressions of the uncertainty and confusion about status which the change engendered.

*There is little doubt that the negative reactions of wives, girlfriends and family was important as Naval Regulations in discouraging the practice.

General Summary of Naval Data

Officers: Line: 37,716	CWO/WO: 4084
Staff: 14,926	
Enlisted: 544,040	
Serving Less than four years	296,958
Serving Four to eight years	87,691
Serving Eight to twelve years	40,689
Serving Twelve to sixteen years	54,976
Serving eighteen to twenty-two years	31,406
Serving twenty-two to thirty years	3,005
Serving over thirty years	304
Ships: 864	

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

The Navy continued to meet operational commitments in the Pacific and Mediterranean by maintaining forward deployed units on station at all times. This required the regular deployment of some forces and the permanent deployment of certain other ships and units.

Units of the Pacific fleet were involved in the atomic tests conducted in the Micronesian areas. Americans were evacuated from Nicaio, Cuba due to the civil war. Naval units conducted flood relief in Morocco and Uruguay and provided relief in the Ryukyus after the town of Konika was swept by fire.

Although the Secretary of Defense's report for this year reports certain manpower problems, the fleet was manned at 81% of normal complement. The outstanding problem was lack of experience among junior officers. At least 60,000 senior enlisted men were in the zone eligible for transfer to the Fleet Reserve or would attain that status within four years. Concern with personnel issues is indicated in SecDef Report which discusses expansion of personnel research.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Officers (Line)		
Fleet Admirals	1	1897
Admiral	8	1919 to 1923
Vice Admiral	28	1919 to 1929
Rear Admiral	209	1919 to 1933
Captains	2518	1929 to 1942
Commanders	5898	1932 to 1955
Lt. Commanders	7770	1935 to 1947
Lieutenants	8844	1932 to 1955
Lieutenants(jg)	14591	1943 to 1959
Ensigns	6693	1954 to 1959

The Navy register records fifty two different officer source codes in use at this period.

Staff:		
Medical	3212	(13 RAdm)
Supply	4701	(17 RAdm)
Chaplain	816	(2 RAdm)
CEC	1588	(6 RAdm)
Dental	1568	(4 RAdm)
MSC	1728	
Nurse	1313	

In addition each community also had on active duty a number of officer designated TAR (Training and Administration of Reserves); totaling 1897.

Warrant officer and chief warrant officers are no longer identified in the Navy register in separate designator lists but simply recorded by pay grades, which have been expanded to include one grade of warrant (W-1) and three grades of chief or commissioned warrant (W-2-3-4).

The CWO/WO designators authorized in 1960 were:

- Aviation Operations Technician
- Boatswain
- Aviation Ordnance Technician
- Surface Ordnance Technician)
- Control Ordnance Technician) Same Insignia
- Underwater Ordnance Technician)
- Mine Warfare Technician) Same Insignia
- Aviation Maintenance Technician
- Machinist
- Electrician
- Aviation Electronic Technician
- Communication Technician)
- Electronics Technician) Same Insignia
- Ship Repair Technician (formerly Carpenter)
- Ship's Clerk
- Band Master
- Supply Clerk
- Medical Service Warrant)
- Dental service Warrant) Same Insignia
- Aerographer
- Photographer
- CEC Warrant

It had been decided to abandon the warrant officer program. This coincided with the establishment of the senior and master chief petty officer grades. CWO/WO billets were to be filled by LDOs and master chief petty officers.

[illegible]

In addition a number of emergency service ratings held by USNR personnel were still authorized.

The most significant change in enlisted structure, however, was the establishment of pay grades E-8 and E-9, senior and master chief petty officer. It should be noted that not all lower grade ratings had a direct progression to master chief petty officer, a situation which paralleled, in part, the structure of the pre-1930 period when ratings were often authorized only at a single pay grade, which we can equate to a level of skill required in the fleet.

Muster list aircraft carrier 1960 records no longer identify officers on board by rank, using billets instead. There were 156 ship's company officers and CWO/WOs.

Enlisted

	DECK	ORD	ELEC	ENG+HULL	ADMIN	MISC	AVIA	MED DENT	STEW
CPO	BM 2	GM 2	ET 4	MM 3	YN 3	--	AK 3	HM 2	SD 3
	SM 1	FT 2		BT 5	PN 2		AB 10	DT 1	
	RD 4	NW 3		EM 7	RM 1		AO 3		
				IC 1	DK 1		PR 1		
				SF 3	SK 2		PT		
				DC 3	SH 2		AM 2		
				MR 1	TE 1				
					CS 3				
PO1	BM 16	GM 3	ET 5	MM 4	YN 3		AK	HM 8	SD 8
	QM 1	FT 2		BT 13	PN 2		AB 19	DT 1	
	SM 1	NW 4		MR 1	RM 4		AT		
	RD 4			EM 7	DK 2		AO 10		
				IC 2	SK 6		AD 2		
				SF 4	LI 1		AE 1		
				EN 1	SH 6		AM		
				DC 4	TE 2		AD 2		
					CS 7		AG		
							PH		
							PT		
PO2	BM 21	GM 3	ET 2	MM 33	YN 6	--	AK 4	HM 6	SD 16
	QM	FT 2	ETN 2	MR 1	PN 3		AG 2		
	SM 2	FTM 2		EN 1	LI 2		PR 1		
	RD 6	NW 4		EM 18	SK 8		AME 3		
				BT 17	SKG 7		AB 24		
				IC 7	DK 2		AT 1		
				SFM 3	TE 2		AD 2		
				SFP 2	SH 14		AO 13		
				DC 5	RM 3		PH 5		
					CS 2		AK 4		
							AMM 3		
							AMS 5		

	DECK	CRO	ELEC	ENG+HULL	ADMIN	MISC	AVIA	MED DENT	STEW
PO3	BM 32	GM 16	ETR 3	MM 11	YN 13		AK 8	HM 3	26
	QM 1	FTM 2	ETN 3	BT 27	YNT 4		AG 8	DT 1	
	SM 4	FTA 6		EM 42	PN 3		AMM 3		
	RD 16	FTL 1		IC 17	PNA 5		ADR 5		
		NW 5		EN 6	RM 16		ADJ 3		
				SFM 2	LI 1		ATR 1		
				SFP 7	SH 15		ATN 3		
				MR 3	CS 3		AO 20		
				DC 9	JO 4		ACT 3		
					SK 12		AGF 1		
					SLG 1		AB 14		
					DK 2		ABU 11		
							AEM "		
							PHG 4		

DESIGNATED STRIKERS

E-3	QM	GM 4	ETN 3	MM 33	PN	AK 3	HN 9	TN 38
(SN, FN,	SM 2	FTM 1	ETR 16	BT 17	SK 2	AG 6	DN 4	
AN, DN,	RD 16	FTA 3		EM 33	RM 19	AME 5		
HN, TN)				SF 2	SH 1	AMM		
				IC 9	LI	AMS 3		
				DC 1	CS	ABU 13		
				MR 2		ABG 5		
						AD 3		
						ATR		
						ADJ 6		
						ADR 1		
						ATM		
						AQ		
						PH 7		

E-2	BM 5	GM	ETR	MM 9	YN	ABG 4	--	TA 5
(SA, FA,	QM	FTA 2		BT 3	RM 8	AMS		
AA, DA,	RD 5			EM 2	SH	PR		
HA, TA)				EN				
				SFM				
				SFP				
				IC 6				

NON-DESIGNATED

E-3	585	136	297
E-2	177	177	82
E-1	10		2

ONE UNIDENTIFIED AVIATION RATING GROUP;

CPC 3	CF1 5	CF2 5
CF3 11	CFAN 2	CFAA 1

RECRUITING

All enlistments were made for general service at the rate of seaman recruit. Some guarantees were made for further training in a specific area, but these were not totally binding on the service. All recruits were required to complete recruit training even if enlisted for a specific branch. In addition to four and six year first enlistments and the traditional minority enlistment, a two year enlistment was also offered. This paralleled the two year period required of draftees. These two year enlistments were in the USNR and in 1960 approximately 13,000 sailors were in this status.

During this period many first enlistments were draft motivated. Post service educational benefits were also an important factor in encouraging enlistment although they were offered to veterans of all services whether drafted or volunteer.

Recruiting appeals continued to be centered around the opportunity to learn useful skills.

TRAINING

Recruit training was twelve weeks. More than half of the graduates of recruit training went on to various "A" schools before going to sea. Many ratings, particularly the older ones, could provide adequate on-the-job training, but an increasing number of technical rates required school training before on-the-job training was practical.

Rate training manuals and correspondence courses were available for use on board ship. In addition the Education and Information program published texts on a wide variety of subjects which could be used as correspondence courses through the USAFFI system or as self study texts. Many ships and stations used these texts as the basis for regular classes conducted by personnel on board who were qualified.

ADVANCEMENT

The basic requirements for advancement remained unchanged.

At the completion of recruit training (or four months naval service) the seaman recruit was automatically advanced to SA, FA, AA, CA, DA, HA or TA. After six months at that grade, a sailor was eligible for advancement to SN, FN, AN, CN, DN, HN, or TN upon passing a locally administered examination and being recommended by the commanding officer.

General requirements for further advancement were:

1. Have the needed length of service.

E-3 to PO-3	-	6 months
PO-3 to PO-2	-	12 months
PO-2 to PO-1	-	24 months
PO-1 to CPO	-	36 months*
E-7 to E-8	-	4 years, 11 years total service
E-8 to E-9	-	1 year, 13 years total service**

2. Qualifying proficiency marks in rate and conduct.

3. Navy training or correspondence course.

4. When required, complete a course of instruction at school.

5. Qualify in required practical factors.

6. Commanding officer recommendation.

7. Pass a service-wide examination.

With the disestablishment of warrants the paths to commissioned status were either through the Naval Academy (enlisted quota 160), NROTC (200), Integration Program, limited duty officer, naval aviation cadet, aviation officer and NESEP.

Requirements for the Integration Program were:

Age 21 to 24

Service: At least 3 years USN

Education: 30 credits college or H.S. with GCT.ARI 60 or above.

Those accepted went to General Line Officer Candidate School in Newport, Rhode Island.

LDO requirements were:

Service: At least 8 years

Grade: PO1 or higher

Age: Below 34

Education: H.S. or equivalent.

*Appointments as CPO were acting for 12 months before becoming permanent.

**to be increased to 2 years in 1963.

The Naval Cadet Program required:

Education: 2 years college
Service: 1 year service
Age: 18 - 24
Status: Unmarried
Obligation: 3-1/2 years after graduation.

Twenty percent of the entrants were enlisted people.

AOC was open to enlisted personnel but its basic educational requirement was a bachelor's degree, so few in fact entered.

NESEP: Navy Enlisted Scientific Education Program requirements:

1. E-2 or above
2. Under 25
3. H.S. graduate

Appointees received a four year college education followed by OCS and commissioning as an ensign.

ASSIGNMENT AND ROTATION

Initial assignment to either the Atlantic or Pacific Fleet was made by the Bureau of Personnel. Fleet commanders made further assignments to type commanders who made a final assignment decision to a ship or squadron.

Rotation between sea and shore duty was governed by a program established in 1957: Seavey; Shorevey.

In this program a specified tour of sea duty was established for each rate and when this had been served a sailor was automatically identified as eligible for shore duty. Transfer ashore could be expected within 4 to 15 months.

Normal shore tours ranged from 12 to 36 months, averaging 24. Requests for changes of duty outside this rotation were accepted but not encouraged. Assignments to foreign shore duty were controlled by Fleet Commanders.

Prior to being put on eligibility lists, sailors submitted a form indicating desired duty but no guarantee was made by the Navy. Veterans of this period recall that despite seavey, shorevey intentions, sea tours were often extended well beyond the expected period.

RETIREMENT

Retirement policy remained basically unchanged: eligibility for transfer fleet reserve after 20 years (actually 19-1/2) and full retirement at thirty years. The Navy was quite candid in stating that most active enlisted careers ended at the twenty year point. The new rates of senior and master chief petty officer were intended to make a thirty year career more attractive.

It should be noted that the late 50's and early 60's marked the 20th anniversaries of a unique cohort of senior enlisted people; those who joined in the years before WWII and made CPO before 1945, thus having up to fifteen years of service as CPOs (many as temporary warrants or officers) as well as more continuous operational time under war time conditions than any group of sailors since the Royal Navy during the Napoleonic Wars.

LEAVE AND LIBERTY

Leave and liberty policy is spelled out in the 1960 Bluejacket's Manual more clearly than in earlier editions, although the policy remains largely the same.

Leave was earned at the rate of 2-1/2 days a month up to a maximum of 60 days. Commanding officers could grant advance leave and/or excess leave in special cases. At the end of an enlistment a sailor with unused earned leave on the books was paid a day's pay plus leave ration for each day. If an enlistment ended with a sailor having taken more leave than he earned his final checkage was adjusted to reimburse the government.

Although it is not stated, liberty had, in the decade since 1950, become more of a right than a privilege, although still controlled by the commanding officer. Depending on the situation, liberty could be granted on a port and starboard, three-section, four-section or even six-section basis. In special cases absence of 72 or even 96 hours could be counted as liberty. Running watch standers such as signalmen, radiomen, or those whose duties did not change when in port, such as cooks and bakers, were regularly granted early liberty.

Liberty cards were issued to all personnel and distributed to the liberty party by the division liberty card petty officer.

UNIFORM

1960 uniform regulations begin to demonstrate some dramatic departures from prior periods. At this time two types of dress and undress blue trousers were authorized: type A with the traditional drop flap fly, and type B with a zipper fly and pockets. Although the undress blue and undress white uniforms were still regulation, an additional feature had been added to the enlisted sea bag: a short sleeve white shirt which could be worn with white trousers as "summer whites." In addition to the pea coat, a raincoat had been added.

The blue "flat hat" was no longer an item in the sea bag.

Dungarees were general issue and their use even less restricted than before. Stenciled rating badges without specialty marks were required on dungaree shirts. The traditional chambray shirt was being replaced with a less conventional shirt design. Blue working caps were authorized at the discretion of the commanding officer and a blue working jacket had been introduced.

For the first time in many years uniform regulations authorized tailor made uniforms. Sailors could have dress blues made of serge, gaberdine or tropical worsted. Such uniforms were required to match regulations in all other features and sailors were required to keep issue uniforms for inspection and ceremonial occasions. It should be noted that "tailor made," as used by enlisted personnel, meant any uniform not issued to them or purchased in an official uniform shop. Most were in fact manufactured and sold off the rack.

Civilian clothing was prohibited aboard ship but could be kept aboard naval activities ashore if authorized by the commanding officer. Civilian clothing could be worn on liberty and to and from shore activities when authorized.

Grooming regulations remained unchanged; hair closely trimmed and not to exceed three inches. Short neat mustaches and beards were permitted. In practice most of the Navy, both commissioned and enlisted, remained clean shaven.

GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE

The implementation of the Universal Code of Military Justice in 1951 changed many of the customary procedures and expectations of captain's mast. The punishments which could be awarded in this non-judicial context were limited and even more restricted for commanding officers of lower ranks. The procedural safeguards were more complex and the appeal process more effective.

At first glance the figures for captain's mast in 1960 suggest that UCMJ improved good order and discipline. However a number of factors must be considered.

Because of the greater burden of administrative paper work associated with captain's mast, there is no question that commands were more reluctant to bring offenses to captain's mast than in the past. One device for avoiding this was to screen cases before they went to the commanding officer. By late 1951 the practice of holding an executive officer's mast or screening was universal. This served to eliminate many cases which in previous times would have gone forward to the captain. Estimates by former executive officers and commanding officers are that at least fifty percent of the offenders did not go to mast; receiving counseling or a warning or having the case dismissed by the executive officer. Thus, for purposes of comparison, the number of offenses brought to mast would have to be doubled in 1960.

In addition, peer pressure in the CPO mess tended to reduce the number of mast cases. Veterans of this period agree that putting a man on report was admitting that "you couldn't handle your people" and at the very least made a CPO the butt of jokes from his shipmates. A CPO who repeatedly put men on report was considered to be a poor chief.

Finally, the additional paper work required and the time lost from work when one became involved in a mast case tended to discourage use of the non-judicial system except when no other course of action was available. One must also consider that unfamiliarity with the new system perhaps added to the reluctance on the part of officers and senior enlisted men to put a man on report. All officers above the rank of lieutenant had spent most of their careers under the old system. Many lieutenants and at least some lieutenants (jg) were in a similar situation. One can surmise that many CPOs had attained that rate prior to 1951 and all had served under the old system.

One cannot help but note the increase in mast cases involving disrespect, insolence and disobedience. Overall fifteen percent of the cases brought to mast involved these charges. This contrasts to about five percent in 1910 and 1920. In the case of the aircraft carrier examined, the number of charges for disobedience, insolence and disrespect exceeds the number of cases of over leave for less than one day. This may be an artifact of the executive officer screening procedure, inasmuch as one suspects short periods of overleave might well be dismissed and let off with a warning while more serious cases went forward to mast.

1960

<u>CHARGES</u>	<u>BB</u>	<u>CV</u>	<u>CA/L</u>	<u>DD</u>	<u>AO**</u>	<u>ATF</u>
Total on Board		3198	407*	257	201	63
DRUNK ON BOARD		11	11	1	--	-
DRUNK ASHORE		21	7	3	13	-
DISOBEDIENCE/		168	4	7	11	1
DISRESPECT/INSOLENCE		97	3	3	11	2
UNIFORM VIOLATIONS		1	4	2	--	-
THEFT OF CLOTHING		4	--	-	--	-
OTHER CLOTHING VIOL.		4	--	-	--	-
GOVERNMENT PROPERTY		9	--	-	--	-
DUTY-FAILURE/NEGLECT		125	3	3	11	-
INCOMPETENCE		--	--	-	--	-
FIGHTING		38	2	-	--	-
GAMBLING		4	--	-	--	-
LIBERTY CARD		2	4	1	--	-
SLEEPING		3	3	-	--	-
SMOKING		1	--	-	1	-
UA UNDER 1 DAY		132	11	16	20	1
UA OVER 1 DAY		182	10	15	5	2
MISCELLANEOUS		112	8	11	11	1
TOT NJP		952	70*	63	83	7
NJP RATE		29%	17%	26%	41%	11%

Overall NJP Rate 29%. (Estimated offenses: 60%)

*Records extremely inaccurate and inconsistent numbers shown are minimum possible.

**Estimate

AUTHORITY

Since before WWI the Bluejacket's Manual had, in every edition, stressed the dual nature of naval service; technical and military, and most particularly the military leadership responsibilities of petty officers.

The 1960 edition on the other hand made little specific mention of this subject. This does not indicate a conscious change in policy but more probably an assumption that the authority and responsibility of the petty officer was so obvious that it did not need to be discussed in great length. Nonetheless, entering recruits in this period did not have, in clear written form, as forceful a statement of the authority of petty officer as had earlier cohorts.

On the other hand, the BJM provided in considerable detail an account of the technical responsibilities of each rating. In the chapter on "Military Facts," the subjects discussed were limited to military drill, sentry watches, guard duty and security watches. The chapter on leadership and discipline provides only a general discussion of leadership and followship. The appendix contains a reprint of General Order 21 issued by the Secretary of the Navy in 1958 which addressed the issue of leadership in the most general terms. Its stated objective was to reemphasize and revitalize (emphasis added) naval leadership in all its aspects; inspirational, technical, and moral. The focus of the order however was on introducing modern concepts of management and executive development and did not, in any specific way, address the issue of responsibility or authority.

In practice there would seem to have been some breakdown of petty officer authority if the increase in charges of insubordination, insolence and disobedience are indeed evidence of tensions in the enlisted force. Prior to UCMJ many offenses of this nature would have been handled at the division CPO level by simply assigning extra duty or withholding the offender's liberty card.

Structural evidence for the patterns of authority is, at best, speculative, but a number of issues must be considered. There is for instance, in a number of documentary sources, a curious deemphasis of rank as contrasted with technical specialty. This is to be seen in the format of the Bluejackets Manual and even more clearly in the muster lists of ships of the time in which officers are listed not by rank but by billet. General order 21 itself suggests that the naval hierarchy felt some discomfort at the quality of leadership and the general state of good order and discipline. The creation of a number of new ratings since 1949, as well as the apparently gradual abandonment of the precedence of ratings, created a situation in which the roles and responsibilities of petty officers must have been, as compared to previous periods, somewhat unclear.

The actual ratio of experienced sailors to inexperienced seems not to have changed dramatically, but the ratio of commissioned officers to enlisted, had dropped from approximately 1 to 14 in 1940 to 1 to 9, which suggests that authority in commissioned ranks, particularly mid and junior level officers, was becoming more defused. It may also indicate that junior

officers were becoming more involved with day-to-day technical and personnel management issues on the divisional level, thus in effect deposing chief and senior petty officers. The creation of the senior and master chief grades also raised questions of responsibility and authority. It should be repeated that the Navy was experiencing a large scale loss of experienced senior enlisted who had entered the service in the year prior to WWII and that their replacements did not have the same background or experience.

In summary the patterns of authority which had developed in the two and half decades prior to WWII and remained intact as an organizational model throughout the war and immediate post war years appears to have been undergoing some changes.

General Naval Data

Officers: Line: 61,258 (included 543 female)
 Staff: 20,400 (included 2316 female)
 TAR: 1,813
 CWO/WO: 4,395 (included 12 female)

Enlisted: 679,021 (male)
 5,405 (female)

Serving Less than two years	215,444
Serving Less than three years	103,839
Serving Less than four years	71,297
Serving Less than six years	38,881
Serving Less than eight years	25,411
Serving Less than ten years	23,535
Serving Less than 12 years	21,189
Serving Less than 14 years	20,221
Serving Less than 16 years	31,333
Serving Less than 18 years	20,012
Serving Less than 20 years	22,041
Serving Less than 26 years	7,809
Serving Less than 30 years	4,329
Serving More than 30 years	253
Ships in commission:	932

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

The Navy was involved in operations in the Viet Nam conflict. The Seventh Fleet consisted of 200 ships. Three carriers were maintained on Yankee Station conducting round the clock flight operations. In addition, Naval vessels were involved in interdiction of the coast of North Viet Nam (operation SEA DRAGON). The coasts of South Viet Nam were under surveillance of operation MARKET TIME while riverine forces carried out similar duties as part of operation GAME WARDEN. Ships of the Seventh Fleet were underway 78% of the time.

Amphibious forces conducted numerous landing operations. The Atlantic Fleet provided units for service in Southeast Asia on a rotational basis while the Sixth Fleet maintained fifty ships on station in the Mediterranean.

In addition there were three major fleet exercises underway: Blue Lotus, off southern California; Coral Sands II, on Molokai; and Springboard in the Caribbean. The last was carried out in cooperation with the navies of Canada, Germany, Ecuador, Brazil and the Netherlands.

Naval vessels and personnel provided disaster relief in the southern United States following hurricanes and tornadoes; in Sicily after an earthquake; and rescued the crews of several vessels in distress in the South China Sea, Caribbean and Atlantic.

The U.S.S. New Jersey had been recently recommissioned for service in the Viet Nam area and subsequently decommissioned.

First term re-enlistments had dropped to 20% among volunteers and 10% among draftees. Career(second or subsequent) re-enlistments were declining.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Officers (Line) URL

Admiral	8	1933 to 1938
Vice Admiral	39	1931 to 1941
Rear Admiral	181	1930 to 1944
Captain	2519	1937 to 1953
Commander	5143	1941 to 1956
Lt. Commander	7765	1942 to 1962
Lieutenant	7700	1940 to 1965
Lieutenant (jg)	14299	1958 to 1968
Ensign	7469	1968 to 1969

EDO

RAdm	15	1935 to 1941
Captain	200	1938 to 1949
Commander	254	1935 to 1956
Lt. Commander	353	1949 to 1961
Lieutenant	193	1955 to 1966
Lieut. (jg)	99	1963 to 1968
Ensign	57	1961 to 1968

AERO - EDO

V Adm	1	1934
RAdm	7	1939 to 1941
Captain	82	1940 to 1956
Commander	163	1944 to 1956
Lt. Commander	178	1950 to 1959
Lieutenant	54	1944 to 1966
Lieut. (jg)	36	1957 to 1967
Ensign	12	1966 to 1969

CRYPTO

RAdm	1	1934
Captain	39	1933 to 1947
Commander	94	1936 to 1956
Lt. Commander	188	1944 to 1962
Ensign	47	1968 to 1969

ORD-ENC

RAdm	2	1932 to 1943
Captain	13	1934 to 1948
Commander	46	1943 to 1956
Lt. Commander	39	1943 to 1961
Lieutenant	7	1947 to 1958

TOTAL LINE: 48,330

LIMITED DUTY (21 Designators)

INTEL

RAdm	1	1940
Captain	38	1939 to 1947
Commander	91	1943 to 1957
Lt. Commander	255	1942 to 1962
Lieutenant	232	1949 to 1966
Lieut. (jg)	226	1965 to 1968
Ensign	108	1968 to 1969

PHOTO

Captain	3	
PAO		
Captain	17	1941 to 1945
Commander	33	1942 to 1955
Lt. Commander	67	1959 to 1966
Lieutenant	45	1959 to 1966
Lieut. (jg)	13	1955 to 1968
Ensign	9	1968 to 1969

GEOPHYS

Captain	29	1932 to 1948
Commander	58	1942 to 1956
Lt. Commander	72	1942 to 1962
Lieutenant	16	1965 to 1968
Ensign	108	1968 to 1969

Commander	201	939 to 1945	Lt. Commander	560	1939 to 1948 (a few ex-enlisted)
Lieutenant	4227	1936 to 1954 (all ex-enlisted)	Lieut. (jg)	209	1946 to 1956 (all ex-enlisted)
Ensign	162	1954 to 1955 (all ex-enlisted)			

CWG/WO

W-4	523	1935 to 1950	W-3	46	1940 to 1947
W-2	2324	1944 to 1959	W-1	1739	1954 to 1960 (none from 1960 to 1968)

Female Officers were classified separately and included:

Captain	10	Lieutenant	154
Commander	33	Lieut. (jg)	166
Lt. Commander	86	Ensign	135

Officers on active for training and administration of reserves included:

RAdm	3		
Captain	139	Lieutenant	440
Commander	423	Lieut. (jg)	42
Lt. Commander	562		

STAFF

The Medical Corps consisted of 4629 officers headed by one vice admiral and fourteen rear admirals.

The Supply Corps consisted of 5840 officers (including 440 LDOs) headed by eighteen rear admirals plus 17 women.

The Civil Engineer Corps consisted of 1970 officers (including 91 LDOs) headed by two rear admirals.

The Judge Advocate Generals Corps consisted of 747 officers headed by two rear admirals.

The Chaplains Corps consisted of 1073 Officers headed by two rear admirals.

The Dental Corps consisted of 1955 officers headed by two rear admirals.

The Medical Service Corps consisted of 1614 officers with six captains.

The Nurse Corps consisted of 2277 officers with twenty captains.

TOTAL STAFF: 18,498

The CWO/WO Specialties authorized:

Boatswain
Operations Technician

Surface Ordnance Technician
Control Ordnance Technician
Underwater Ordnance Technician
Electrician
Electronics Technician
Machinist
Communications Technician
Ship's Repair Technician
Civil Engineer Warrant
Ship's Clerk
Aerographer
Photographer
Medical and Dental Service Warrant
Supply Clerk
Aviation Boatswain
Aviation Electronics Technician
Aviation Maintenance Technician
Aviation Ordnance Technician
Air Control Technician
Air Intelligence Technician

Enlisted Structure

The rates and ratings on the following page were authorized in 1970.

In addition the Navy Enlisted Classification system listed several hundred Naval Enlisted Classification Codes representing special skills usually related to a rating or rating group. The billet master chief petty officer of the navy had been created.

Because the attrition from some ratings was higher than in others advancement opportunity was in no sense equal for all members. Members in ratings with slow advancement prospects were encouraged to train for ratings which were less full. This is a departure from previous practice which discouraged such lateral conversions. This option was seldom open to sailors above the rate of PO 2.

Manning Destroyer 1970:

	DECK		ENG		ARTIF		SPECIAL
MCPO			ST				
SCPO	FT		MM				
CPO	BM		MM	2	SF		RM
	SM		BT		IC		SK
	RD				ET		CS
	ST						
	GMM						
	GMG						
PO1	BM	2	MM	4	SF		YN
	QM		BT	3	IC		SK
	SM		EN		DC		CS
	RD				EM		SH
	ST	3			ET		RM
	GMM						SD
	GMG						
	FTM	3					
	FTG						
PO2	SM		MM	5	ETN	3	SK
	RD	3	BT	7	ETR	2	SH
	STG	2	EN		EM	2	RM
	GMG				IC	2	HM
	GMM	2			SFN	2	
	GMM	2			SFP		
	FTG	2			DC	2	
	FTM	6					
	BM	3	MM	9	EM	5	YN
	QM	3	BT	1	IC	4	SK
	SM		EN	2	SFM		RM
	RD				ETR	3	CS
	STG	3			ETN		SH
	TM						PC
	GMM	2					SD
	GMG	3					

	DECK	ENG	ARTIF	SPECIAL
DESIG	EMSN	MMFN 2	EMFA 4	TN 6
STRIKERS	QMSN	MMFA 2	SFMMFN	TA 1
	EMSN	ENFA	DCFN 2	YNSN
	SMSA	BTFN 5		SHSN
	RDSN	BTFA		PCSN
	RDSA			
	STGSN			
	GMGSA			
	FTGSN			
	FTGSA			
NON	SN 45	FN 21		
DESIG	SA 6	FA 2		

ADVANCEMENT

The advancement system remained essentially unchanged from that of 1960. The length of "A" school training in some ratings of a very technical nature led to the making of "instant petty officers," that is, personnel who were rated while in school or upon graduation. Petty officers first class and above, over 23, but not yet 31, could apply for appointment as warrant officers. Limited duty officers were drawn from among CWO-2 and CWO-3.

REWARD AND RECOGNITION

The enlisted pay schedule for 1970 was:

[illegible]

2. If no nursing is given for a year under cumulative years of service, the amount immediately to the left applies.

With serving as Master Chief Petty Officer of the Marine Corps, basic pay for this grade is \$1016.10 regardless of cumulative years of service computed under section 306, 31

For best allowance for upstream sales while on active duty for training, see Part 8, IMPRO.

is basic allowance for quarters for top grade in
with 4 years of less service

to enlisted members of corresponding grades.

Monthly Incentive Pay (Aviation Pay for Crew Members and Submarine Duty Pay) and Special Pay of Enlisted Members

[illegible]

It is no accident to observe for a long grade under cumulative years of -- vice, the number immediately to the left applies.

---From The Navy Register

A system of proficiency pay had been instituted to encourage certain ratings to remain in service. The rates of pay varied according to the needs of the service. In addition, a variable re-enlistment bonus was offered again in terms of the needs of the service for specific ratings.

It should be noted that the Navy had not at this time fully accepted the practice of referring to petty officers exclusively by pay grade, choosing instead to list pay schedules by petty officer abbreviations and pay grade.

Since 1950 the following medals and awards had been authorized:

- Meritorious Service Medal
- Navy Achievement Medal
- Combat Action Ribbon
- Meritorious Unit Commendation
- Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
- Viet Nam Service Medal

For the first time members of the U.S. Navy were authorized to wear service medals issued by another government.

The presentation of letters of appreciation or commendation to enlisted personnel appears to have become more common than it was in the past. On the other hand, the awarding of special privileges such as early liberty etc., according to veterans of the period, have been less frequent.

GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE

No individual unit records of non-judicial punishment are available for examination and may in fact no longer exist. However, the Naval Personnel Research and Development Center, San Diego conducted a study on non-judicial punishment in the mid-1970s which can be extrapolated to provide annual rates for vessels with crews of less than 800.

These rates are approximately 50% on an annual basis. This represents actual captains' masts, not reported offenses. Estimates suggest that only between fifty and seventy percent of the reported offenses were sent to mast after executive officer screening. Screened cases were either dismissed or sent back to the division to be handled by other means, usually the assignment of extra military instruction.

Using the NPRDC figures and the estimates provided regarding executive officer screenings, we can postulate an offense rate of approximately 70 to 80%.

No information is available on which to base an accurate assessment of the kind of offenses being committed. However, reviewing unofficial materials and interviewing veterans of the period indicates that cases of drug use, particularly marijuana, were increasing rapidly and made up a large part of the offenses reported.

RECRUITING

First enlistments for two, three, four and six years were available. The shorter term enlistments were in USNR requiring two years active service followed by four years of reserve service. All enlistments were for general

service although tentative school guarantees were made and almost all first enlistments were at the rate of apprentice seaman. Persons with ROTC or military school experience were eligible for enlistment at pay grade E-3. Some first naval enlistments by persons with prior service in other branches were made at advanced pay grades.

A wide range of advertising and marketing techniques were utilized, emphasizing training and marketable skills. It should be noted that many enlistments had to be considered as draft motivated. Perhaps the most effective initial recruiting device, the "Heritage" poster, was used during this period. This poster, showing a sailor and his son looking at USS Constitution, is remembered by men who enlisted during the period as having a distinct impression on them and attracting to the Navy. It should be noted that the sailor depicted was not wearing an absolutely regulation uniform inasmuch as the artist had drawn his trousers with bell bottoms.

The Navy was participating in Project 100,000, mandated by the Department of Defense. This required the recruiting of applicants who were deemed culturally and educational deprived and who would not, under normal circumstances, have been accepted.

TRAINING

Roughly seventy percent of all recruits went from recruit training to an "A" school to receive basic technical rate training before being sent to their first duty assignment. A growing number of ratings required "A" school training for eligibility for advancement to PO4, virtually reversing the traditional "ship-as-a-training-school" concept. An increasing number of advanced schools ("C") were becoming part of the normal enlisted career pattern. Correspondence courses were available for most ratings and for many skills as well as other relevant subjects. Special courses for Navy instructors had been established to prepare petty officers for instructor duty. A similar school existed at each training center for recruit company commanders.

Project 100,000 recruitment admitted many recruits whose basic educational skills were extremely low and required the initiation of remedial education classes at recruit training centers.

Assignment and Rotation

Enlisted personnel were assigned to either Atlantic or Pacific Fleet Enlisted Personnel Distribution Office which, in turn, made available individuals to the various type commanders who made the final assignment to specific ships or commands.

The Seavey Shorevey Program was still in effect. For every 32 sea billets there are an estimated 13 CONUS shore and 2.5 overseas shore billets.

RETIREMENT

The thirty year retirement remains in 1970 a choice for only a small minority of enlisted personnel. Requirements that personnel promoted to

CPO, SCPO and MCPO obligate minimum periods of service after promotion and certain factors in the pay schedule appear to have operated to encourage a greater number to remain to the 22 year point, but the figures provided by the Bureau of Personnel Statistics clearly indicate a majority of those reaching the twenty year point chose to transfer to the Fleet Reserve.

LEAVE AND LIBERTY

Leave and liberty regulations remained unchanged. Liberty cards were, however, required only of petty officer third class and below. This is one of the first evidences in practice of the classificatory down-grading of petty officers third class, which included them with non-rated personnel as "apprenticeship ratings."

UNIFORM REGULATIONS

Uniform regulations remained essentially the same. The drop flap trouser was no longer issued. the pullover working shirt introduced in 1960 had been abandoned and the traditional chambray dungaree shirt returned to the seabag. The seabag itself was no longer the small white canvas bag, but the large army type carryall provided in olive drab. Clothing was no longer rolled but rather folded. Thus the "clothes stops" issued to tie rolled clothing in the seabag and onto the wash line were no longer issued. Washing clothes aboard ship had been abandoned beginning in WWI. The blue working cap was authorized for wear unless forbidden.

The practice of identifying a sailor's command, which prior to and during WWI had been done by printing the ship's name in gold on the silk hat band of the blue flat hat, had been revived in the form of a patch worn on the shoulder seam of the right shoulder.

Certain embroidered distinguishing marks were still worn on the sleeve. These included:

- Diver
- Assault Boat Coxswain
- Sharpshooter
- Sonar Operator
- Navy "E"
- Expert Lookout
- Gun, Director Pointer Trainer
- Fire Control Radar Operator
- AA Machine Gunner
- Gun Range Finder Operator
- Scuba Diver
- Mine Assembly Man
- Mount Captain
- Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician
- Fire Fighter Assistant

Although still authorized, a number of these had fallen into disuse in part because the skills they represented had been incorporated into new ratings.

Aircrew and submarine sailors were now identified by metal insignia worn on the left breast.

Grooming regulations limited hair length to three inches. Mustache could be worn at personal discretion but beards only with the permission of the commanding officer. The 1968 Bluejacket's Manual does not cite a source for this restriction which is the first such statement in the seventy preceding years.

AUTHORITY

The rising incidence of non-judicial punishment during this period suggests an eroding of authority in the enlisted force. A possible explanation is the continuing emphasis on technical skills rather than military responsibilities. In addition, one must point out the high operational tempo, the acceptance into the service in large numbers of people of lower educational attainments, and the fact that a very large proportion of the junior enlisted force were, in fact, unwilling recruits, having entered the Navy as an alternative to the Army.

However certain structural changes must be considered, not the least of which is noted earlier, the blurring of the line between rated and non-rated personnel by classifying petty officers third class with non-rated personnel. This clearly reflects the emphasis among personnel managers and planners on levels of technical expertise rather than military responsibilities.

GENERAL NAVAL DATAOfficers

	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
Line	43,449*	1,774
Staff	16,905	2,564
CWO	3,137	17

<u>Enlisted</u>	430,729	29,068	<u>Total:</u>	459,787
-----------------	---------	--------	---------------	---------

Serving less than four years	249,639
Serving four to eight years	88,964
Serving eight to twelve years	43,128
Serving twelve to sixteen years	31,262
Serving sixteen to twenty years	29,504
Serving twenty to thirty years	16,988
Serving over thirty years	462

Ships 398

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

The Navy continued to deploy forces in the west in Pacific and Mediterranean and conduct regular operations with NATO allies in the Atlantic. Fleet exercises were conducted with allies in Latin America and the Pacific. Regular exercises continued to be held on both coasts.

The major change in operational focus was the increased attention paid to the Indian Ocean where, because of the Iranian situation, the Navy was maintaining a regular presence, operating on a virtual war footing. This operation included a number of deployments at sea as long or longer than any experienced in WWII.

In general, ships were steaming at the following rates in the respective fleets.

Fleet

2	31 days per quarter
6	42 days per quarter
3	27 days per quarter
7	45 days per quarter

The Navy considered this less than desirable in terms of maintaining readiness, preferring 39, 50, 31.5 and 54 days, respectively.

Maintaining this operational schedule was placing increasing burdens on both equipment and the people who operated and maintained it.

* As of June 30, 1980.

The general pattern of deployment was:

	WestPAC	Med	Atlantic	Mid East
CV	2	2	--	--
Surf Comb.	19	14	4	2
Attack Subs	6	4	1	--
MISF	11	10	--	--
AMPHIB	2ARG*	1ARG	1ARG	--

* Amphibious Readiness Group

Roughly 30% of the Navy was deployed, 40% in a state of operational readiness while assigned to CONUS ports and 30% engaged in overhaul, maintenance and training.

First enlistments were on the up grade, but re-enlistments in a 7 to 10 year range were declining. A number of incentives to retain experienced personnel were offered including payment of VRB in lump sums, and guaranteed assignments and limitations on sea-shore rotation for eligible CPOs with more than twenty years service. The LMET program was also instituted for its retention potential.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE - 1980

Officers

	URL	LDO	Line Women	TAR
	32,570	3,165	1,991	1,086
Admiral	8			
Vice Admiral	29			
Rear Admiral	155		1	2
Captain	1,806		14	124
Commander	3,918	138	49	354
Lieutenant Commander	6,163	390	185	428
Lieutenant	8,338	934	471	171
Lieutenant (jg)	5,686	884	506	6
Ensign	6,468	811	765	1

RL

	EDO	EDO Women	ADO(AE)	ADO (Main)	ADO(M) Women
	1,123	13	344	460	11
Admiral					
Vice Admiral	1				
Rear Admiral	14		5		
Captain	146		55	24	
Commander	310		124	40	
Lieutenant Commander	356		151	119	2
Lieutenant	241		9	131	3
Lieutenant (jg)	47	5		72	4
Ensign	308	8		40	2

	CRYPT	Women	INTELL	Women	PAO	Women
	541	33	891	51	165	18
Admiral						
Vice Admiral			1			
Rear Admiral	2		2		1	
Captain	44		64		19	
Commander	120		172	1	36	
Lieutenant Commander	173		230	6	50	4
Lieutenant	122	9	188	16	49	8
Lieutenant (jg)	125	9	104	17	8	5
Ensign	55	15	131	11	2	1

GEOPHYS 331 Women 12

Admiral		
Vice Admiral		
Rear Admiral		
Captain	26	
Commander	72	
Lieutenant Commander	106	1
Lieutenant	72	1
Lieutenant (jg)	32	2
Ensign	23	8

STAFF

	Med.	S.C.	SCLCDO	SC Women	SC TAR	
	3,489	4,075	184	145	145	
Admiral						
Vice Admiral	1					
Rear Admiral	12	15				
Captain	419	192		2	2	
Commander	515	586	6	2	2	
Lieutenant Commander	1,028	808	13	5	5	
Lieutenant	1,414	943	45	29	29	
Lieutenant (jg)		705	64	49	49	
Ensign		626	56	58	58	
	Women	CEC	Women	CECLDO	JAG	D.C.
Chap. 862;	7	1,269	16	31	779	
Admiral						
Vice Admiral						
Rear Admiral		5			2	3
Captain		83			58	363
Commander		209		3	118	270
Lieutenant Commander	1	328		9	212	253
Lieutenant	5	344	1	5	346	730
Lieutenant (jg)	1	164	4	9	42	
Ensign		136	11	5		
CWO						
CWO-4	528					
CWO-3	640					
CWO-2	1,811					

The rank of Warrant Officer (W-1) was discontinued. The 120 WOs on active duty in April 1980 either reverted to enlisted status or were promoted to CWO/LDO.

OFFICER CATEGORY

UNRESTRICTED LINE

Line officer
Line officer qualified in Surface Warfare
Line officer qualified in Submarine Warfare
Line officer qualified in Special Warfare
Line officer qualified in Special Operations
Line officer in training for Surface Warfare qualification
Line officer in training for Submarine Warfare qualification
Line officer in training for Special Warfare qualification
Line officer in training for Special Operations qualification
Line officer in the aviation community whose rating as pilot or Naval Flight Officer has been terminated
Line officer qualified for duty involving flying as a pilot
Line officer qualified for duty involving flying as a Naval Flight Officer
Line officer in training for duty involving flying as a Naval Flight Officer
Line officer in training for duty involving flying as a pilot

RESTRICTED LINE

Engineering Duty officer (Ship Engineering)
Engineering Duty officer (Ship Engineering and Ordnance Engineering)
Engineering Duty officer qualified as a Ship Engineering specialist
Engineering Duty officer in prescribed program for designator 144X
Aeronautical Engineering Duty officer (Aeronautical Engineering)
Aeronautical Engineering Duty officer (Aviation Maintenance)
Special Duty officer (Cryptology)
Special Duty officer (Intelligence)
Special Duty officer (Photography)
Special Duty officer (Public Affairs)
Engineering Duty officer (Ordnance Engineering)
Special Duty officer (Geophysics)

UNRESTRICTED LINE - PROSPECTIVE STAFF CORPS

Line officer under instruction as a prospective Medical Corps officer (Senior Medical Student)
Line officer under instruction as a prospective Dental Corps officer
Line officer under instruction as a prospective Medical Service Corps officer (Optometry)

LIMITED DUTY OFFICER

Deck - Surface
Operations - Surface
Engineering/Repair - Surface
Nuclear Power - Surface
Ordnance - Surface
Electronics - Surface

LIMITED DUTY OFFICER (Continued)

Deck - Submarine
Operations - Submarine
Engineering/Repair - submarine
Nuclear Power - Submarine
Ordnance - Submarine
Electronics - Submarine
Naval Aviator
Aviation Deck
Aviation Operations
Aviation Maintenance
Aviation Ordnance
Avionics
Air Traffic Control
Administration
Data Processing
Bandmaster
Cryptology
Intelligence
Meteorology
Photography
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Physical Security
Supply Corps LDO
Supply Corps (Mess Management)
Civil Engineer Corps LDO

STAFF CORPS

Medical Corps officer
Dental Corps officer
Medical Service Corps officer
Judge Advocate General's Corps officer
Nurse Corps officer
Supply Corps officer
Chaplain Corps officer
Civil Engineer Corps officer

WARRANT OFFICER

Boatswain (Surface)
Operations Technician (Surface)
Engineering Technician (Surface)
Repair Technician (Surface)
Nuclear Power Technician (Surface)
Ordnance Technician (Surface)
Underwater Ordnance Technician (Surface)
Electronics Technician (Surface)
Boatswain (Submarine)
Operations Technician (Submarine)
Engineering Technician (Submarine)
Repair Technician (Submarine)
Nuclear Power Technician (Submarine)

WARRANT OFFICER (Continued)

Ordnance Technician (Submarine)
Underwater Ordnance Technician (Submarine)
Electronics Technician (Submarine)
Aviation Boatswain
Aviation Operations Technician
Aviation Maintenance Technician
Aviation Ordnance Technician
Aviation Electronics Technician
Air Traffic Control Technician
Ship's Clerk
Data Processing Technician
Bandmaster
Cryptologic Technician
Intelligence Technician
Aerographer
Photographer
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician
Physical Security Technician
Supply Corps Warrant
Food Service Warrant
Civil Engineering Warrant
Physician's Assistant

The distribution of rates in 1980 was:*

MCPO	3,260
SCPO	8,405
CPO	30,435
PO1	66,373
PO2	79,888
P-3	90,589
SN etc.	73,988
SA etc.	47,523
SR	59,336

It should be noted in the chart on the following page that ratings are identified entirely by their pay grades. This conforms to usage in most naval correspondence. In the Navy Military Personnel Statistics, from which this chart was taken, the term petty officer is used, in abbreviation, in only one section.

The job of command master chief petty officer was, in many larger commands, in the process of becoming an authorized billet instead of a collateral duty. Master chief petty officers of Fleets and Forces, including the Shore Establishment and the Naval Reserve, had been authorized with a star replacing the specialty device. This group interacted with the master chief petty officer of the Navy to form the CNO Master Chief Petty Officer Advisory Committee.

*accurate manning documents for 1980 not available.

INCLUDES CHANGES EFFECTIVE 10/1/00

19861 3 JUL 85 1735 04

GENERAL NOTE: (HEAD) RECREATIONAL FIELD APPLICATIONS TO USE AND UTM, WHICH PROVIDES PRIMARY MEANS OF IDENTIFYING BULLET REQUIREMENTS AND IDENTIFYING CHARACTERISTICS.

SERVICE RATING: SUBDIVISION OF CERTAIN RATINGS APPLICABLE TO USE AND USES, WHICH PROVIDES NECESSARY SPECIALIZATION IN TRAINING AND UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL IN COMPLEX WORK AREAS.

NOTE: THESE RATINGS ARE OBTAINED BY PATIES OF PROFESSIONAL SKILLING.

[illegible]

The Navy Enlisted Classification System had expanded to include Drug and Alcohol Counsellors, Human Resource Management Specialists, Race Relations Education Specialists and Equal Opportunity Program Specialists, as well as specialists in correctional counselling.

DISCIPLINE AND GOOD ORDER

Individual NJP records for the 1970-80 period are not available. Unit summaries of total reported disciplinary infractions and number of drug related infractions do exist and provide us with the ability to compare the 1980 decennial point with previous years. The principal investigator has some reason to believe that different reporting units may not have interpreted reporting instructions in the same way, thus weakening confidence in these numbers. In addition the executive officers' screening continued to weed out large numbers of offenses which therefore were not reported.

	<u>TOB</u>	<u>NJP</u>	<u>Drug Related</u>	<u>NJP rate**</u>
Cruiser	835	295	65	35%
Destroyer	350	118	36	34%
AO	350	165	30	47%
ATF	34**	20	2	58%
OVERALL				38%

Actual manning in all cases was lower (80% to 50%) thus increasing the NJP rate. If one also considers the number of offenses screened by the executive officer (30% to 50%), offenses for 1980 were approaching those of 1920 and earlier.

The UCMJ was amended three times during the 1960s in the direction of restricting the power of the commanding officer to award punishment at mast (sailors stationed ashore could demand court martial, sailors embarked could not), or at least subjecting the commanding officer's decision to legal or judicial review.

Testimony of both officers and senior enlisted supports the contention that the many procedural safeguards involved in taking a man to mast tended to discourage the practice except in rather flagrant cases. At the same time both communities complained that loss of the ability to assign punitive extra duty or withhold liberty privileges had so weakened the authority of senior petty officers that they tended to ignore infractions if at all possible. Differing interpretations of changing policies and regulations also caused disciplinary problems. Senior petty officers tended to interpret grooming standards, for instance, more rigorously (in line with their own experience) in many cases than did their officers. The result appears to have been an increasing withdrawal of many senior enlisted personnel from actively enforcing regulations and exercising military authority.

**These ratios are based upon official manning figures as presented by Polmar in Ships and Aircraft of the United States Navy.

RECRUITING

The end of the draft in 1973 made the Navy, as all other services, entirely dependent on voluntary enlistments. The primary recruiting target group remained the seventeen to twenty-four year old male and the eighteen to twenty-four year old female. Prior other service personnel and some recruits with ROTC or military school experience were enlisted at the E-3 level. All other enlistments were at the rating of seaman recruit. Pre-enlistment testing and classification determined the selection of post-recruit specialty training.

Recruiting was conducted by a separate Navy Recruiting Command. Recruiters were sent to school and a classification of career recruiter was established for exceptionally able enlisted recruiters. Various quotas were established for high school graduates, mental groups, sex and ethnicity. During the years preceding 1980 the Navy experienced short falls in recruiting, especially in high school graduates of the higher mental groups. Various special programs, including the enlistment of a recruit company from a single area so that recruits would serve together through training, were in place. Some recruiting, particularly for the nuclear program and high tech ratings, guaranteed assignment to special school pipelines.

Backlogs in school placements, which had caused severe disciplinary problems at Service School Commands due to the large numbers of underemployed sailors awaiting instruction, were reduced through the development of the Delayed Entry Program. This permitted a recruit to be sworn in and wait at home until a school seat was predicted to be open at the end of recruit training. In some cases this waiting period was as much as a year. Recruiters were responsible for maintaining contact and motivation through meetings, tours, picnics etc. Throughout this period the primary recruiting appeal had been "It's not just a Job it's an adventure." Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s recruiting often assured wavering potential recruits. "It's really just like a job anywhere." Recruit entry interviews indicated that learning marketable skills was the most common reason for joining, although travel was generally the second most frequent reason given as a priority by most recruits.

TRAINING

Recruit training, conducted in San Diego, Great Lakes and Orlando (all women trained at Orlando) had been reduced to seven weeks. Approximately 60% of training was conducted in classrooms. Seventy percent of the graduates of recruit training went directly to "A" school training. Thirty percent, usually non-high school graduates with test scores too low to qualify for schools, went to Apprentice Training for airmen, firemen or seamen. Apprentice training was being expanded from two weeks to one month in response to fleet evaluations of the personnel arriving from these facilities.

"A" school training ranged from as little as four weeks to over a year in some of the more technical fields. In many cases there was a common core curriculum for a number of ratings, at the conclusion of which people went to further "A" training in a specific rating.

Much of the training, particularly in the high population ratings and in core training, was computer managed instruction. This reduced the numbers of senior enlisted people with whom young sailors had contact and dramatically changed the relationship between the instructor and the student. Commander, Naval Education and Training and his subordinate command Commander, Naval Technical Training, were specifically charged with providing technical training only. The result was that "A" school students received no continuing military training. Complaints of indiscipline, unauthorized absence, drug use, missing watches, etc., were very high. By 1980 it was decided that military training and a more military atmosphere would be provided and maintained in school facilities. Additional experienced petty officers were assigned to assume military leadership roles. Uniform regulations were tightened and military courtesies more rigorously enforced.

In addition to "A" school training, an extremely large number of courses for senior personnel were offered. These included technical training in various specialties and additional training in areas such as leadership and management, which had been instituted in the late 1970s. Navy wide programs in race relations, equal opportunity, drugs, and alcohol required specially trained instructors and facilitators. The enforcement and conduct of equal opportunity programs and drug and alcohol counseling also required specially trained personnel. Shipboard training was formalized in the General Military Training program which covered a wide range of subjects taught by officers and petty officers. The second phase of the equal opportunity program required the training of special command training teams, made up of senior petty officers and junior officers, which delivered prescribed workshops on military rights and responsibilities, affirmative action, and intercultural relations.

The Personal Qualifications Standards (PQS) system required both enlisted and commissioned personnel to meet specific objectives related to a wide range of watch, battle and duty stations.

In the late 1970s, in response to growing concern over the level of leadership competency and extremely high first term attrition rates, the Leadership Management Education and Training program was implemented with courses being offered at several career points for both officer and enlisted personnel. A Senior Enlisted Academy had been authorized to meet the needs for advanced training for enlisted people who would assume the duties of Command, Fleet and Force Master Chief Petty Officers.

Surface officers entering the fleet were assigned to Surface Warfare Officers School, paralleling special training for submarines and aviation. Prospective commanding officers and executive officers were required to attend pre-reporting training programs. A special engineering program for prospective commanding officers and for flag officers enroute to sea assignments was instituted at Idaho Falls.

In general the pattern of Navy training had changed from one in which all relevant training and educational activities were conducted on a one time basis in the early months and years of a naval career, to one in which training and education were continued throughout a career from the lowest to the highest ranks.

ASSIGNMENT

All personnel assignment activities had become centralized in the Naval Military Personnel Command (Bureau of Personnel prior to 1978). Non-designated seamen, firemen, and airmen were handled by the Enlisted Personnel Management Center located in New Orleans. Once a sailor graduated from "A" school or had been designated a striker, his record was passed to NMPC and his assignments handled by a detailer. Assignments operated according to a system of sea-shore rotation outlined in the Enlisted Transfer Manual. The objective of the system was to assure a fair sharing of sea, shore, overseas and arduous duty assignments, according to a rough rule of three years at sea and two years ashore. In fact, the rotation system operated differently for different ratings, different duty stations etc. Nonetheless, after serving a minimum period, a sailor could expect to be rotated to another duty station. Although many did not do so, each sailor was supposed to file a duty preference card and individual desires were, at least in theory, taken into account by detailers. Many people were expressing dissatisfaction because of the frequent moves, often to distant stations. The reduction in the size of the Navy made it increasingly difficult to keep the rotation system operating without ordering major geographic shifts which were increasingly disturbing to family life. A major criticism of the rotation system was disruption of family life. Yet another was that it discouraged long term identification with a ship or unit and encouraged short term "quickfix" attitudes.

RETIREMENT

Retirement policy, although being questioned in Congress, had not in fact changed. An up or out policy, which had been in effect throughout the decade, required that sailors advance to E-4 or at least pass all tests for advancement to E-4, to be eligible for re-enlistment. Sailors who did not advance past E-4 in subsequent enlistments would not, in most cases, be permitted to re-enlist, and first class petty officers could not remain on active duty past twenty years. The majority of enlisted people transferred to the Fleet Reserve after attaining twenty years of service. Previous practices which permitted the accumulation of "constructive" time, thereby reducing actual day-to-day service required for transfer to 19 1/2 years, were discontinued. The number of people in the over-twenty year period was almost 4% of the total enlisted force, the highest figure except in war years, of the entire period of study.

LEAVE AND LIBERTY

The use of liberty cards had been abandoned in the late 1960s. Three to six section liberty was granted depending on the location of the ship and operational requirements. Leave policy was essentially unchanged. Operational tempo and the resultant maintenance and training requirements for ships returned from deployment often made it impossible for personnel embarked to take thirty days leave. On the other hand, the granting of leave at the point of rotational transfer was a common practice. Fifteen days leave, which had been granted at the end of recruit training, was generally deferred until the end of apprentice training and in many cases after "A" school.

REWARDS AND RECOGNITION

The Navy pay system was essentially unchanged except that the actual amounts had been increased by various annual increments tied to increases granted civilian government employees. In addition to pay and allowances previously authorized, the Variable Housing Allowance had been authorized. This system provided extra payment based on the average cost of housing in a given area. A career sea pay program, which paid additional monies depending on a sailor's cumulative sea duty, was also in place. Proficiency pay and the Variance RC Enlistment Bonus continued to be paid.

In addition to the various medals and decorations listed previously, the Navy E ribbon had been authorized. The Medal for Humane Action and a Sea Duty/Deployment ribbon had also been established.

Virtually all commands conducted sailor of the month, quarter and year programs and various large commands (TYCOMs and FLEETs) also conducted such programs and made nominations to the Sea and Shore Sailor of the Year Program. The winners were promoted and permitted to select their next duty station. Commanding officers of ships and certain other units were authorized to award a certain number of Navy Achievement Medals. Letters of commendation were regularly issued to outstanding performers. On the other hand, special privileges, such as early liberty as a reward, had become increasingly rare.

UNIFORM AND GROOMING

The pressure to change the Navy uniform, which had existed since at least the end of WWII, finally had effect in the 1970s. The traditional bell bottoms and white hats were phased out over several years and replaced by a uniform essentially the same as that of a chief petty officer, with the exception that E-1 through E-6 insignia was silver and the hat ornament was different. With the old uniform went the traditional methods of folding, rolling, pressing, and stowing which had been part of Navy lore. The traditional undress whites and blues also disappeared in favor of summer blues (salt and peppers), summer whites, and a winter working uniform. Chief petty officer service dress whites were also abandoned. Working uniforms were replaced in most situations by dungarees worn with the blue ball cap, and in offices with the salt and pepper or summer white uniforms. The seabag had expanded greatly and a number of uniforms became optional. There was a great deal of confusion over what precisely the "uniform of the day" was at any particular period. The loss of the distinctive shift from white hat to chief's hat was not well received by either the white hat or the chief. "Putting on the hat" no longer had meaning and was replaced by "shifting into khakis" to denote promotion to CPO. Unfortunately khakis began to fall into increasing disfavor as anything but a strictly working uniform, so even this distinction was seriously threatened.

The shift to the new uniform caused the abandonment of the various distinguishing marks which were previously worn on the sleeve, although at least two such marks remained authorized (expert lookout and fire fighting assistant). The Navy E became a ribbon worn on the left breast in service

dress mode and on the right breast in full dress mode. The active duty requirement for the wearing of gold rating badges and service stripes was finally abandoned and reservists were permitted to wear gold lace. Brown shoes, worn with khakis by officers and chiefs, a practice long identified with the air community, were forbidden. The wearing of aviation green was also greatly restricted.

Grooming regulations were clarified to permit beards at the individual's discretion and hair styles which, within basic naval standards of neatness, conformed in general to civilian styles. It should be noted that the famous "Z-gram 70" did not change Naval grooming regulations but, in fact, in the matter of beards and mustaches, confirmed what had been policy for at least seven decades. The same message did in fact condemn and prohibit certain restrictive practices which had penalized sailors who chose to grow beards by restricting them until the beard was fully grown. An extremely specific grooming regulation has been promulgated to provide guidance in these matters. In general it stated hair could not be longer than four inches or bulk higher than two inches, limited side burns to the lower edge of the ear lobe, and prohibited eccentric beard or mustache styles. The issue of grooming became extremely emotional and created a most decided gap between young enlisted personnel and their seniors, particularly senior petty officers and senior commissioned officers.

Nonetheless the wearing of beards had become very common. They were pictured regularly in official and unofficial publications, including the bluejackets manual. By 1980 facial hair was more common among senior petty officers and mid-level officers than among junior enlisted.

Civilian clothing, which had been permitted aboard shore stations, could now be kept aboard ship and worn on liberty. In part this was a response to desires of foreign nations who objected to reminders of an American military presence. Another factor was the wish to avoid conflict between service members and anti-military civilians. Nonetheless, the move also was designed to meet the expressed desires of many individual sailors. In Japan, where local sentiment tended to favor Americans wearing uniforms, the Navy still permitted their wear because it felt it would be taking a privilege away from the sailors to require uniforms.

The policy which permitted civilian clothes to be worn off a ship or station actually created a situation wherein dress blues or white uniforms were seldom worn at all, inasmuch as most work was done in dungarees by sailors who then shifted to civvies to go ashore. Dress or service dress uniforms might then only be worn at occasional formal inspections and for those on special watches.

AUTHORITY

Although the documents and other official sources do not provide solid evidence beyond the continued rise of offenses, unofficial sources, particularly interviews and discussions with serving officers and enlisted personnel, suggest that the decade of the 1970s was one in which authority of both officers and petty officers eroded considerably.

The same people often provide their own analysis of the problem which in many cases appears to be correct.

Many informants cite the increased and almost exclusive emphasis on technical expertise in training over the past two and a half decades. This, as noted in earlier sections, was officially, although perhaps unintentionally, supported by such practices as referring to petty officers and non-rated men by their pay grade rather than their rank. The difference between a seaman or fireman and a petty officer third class is cognitively far greater than the difference between E-3 and E-4.

The introduction of the shore patrol, in which all petty officers were liable to serve, in the decade 1900-1910 was one of the structural changes which reinforced the military status of the petty officer. By 1980 the practice of each ship in port supplying a certain number of petty officers for shore patrol had been abandoned virtually everywhere in CONUS in favor of permanent shore patrol detachments or mixed service police. In addition, many of the enforcement duties previously assigned to petty officers of any rating were assigned to the Master at Arms rating which was re-established in the 1970s.

The practice of requiring a first class petty officer to serve as captain of each enlisted mess and stand accountable for behavior among his mess mates had begun to disappear with the introduction of the general mess. First class petty officers, nonetheless, ate in the general mess until at least the mid 1960s when the practice of establishing a separate messing area for them began to appear. Thus the opportunity for observing and supervising subordinates was reduced and good order in the mess decks became increasingly the sole responsibility of the mess deck master at arms. In some ships first class petty officers were berthed separately. These practices, intended to enhance the prestige and status of first class petty officers, may well have been major contributors to a loss of authority, inasmuch as they reduced the amount of time the first class petty officers were actually present to observe and supervise their juniors and tended to restrict that time to the actual work center or watch station. This provided a powerful support for the idea that technical expertise was more important than military responsibility.

It should be noted that relatively few informants, even among commissioned officers, saw these practices as eroding authority and responsibility although a number objected on other grounds.

On a wider level, a number of programs initiated in the 1970s tended to by-pass the traditional relationship between senior and junior enlisted. The traditional responsibility of petty officers as primary counsellors of their subordinates began to be eroded as special counsellors for drug and alcohol problems were introduced into the fleet. More and more such problems were seen as the counsellor's problem rather than that of the division's leading POs. Racial programs also tended to by pass the on-board chain of command, inasmuch as they were imposed from above and conducted by people from outside the command. Various committees established to deal with issues such as race relations and other human relations issues were perceived to by-pass the on-board chain of command.

The manner in which these programs were instituted from the highest level of the Navy to the individual officer and sailor through the medium of seminars and workshops tended to leave the "middle management level" of the chain out of the equation. In short, all personnel tended to be treated alike in these efforts, which tended to further reduce the distinctions between enlisted ranks and narrow the gap between enlisted and officers, a process already begun with the uniform change which was in no sense a part of these programs.

Clearly many senior enlisted confronted with numerous changes in naval practice (if not policy) were themselves confused. Subject to criticism for behavior which had not been criticized before (i.e. enforcing grooming regulations as they had learned them through experience), they tended to withdraw from direct exercise of authority.

The institution of the rating of navy counsellor is another instance of erosion of traditional senior-junior relationships inasmuch as juniors with questions about advancement, schools, re-enlistment programs, etc., tended to go to, or be directed to go to, the navy counsellor rather than to their leading petty officer or chief petty officer.

At the same time much of the pipeline training for junior officers began to stress interpersonal communication and counselling, suggesting that a direct link between the division officer and junior enlisted personnel was desirable. Once again, this direct relationship tended to bypass the leading enlisted personnel. In many cases chiefs and first classes, rebuffed in their attempts to exercise authority, withdrew. In many other cases these issues became excuses for withdrawal from all but technical involvement.

The low re-enlistment rates of the 1960s and early 1970s, coupled with a high operational tempo, placed heavy burdens of operation and maintenance on the shoulders of senior petty officers. In the past senior petty officers, who would have had little to do but supervise operations and maintenance activities, became literally the only people on board with enough experience to perform repair and maintenance tasks. This, among other things, reduced the opportunity to train subordinates and thus reduced further the leader-follower relationship.

Continued rapid technical change must also have played a role, inasmuch as the experientially-learned technical skills in many rating groups became obsolete, requiring petty officers to relearn new techniques, thus reducing authority derived from expertise. The practice of bringing supernumerary "tech reps" on board to maintain certain items of equipment was bitterly resented in the chief petty officer community.

Similar rapid changes in personnel policy, regulations, and programs, created a situation where the leading petty officer or even the commissioned officers with whom a sailor might interact did not know current policy. Many officers and petty officers literally gave up trying to enforce uniform regulations because frequent changes made it difficult to be certain precisely what the regulation was at a given time.

As noted earlier, the increasing procedural problems surrounding the NJP, as well as the continued scrutiny of civilian legal forces and the courts of military appeals, created the impression that the military leader's hands were tied. Unfamiliarity with the parameters of extra military instruction as a corrective tool made many commands leary of using it.

To compound the problem the increasing technical and administrative requirements imposed on officers tended to once again emphasize the non-military aspects of a naval officer's job over the military aspects.

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This study has attempted to develop a series of synchronic or "stop action" pictures of the state of personnel policy and practice in the Navy at nine different points, beginning with 1900 and ending in 1980. These pictures have been reconstructed by reference to various official and unofficial sources and, where possible, interviews have been supplemented by the principal investigator's personal experience on active duty and as a reservist.

The intent has not been to develop historically accurate depictions of each of the decennial years, but rather to use the decennial years as a device to determine general patterns in naval life during the period. From an anthropological point of view, the Navy is, or closely approximates, a culture; that is a total physical, social and symbolic environment. It would have been impossible to present a total picture of the Navy in this context, therefore the study was conducted following a set of dimensions which are areas of presumed importance to the organization and to the individual sailor: recruitment, training, advancement, reward and recognition, leave and liberty, uniforms and grooming, and retirement. As a possible index of the degree of good order and discipline, NJP rates were determined for a selected group of ships at each decennial point. To provide a context within which these dimensions were operative, the structure of the organization was developed.

Structure in this case does not mean the designs usually presented in organizational charts or "wiring diagrams." One clear finding of this and all other historical studies of the Navy is that reorganization and adjustment is in fact the norm rather than the exception. In this context structure refers to a complex of recognized statuses and roles occupied by individuals in the system; in this study the numbers and types of commissioned officers and the numbers and types of enlisted people. This structure was presented in a Navy-wide view and in reconstructions drawn from muster lists of the ships under study.

STRUCTURE

The major structural elements of the Navy are, and have been, commissioned officers and enlisted personnel. Within the commissioned status group, a basic division has been between line and staff. In 1900 the staff consisted of personnel responsible for managing supplies and accounts, health care, construction and civil engineering, religious matters and certain educational and scientific matters (professors of mathematics). Although the number of staff corps has increased and designations have changed, the basic staff functions have not. Four corps now deal with health care, civil engineering has continued, as has the Chaplains' Corps, and the Supply Corps continues to deal with issues of supply and accounts. The naval Constructors Corps no longer exists. The functions of professors of mathematics have been subsumed into the line. Most noticeable is the gradual elevation of staff officers, first by according them the same ranks as line officers and abandoning such titles as medical director, assistant paymasters and passed assistant surgeon. This transition occurred rather gradually during and immediately after WWI when the Navy Register began

listing staff designations with a notation of corresponding ranks in the line (e.g., some surgeons ranked with commander, others with lieutenant commander). The other evidence of elevated staff status was the appearance of flag officers in these corps. Today only the medical service corps does not have a flag. In short the areas of staff responsibility have been culturally defined since the beginning of the century and while there have been structural responses to increased technological and organizational complexity, "The Staff" deals with essentially the same issues with which it dealt in 1900.

It is the line which has undergone the most dramatic transformation. With the absorption of the engineers in 1899, the line was composed of officers who performed duties in relation to operations ashore and afloat. In fact, the amalgamation took the form of converting engineers into deck officers but not the opposite, creating a shortage of qualified engineering officers until about the time of WWI. The structural evidence for this was the need to create a number of warrant machinists with watch standing responsibilities.

Officers of the line were, in response to ever increasing, technological, tactical, and administrative complexity, assigned to a variety of duties, most of which did not exist in 1899. In many of these new areas it is clear the commissioned status was accorded primarily because of technical skills and knowledge rather than actual or potential military command responsibility.

The modern line is divided into two administrative and seven functional communities. The administrative division is that between unrestricted and restricted line, representing an officer's ultimate potential for command at sea. Of more importance from a structural point of view, the functional divisions give us a much clearer picture of the Navy. Within the URL there are surface, aviation, and submarine communities. The communities interact structurally in a complex way. Basic training, whether in OCS, NROTC, USNA, ORAOCS, is essentially the same. At the other end of the career ladder, major flag billets are open to members of each of the communities. The operational careers of the three groups are today quite separate, except where they interact in certain administrative shore assignments. The "General" or "Unrestricted" aspect is more truly demonstrated in shore assignments than it is at sea.

The historical development of this situation deserves more detailed study. Prior to WWII, officers all tended to serve one or more tours in surface vessels before being trained as aviators or submariners.²¹ The war demanded large numbers of non-career junior officers trained into specialties which apparently set a pattern of early service selection.

Many students of naval organization have commented on the development of, as Zumwalt describes them, "unions"²² within the service. In terms of its effect on macro-organizational issues, to date no one has explored the historical background which led, for instance, to the decision that pilots would be commissioned officers.²³ Other nations did not make the same decision. The result, on a behavioral level, has been the development of a

situation very closely analogous to that frequently reported in the ethnological literature; that of the segmentary society. That is, a situation in which separate corporate groups within a larger system generally act in opposition. The almost ritualized hostility between communities is expressed in the development of stereotypes of typical "black shoe," "fly boy," or submariner behavior and personality. In face-to-face situations a great deal of hostile joking takes place. In short, the URL community appears to be a community only from the outside.²⁴

The development of the restricted line is another subject which begs for further research. Why public affairs, intelligence, and geophysics in particular developed as part of the line rather than separate Staff Corps and the possible organizational consequences of alternative models would perhaps yield valuable guidance to future planners.

A final element of the officer corps is the LDO/WO community, technically related to one of the line or staff communities. This group must, from a structural point of view, be treated separately.

The current view of the warrant officer is as an ultimate point in an enlisted career. If the documents examined have been interpreted correctly, this was not the case over much of the period under study. In many decennial years many WOs and CWOs had no enlisted service. Many others had only one or two years such service. Even though regulations called for boat-swains and gunners to have minimum time in service, it would appear that many did not. No time in service or rate requirements existed for the artificer and staff warrants, except for payclerks, which required service as a CPO. While there appears to have been a preference for ex-enlisted men, technical skills, as demonstrated by examination, appear to have been the primary considerations.

The periods after WWII see the greatest proliferation of WO specialties, from 6 in 1910 to 11 in 1950, to 35 in 1980. In addition to a proliferation of numbers, the data suggest a shift in attitude toward the duties of CWO/WOs. Initially CWO/WOs were considered as assistants and advisors to their respective department heads. The expansion of the community to meet new technical requirements appears to have been accompanied by changes in responsibility toward more direct supervision of enlisted personnel, a more active role in the direct chain of command. This structural change is paralleled by such symbolic acts as the disestablishment of separate warrant officer messes. Provision for promotion of CWO/WO to ensign was a somewhat more concrete representation of the realignment of this community into the direct chain of command. A post-WWII extension of the CWO/WO elements was the development of the limited duty officer. There are 31 LDO designators, paralleling in most cases the WO designators. The distinguishing characteristic between LDO and CWO/WO is stated to be that between management and supervision. In actuality this line is rather indistinct and creates high levels of dissatisfaction.²⁵ There is an obvious structural tension at this level of the chain of command between URL/RL officers, LDOs, and CWOs. This is further complicated by the creation of the senior and master chief petty officer rates, which were initially intended to assume CWO/WO roles.

In general, the officer corps displays certain structural anomalies which seem to have two basic historical causes: 1) the separate careers of the three major URL communities, which merge only at accession and again at the senior levels; 2) confusion over the roles and responsibilities of the LDO/WO in relation to other groups in the middle management levels. These anomalies did not manifest themselves at the decision point(s), rather the stresses in the unrestricted line were not evident until officers who had experienced the separate career paths attained senior ranks, providing effective and vocal representation of their "unions." This would appear to have been in the 1960-70 decade.

An overall problem has been the practice of subsuming a wide range of special skills into the general line. The present situation suggests that the stresses are increasing in the direction of fragmentation of the general line, as symbolized by the creation of the warfare designators and their accompanying insignia, which no longer represent a special qualification, but entirely separate communities.

Warrant officer has been anomalous almost since the inception of organized navies in the 16th century, but appears to have posed no major problems because it represented the social class realities of the times. The anomaly appears to have created more severe tensions in the U.S. Navy as social and economic patterns in America changed dramatically after WWII.

ENLISTED STRUCTURE

While technical skills and knowledge created certain tensions in the officer corps structure, they were the foundation of the structure of the enlisted force. In 1900 there were 37 ratings authorized. These were further divided into petty officers and enlisted men. Enlisted (that is non-petty officers) totalled 9 different specialties. The remaining twenty eight specialties were rated as petty officers. Ships' cooks and officers' cooks, stewards and mess attendants were neither petty officers nor rated but stood anomalously outside the rating structure. A further subdivision of the petty officers was that between seaman branch and engineering, artificer and special branch petty officers. Although the term no longer was in use, the first group were considered petty officers of the line with military and command responsibilities. For petty officers of the other branches, authority was extended only to the limits of their particular department. All rating groups were ranked, with top precedence being accorded to masters at arms. In short, although engineering officers had been incorporated into the line, engineering enlisted men had not.²⁶ The seaman branch petty officers exercised military and technical responsibilities while all others had only technical responsibilities (although, of course, they did have battle stations). Although some ratings have remained throughout the eighty year period, an overall picture of the enlisted structure is one of constant adjustment to fit new technical demands. A pattern of development can be seen to the extent that new skills or techniques tended to be incorporated into existing ratings until they became too demanding of time and training and then were recognized by developing a new rating. Examples are torpedoman and mineman, both of which represented part of the gunner's mate responsibilities. The torpedoman was first recognized

by a special distinguishing mark and finally, after World War I, a separate rating was established. Mine technology remained within the province of the gunner's mate, first being recognized by a distinguishing mark, then a division within the gunner's mate rating, and finally the creation of mineman during WWII.

Attempts to reduce the number of ratings or simplify the structure have gone on continuously, with ratings being disestablished, reestablished and combined regularly. Early sections have pointed out the history of quartermasters and signalman. Similar histories can be drawn for plumbers and fitters, hull technicians, metalsmiths and blacksmiths. The major motivation for many of these changes appears to have been a desire to avoid undue specialization in a rating and thus keep on-board manning to a minimum and fully and effectively employ a skilled sailor. There was a counter-pressure to avoid too wide a generalization and keep a set of related skills within a single rating, thus, among other things, easing the administrative burden of assigning enlisted people and at the same time providing a clear-cut progression of training and advancement.

The Navy of 1900 did not provide such a career path, depending on civilian experience to provide the level of artificer skills required. Many ratings were authorized at only one or two pay grades. In the artificer and special branches there were 32 petty officer ratings and only eight chief petty officer rates authorized. Two of these, chief commissary steward and commissary steward, in fact supervised personnel who were outside the rating structure altogether, actually reducing the number of CPO positions available to six. Only within the seaman branch was there a clear progression from entry level (apprentice, landsman) to CPO in all ratings. In the medical department, for instance, there were CPOs, petty officers third class (hospital apprentice third class) and hospital apprentices (which ranked with seaman second class).

By 1940 virtually all ratings had a clear line of advancement from recruit to CPO. By this time all ratings except steward fell within the enlisted structure. It was not until the 1950s that steward's mates were finally admitted to the ranks of petty officers.

1950 also marked a dramatic expansion in the number of ratings, some of which represented new technology and some the amalgamation of a number of tasks previously performed as special assignments for non-rated men (tailors, barbers, laundrymen, etc.), and still others the division of existing ratings which had become stretched thin by the incorporation of new duties.

Prior to WWI there was only a single rating clearly identified with administrative tasks, that of yeoman. It was not until 1920 that duties which had been part of some yeoman assignments and the various traditional jobs such as captain-of-the-hold or storeroom and jack-o-dust were amalgamated to form the rating of storekeeper. Among the ratings authorized for 1980 we find no less than fifteen purely administrative ratings, with four others having largely administrative responsibilities. This represents a magnitude of expansion greater than that of the technical ratings, and provides clear structural evidence of the increasing administrative and

managerial complexity of the Navy. (It should be noted that as yet there has been no officer designator developed for purely administrative purposes, except one held by inactive reservists only. Several administrative sub-specialties do exist however.)

The number of ranks or pay grades in the enlisted force remained unchanged until the 1960s when the senior and master chief petty officer rates were established. We can see that in the 1980 rating structure a situation roughly analogous to 1900 is beginning to develop, where in some ratings progression to senior and master CPO is effected by shifting to a different rating (see for instance GM and ST, which exist only at CPO, and FT, which is authorized only at SCPO and MCPO). On the other end of the ladder, the ratings LN, NC and MA do not have an authorized third class. Because of recruitment and training policy, many of the highly technical ratings do not go to their initial duty assignment until they have attained PO3 and in some cases PO2 status.

The increased need for enlisted ratings with high technical skills, particularly related to electronics, has had great impact on the rating structure and the traditional relationships on board. Using 1940 as a focus, we can characterize certain ratings as having prestige because strikers were selected from among the brightest and best educated of the seamen. Among these were quartermasters and signalmen in the seamen branch. In the Navy of 1980, however, the best educated sailors are directed into high-tech ratings. This, and changing tactical and communication patterns, have reduced the prestige of these ratings, particularly signalman.²⁷

The equation of one-job-one-rating has clearly been a standard toward which naval planners have striven. This, as we can see, has not in fact been achieved. The eighty-two rates now authorized are augmented by approximately 900 NECs, usually associated with one or more rates. NECs have made it easier to assign relevant skills to specific jobs, but have created many situations where a "gunner's mate is no longer a gunner's mate," having experienced repeated tours in an NEC and thus missing experience in the overall duties of the rate. The sea-shore rotation system has generated a similar situation, inasmuch as some ratings have no billets ashore, other than instructor,²⁸ which permit a sailor to remain current. This creates a pressure to return to sea duty to remain qualified for advancement. At the same time, a counter pressure is generated which encourages some senior enlisted to leave the service rather than face the problem of "catching up" while under the pressures of modern operational tempo.

Overall it appears that while the modern rating structure meets the standards of organizational and administrative logic, inasmuch as recruit training, advancement, and assignment for all ratings is essentially similar in plan, it does not meet the standards of operational logic which appears to have been the basis for organizational structure in the early 1900s.

In those years rating structure represented a complex of rules and skill levels required, which resulted in a confusing and unsystematic process of advancement, pay and authority. While a return to the system of 1900-1920 would probably not solve today's problems, certain elements of that structure might, with proper modification, reduce some structural tensions the Navy is experiencing.

DISCIPLINE

A summary of NJP rates shows a general reduction from 1900 to 1940 followed by an upward trend which, by 1980, approaches the rates common before 1920. These figures seem to answer the question of what a tolerable level of indiscipline is. An examination of the charges brought to mast in 1900 and in 1980 suggest that the number of serious offenses brought to mast today may in fact be greater than in the past. It is inconceivable that a sailor would be brought to mast for "breaking a cup" or "wearing a dirty undershirt" in today's Navy. Nor would the service today retain a sailor with the number of "repeat performances" which were within tolerable limits in 1900 and 1910. It is doubtful that sailors with NJP records as extensive as some of those recorded in the early 1900s would have been advanced to petty officer status in today's Navy.²⁹ (In one case, on U.S.S. Iowa in 1900, a chief petty officer was brought to mast five times in one year before being reduced to seaman.)

In the eighty year period the number and types of punishments meted out by commanding officers has narrowed. In part this has been due to changes in law or regulation, but one must not ignore the force of custom in changing what commanding officers and their subordinates considered appropriate. The introduction of the UCMJ has not reduced numbers of offenses committed. It may, however, have reduced the numbers of cases actually brought to mast because of increased procedural complexity of the NJP process. Despite its legal status, the NJP has become part of the judicial process. There are strong indications that the transformation has reduced or eliminated captain's mast as an effective management tool.

The frequency of unauthorized absence, or in pre-UCMJ terms, AOL and AWOL, appears to have little relation to severity of punishment. This suggests alternative means of dealing with overleave, particularly less than 24 hours, might be profitably explored.

The extremely high rate of cases related to liberty cards in 1930 suggests that sudden changes in policy can produce high offense levels if the people to whom the policy applies are not adequately oriented to the new system.

High NJP rates appear to correlate with periods of organizational instability. In 1900 the Navy was experiencing major changes in enlisted personnel policy in recruitment, rating structure and technology, and at the same time experienced high NJP rates. 1940 saw the end of two decades of absolute structural stability and coincided with the lowest NJP rates in this century. 1980, on the other hand, reports high NJP rates and is at the end of a period of extreme instability in virtually all areas. Nearly fifty ratings which did not exist in 1940 were authorized in 1980. A number of others have been created and disestablished (e.g., teleman, and hull technician) within relative short periods. Related to these changes are alterations in uniform, grooming, promotion, advancement and training policy.

RECRUITMENT

Recruiting appeals in the twentieth century have responded to perceived social and economic conditions in civilian life. Early recruiting tended to emphasize the more basic issues of steady pay plus being supplied with food, clothing and shelter, and the opportunity to learn useful skills.

Except in time of war, when the appeal was patriotic in nature, security of employment and learning opportunities continued to be the major recruiting appeals, although opportunity for advancement became an increasingly important theme. The world cruise of the Great White Fleet inspired the slogan, still in use in everyday life, if not in official recruiting literature, "join the Navy and see the world." In one form or another, the travel and adventure theme has played a part in recruiting since that time. In the early years great emphasis was placed on the honorable nature of naval service to counteract the reputation of sailors, which was common in America in the 19th century.

Interviews with entering recruits in 1980 suggest that the opportunity to learn marketable skills is still an important recruiting appeal. Travel, however, usually is mentioned in second or third place as an important consideration of a prospective Navy recruit. At least fifty percent of the modern recruits mention discipline as a factor in their considerations. Although it has not been a major public appeal, the general feeling that a period of service will "make a man" of a boy has most certainly played an important role in attracting youngsters into the service.

Harrod reports that in every year between 1899 and 1940, more people applied than were accepted into service. In most years physical factors constituted the major reason for rejection; often as many as fifty or sixty percent of the total applicants. Rejections for unspecified "other causes" amounted to almost as large a number as physical rejections. In no year did the number of recruits as a percentage of applications exceed 40 percent. First enlistment recruiting figures during the thirty years plus of draft motivated recruitment do not have the significance in terms of effectiveness of recruiting appeals and appropriateness of enlistment standards as do those accrued during the early period of voluntary enlistment.

The high rate of rejection does however suggest that physical standards in particular need to be constantly reviewed to adjust them to available manpower supplies. Discussions with people serving in the Recruit Commands and in elements of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery which deal with recruiting issues, suggests that the subject of standards is one which generates high levels of emotional response rather quickly; a behavioral clue which supports the suggestion even more strongly. It is possible that present standards are supported in part by organizational emotion, rather than a systematic and data-based assessment of appropriate standards.

In 1900 age requirements for enlistment were from 15 to 35. The higher age was permitted for the enlistment of already experienced seamen or artificers. The upper age for first enlistment of landsmen was 25. Current first enlistment ages are 17 to 34, which represents a slight narrowing of

enlistment opportunity over the eighty year period. It represents a reduction in the pool of potential recruits at a time when the demographic factors have reduced absolutely the number of people in the prime recruit population. One post WWII response to demographic pressures has been the expanded recruitment of women.

This study has not dealt with data which would be useful in determining whether dramatic changes in age or physical requirements would be advantageous. It does suggest however that perhaps these subjects deserve intensive scrutiny.

Certainly the most critical element of recruiting policy in this century was the decision to recruit American citizens. Its ramifications in the areas of training, advancement, retirement, and rating structure are discussed elsewhere. From the recruiting point of view, it eliminated a previously important enlistment standard: Experience. The Navy changed from an institution which drew trained personnel from civil life to one which offered an occupational opportunity and potential lifetime career to the young and inexperienced. This decision and its effects throughout the system created the institutional machinery which enabled the Navy to meet the enormous challenges of expansion in WWS I and II.

Another effect of the decision was to change the relationship of the Navy to the civilian population. Nation-wide recruiting efforts provided a Navy presence in inland areas. But more important, the concentration on American citizens created a civilian constituency with political power. This constituency, parents, relatives, and ex-Navy men themselves, could provide support, encourage recruiting, or apply pressure through Congress to effect changes in naval policy. It is doubtful that many of the personnel practices and policies which have developed through the past eighty years would have been put in place had the Navy been perceived of as being manned by foreigners and drifters rather than "the boys next door."

ADVANCEMENT

Advancement has evolved from a system which was, for practical purposes, in the hands of the commanding officer, depending on observed performance and the passing of practical examinations. Navy regulations provided the most general guidelines for commanding officers. The present system places advancement almost totally in the hands of the Naval Military Personnel Command and OPNAV, which determines time-in-rate and service requirements, knowledge and practical factors, examinations, determination of final multiples as well as the quotas for advancement in each class and rating, supervised on a Navy-wide basis. The power of the commanding officer in the process is expressed only in the requirement that his recommendation is required.

The present system has made predicting future possibilities within the service a much less risky task for the individual sailor and therefore has probably contributed to retention and personnel stability. On the other hand the depersonalization of the process does, in at least some instances, generate a sense of helplessness. In recent years the evaluation system used to promote officers has been extended into the enlisted ranks with

senior and master chief petty officers no longer taking examinations. Evaluations are playing an increasingly important role in the promotion of first and second class petty officers.

There is some evidence that policies which demand promotion at certain points as a criterion for re-enlistment eligibility may mean some petty officers have been promoted to levels in which they do not function well and are losing the Navy some unambitious but very competent journeymen petty officers. However, no clear-cut alternatives which would prevent stagnation and reduce overall promotion opportunity have been developed to date. Most certainly the present centralized system has contributed to a degree of standardization of skills and knowledge within ratings. The present system of advancement to, and retaining of, petty officer rates relates at least indirectly to good order and discipline, inasmuch as present policies will not long countenance a petty officer with a badly spotted record. Nor can one be demoted and then have a rate restored with the same ease as in the past.²⁹

The Navy has not yet developed a completely effective plan for continuing the advancement path from enlisted status. Subsequent to 1980 MCPOs have become eligible for advancement to chief warrant officer and technically to LDO. Few senior enlisted have availed themselves of these opportunities. Advancement to CWO entails little financial advantage. Confusion as to CWO responsibilities does not encourage senior enlisted to enter these programs. The possibility of eventually becoming an ensign or lieutenant (jg) is not particularly attractive to men entering early middle age, at the peak of their enlisted profession.

In general the various enlisted to officer programs are directed at younger sailors of from four to eight years' service. The enlisted force remains the smallest source of officer accessions.

LEAVE AND LIBERTY

These dimensions, although of extreme importance on a day-to-day basis, may well be what Herzberg has characterized as hygienic factors. High rates of indiscipline are recorded in the early years when leave and liberty policy were quite restrictive and in later years when they were very liberal. The lowest rates are reported in 1940 when three section and four section liberty was considered as liberal.

It is possible to argue that six section liberty is counter-productive because, with modern operational tempos, repair and maintenance requirements often require liberty to be cancelled. It may be better from the point of view of morale to have more people in the duty section to complete necessary work and thus allow those in the liberty sections to actually go ashore. Six section liberty for a boilertender or machinist's mate means very little, if, in fact, he must forego three of his five liberty nights to perform repairs which a six section duty section could not handle. Because such tasks do not fall evenly on all divisions, it might well reduce perceived inequities which do much to lower morale.

RETIREMENT

Retirement policy has remained in the main unchanged: Three-quarters pay after thirty years of service. One cannot help but feel that a formal retirement policy, something that was not at all common in civil life, was developed in part as a means of encouraging Americans to remain in service. Retirement also assured that there would be regular openings at the upper levels to permit advancement from below.

The 30-year enlisted career has not become the norm however. Drawing on figures supplied by the Bureau of Navigation, Harrad shows us that, between 1907 to 1916, from 1.5 to 1.9 percent of the enlisted force had served over 20 years.

Involuntary extensions and recalls destroy the significance of the war years. In 1921 the percentage of those serving over 20 years dropped to .4 and in 1923 and 1924 to .2, not to rise above .4 until 1932 and 1933. The years 1938 and 1939 report .8 and not until 1940, with involuntary extensions and preparation for war, does the figure jump to 1.8 percent. The figures for 1950 lose their significance because of involuntary extensions.

Creation of senior and master CPOs was expressly intended to encourage remaining in service past 20 years. It appears to have been only moderately successful. The percentage of enlisted personnel serving over 20 years in 1980 was fractionally more than 2.0 percent, the highest in this century. Although MCPO was clearly intended as a rating to be granted at or beyond the 20 year mark, variations in advancement policy have enabled many enlisted men to achieve MCPO before serving 20 years. These, of course, are the most desirable personnel to retain. In 1980 there was little to recommend an additional 10 years of service; further advancement was almost impossible and several years of sea duty almost inevitable.

The act which created the 20 year enlisted career as the norm was the creation of the Navy Reserve Force and, in 1925, the Naval Reserve. Regular Navy people were allowed to transfer into USNRF initially at 16 years, raised to 20 in 1925, with a 1/2 pay retainer, to be raised to 3/4 active duty pay upon completion of 30 years combined service. To date the Navy has not developed a program which makes 30 years of active service and retirement in one's late 40s or early 50s more attractive than a transfer to the Fleet Reserve in the late 30s or early 40s, a time when people are more competitive in civilian life.

UNIFORM AND GROOMING

Uniform regulations and practices illustrate clearly the distinction between official and unofficial (overt and covert) culture in the Navy. Clearly the uniform is a basic element in any military service and a primary focus of organizational and individual identification. As noted earlier the Navy has consistently been faced with a tension between the overt and covert aspects of uniforms. Officially the thrust has been toward uniformity and standardization. On the unofficial level, the pressure exerted by individual sailors has been to adhere to and express a "salty" style. A third

pressure has been the various interpretations of uniform and grooming regulations made by various commanding officers. Nonetheless, there was, for over sixty years, a general agreement between the naval establishment, individual sailors, and various senior officers as to what a sailor should look like. Any changes and variations in the uniform or interpretations of regulations took place within a set of culturally defined parameters on which there was consensus, not only in the Navy, but in the civil populace as well. Kreober and Richardson discussed this phenomenon of clothing style in 1932 and the propositions they put forth in relation to women's dress styles are equally applicable to naval uniform.³⁰

Of all the changes and developments, reorganizations, and adjustments made in every aspect of naval life from 1900 to 1970, uniform regulations changed least. "Salty" style varied from time to time, but the basic uniform provided a visible and daily foundation of cultural continuity. The shift to the fore and aft style uniform in the 1970s was a violation of this foundation. The Navy had resisted pressures for a change in that direction for several decades. The precise process of decision which led to the change is a subject which should be examined and described in detail. There is little doubt that the general population in the Navy was not comfortable with the new uniform and that it had little impact on general American expectations as to what a sailor should look like. Television, motion pictures, advertising and other civilian media did not recognize the uniform change and continued to picture sailors in bell bottoms and white hats long after they had been superseded.

Without suggesting a causal relationship, but at the same time not denying the possibility, one must point to the fact that first term attrition rates during the period of the new uniform were unusually high and that NJP rates continued to climb toward 1900 levels. It is entirely possible that the lack of distinction between the various levels of authority, which was traditional in the Navy, had some bearing on the levels of indiscipline.

Another factor related to this question is that of civilian clothing. The practice of wearing civilian clothing ashore created a situation in which many sailors seldom wore the service dress uniform, shifting from working dungarees to civilian clothing on a daily basis. The new regulations also eliminated the traditional undress uniforms; the changing into undress marked the separation between working hours and "knock off work."

Because the change was effected gradually, there was a proliferation of optimal uniforms, which appears to have developed an institutional tolerance for variation which was a clear departure from the past.

Records reveal that uniform and grooming violations were always a small fraction of the charges brought to mast. Inasmuch as a great deal of uniformity can be demonstrated prior to the 1970s we must assume that regulations were enforced at lower, more immediate levels. One such device was inspection of the liberty party, which reinforced the authority of junior officers and petty officers, who could refuse permission to leave the ship until a sailor adhered to regulations. In many ships a sailor was simply not given his liberty card by the chief or LPO if he did not adhere to

regulations. Similarly topside watches (signal bridge, navigation bridge, lookouts, quarterdeck sentries, etc.) were inspected informally and their supervisors held accountable.

The change to the new uniform generated new and various standards, making clearcut and simple enforcement difficult. The practice of wearing civilian clothes ashore eliminated the most effective opportunity for enforcement. This was exacerbated by the fact that regulations concerning civilian attire were vague and left much room for disagreement as to "appropriateness" between senior enlisted and junior officers and between both groups and senior officers as well as young sailors. Overall the situation was one in which many senior enlisted and junior officers simply stopped attempting to enforce uniform and grooming regulations.

It is obvious that the Navy, since 1900, has not found a totally satisfactory working uniform. A review of regulations reveals the institution has fought a losing battle to restrict the wearing of dungarees or to find a viable substitute. The regulations have regularly been eased. It is also clear that daily practice at any period violated the letter of the law and that these practices tended to become policy when the ensigns and lieutenants (jg) of one period became the admirals of another.

There has also been a strong pressure for the uniform to symbolize structural realities. The most recent examples:

- the development of the SWOS insignia to parallel existing insignia for submarine, aviation, and special warfare;
- the creation of devices to be worn by graduates of apprentice training.

An unavoidable implication of the study is that changes in uniform and insignia must be considered in the broadest of contexts, because as symbols of the service and its structural components they have potential impact on virtually every aspect of naval life.

The subject of grooming standards must be viewed briefly. From 1900 until the 1960s the regulations stood virtually unchanged. Prescribed hair length varied from time to time from 1-1/2 to 3 inches. Beards and mustaches were permitted throughout the period and, it would appear, worn or not worn in rough parallel to civilian styles. Until the 1930s, facial hair is generally seen only on senior officers. The 1960s marked a period of great concern about hair as styles among young people changed. The famous Z-gram 70 did not "permit" beards and mustaches. Rather, it pointed out that they had always been permitted at the discretion of the wearer. The often described decline in grooming standards appears to have been the result of the same sort of confusions described in the paragraphs above. Practice, custom, and style since the 1930s had favored the close shorn and clean shaven. Senior enlisted simply had no standards for judging the neatness of beards or sideburns and many simply did not try. Much of the turmoil quieted when clear-cut and detailed standards were promulgated. At the same time beards and extremely long hair were going out of style among the young in civil life. In the Navy, by 1980, beards were more often worn by chief petty officers and middle grade officers than by seamen and ensigns.

In summary the subject of grooming can be one which creates a great deal of unproductive diversionary activity without demonstrated relation to mission accomplishment. Because civil style has an obvious impact on Naval personnel, it is a mistake to consider the matter one over which the Navy has total control.

PAY AND RECOGNITION

Navy pay has been based on three principles: 1) Technical Competence; 2) Authority and Responsibility; and 3) Length of Service.

Reviewing various pay schemes since 1900 leads one to conclude that factors 1 and 2 are in continual conflict.

In 1900 although the CMAA, for instance, was the senior enlisted man aboard, his salary of \$65.00 was less than that of the CMM whose authority was limited to his department. In almost every instance where a differentiation existed between sailors rated in the same class, it was in favor of the artificer and special branches. In some cases artificers earned more than higher ranked seamen.

A system based on same-class-same-pay did not come into effect until about WWI. There appear to be two factors operating to bring this about: 1) The greater emphasis on the military authority of petty officers vice their technical responsibilities; 2) the greater number of artificers who were learning their skills in the Navy, thus reducing the need to compete for skilled artificers.

This system held firm until after WWII, protected by the depression and the demands of the war.

The increasing demand for technical ratings and a reversed competition in which the civil world seeks to attract Navy trained technicians, has created a situation increasingly analogous to that of 1900. Although the base-pay system remains in place, proficiency, flight, and submarine pay, as well as variable re-enlistment bonuses, mean that the income of all second class petty officers, for example, is not the same. This coincides with a period when the military responsibilities of the petty officer have been increasingly de-emphasized.

Long service payments have changed from a rather haphazard system to one with regular increments. In the past, continuous service was an element in the pay schedule. It is absent today, except in the form of re-enlistment bonuses. "Foggies" are paid for service, continuous or broken.

In general, Navy pay has had to adjust to compete in the market for skills. This has, in the final analysis, overridden the concept of paying more for authority and responsibility, or of equal pay for equal rank. Whether this impacts negatively on the authority of petty officers, or is itself in part an indirect cause of changes in attitudes toward that authority, is a subject beyond the scope of this study.

TRAINING

In the opening years of this century Navy training practice was quite simple: except for basic training and education, apprentice training, and USNA, most other training and educational activities were conducted at sea and training methodology was essentially experiential. A very few in-service schools were in operation and those open to a select group of what we would today consider to be career sailors. At least until 1910 several ships, as much as an entire squadron, were involved in providing actual sea-going working experience for apprentices and landsmen. Apprentice training included a number of general education subjects which reflect the age of most of the people who entered that program. In general one can say that the Navy maintained, into this century, the basic suspicion of "school training," which had characterized the service during the 19th century. Most Navy technicians were drawn from civilian populations as already trained craftsmen.

Today's Navy not only assumes the need to provide shoreside training for recruits, both in basic naval training and in technical subjects before they go to sea, but also requires additional training periodically throughout a naval career for both officers and enlisted people.

The magnitude and complexity of the training system reflects the complexity of modern technological and administrative procedures. It also is in part the result of the decision to recruit American citizens without previous experience at sea or in a trade and train them up from "scratch." This decision impacted on the way we recruit, our basic approach to skills, and a growing assumption which has become a virtually unquestioned foundation of the modern Navy: what the Navy needs, the Navy will train. The growth of the training function of the Navy was, of course, accelerated by the sudden demands made by WWI and WWII, but the basic assumption was made long before these events.

The long range consequence of this decision has been to create a situation wherein an extremely large proportion of the force is, at any one time, involved in training and educational activities. Only during wartime has the service taken advantage of skills which already existed in the civilian population by recruiting experienced technicians. It is possible that a greater dependence on the training and educational institutions of the civil world as a source of needed technicians, particularly in periods of low employment, might well ease the training burden on the service. This is perhaps very important in critical technical areas where junior people simply do not possess enough skill to be useful at sea, necessitating extremely long training pipelines.

Oddly enough the astronomical growth of the training function, both in size and importance, has not led to structural changes. Only one rating, Training Device Man, is devoted to training (although several NECs and instructors do exist). Instruction is considered to be a part of the responsibility of petty officers of all rates and ratings. Similarly there is no officer designator for education, although a number of education related sub-specialties do exist. One might speculate that the general line has been reluctant to surrender this increasingly important function to

internal specialization. The result is that there are relatively few personnel in uniform who can be considered educational professionals, a situation which exposes the service to dependence on outside sources for policy guidance and developmental assistance in training and educational matters.

This is particularly true in the relatively new areas of education and training in the so called non-technical areas: leadership, management, intercultural relations, human behavior, equal opportunity, race relations, and drugs and alcohol; all of which are becoming more and more important elements of the training system. While instructors in technical subjects can be found from among the enlisted people and officers experienced in the field (e.g., signaling, gunnery, radar operation), the "softer" subjects cannot draw on people with backgrounds in these fields.

Overall, Navy training, particularly technical training, has been spectacular in its success and the service, in one sense, suffers from that success. The Navy is seen as an excellent source of trained personnel for industry and commerce, which seeks out Navy people in every specialty from pilot to electronics technician to boatswains' mates.

This situation, on the other hand, has provided the service with its most successful recruiting appeal.

One cannot escape thinking that the service would benefit if at least a small community of professional career naval educators and trainers were developed to provide expert state-of-the-art guidance in this crucial endeavor.

One cannot avoid suggesting that explorations of effective means of recruiting trained personnel from civilian life and integrating them into the service might well reduce the increasingly expensive (in money and manpower) training pipelines required to produce and maintain the levels of technical competence required in the fleet.

One other factor must be considered when we summarize Navy training. In a world where technical and administrative policy and practices change rapidly, the singular importance of seniority and expertise as a basis for exercising authority is continually weakened. Most naval officers and senior petty officers have learned most of what they know about personnel issues, advancement requirements, leave and liberty policy, school assignments, not to mention uniform and grooming regulations, in an experiential manner by either having gone through the process themselves or by learning from others in that most important Navy training process the "sea story session." In a context where experientially learned knowledge is quickly outmoded, some method must be devised to keep the so called "middle manager" abreast of developments. This is not only essential for the smooth operation of the system but for the maintenance of the authority and prestige of officers and petty officers.

ASSIGNMENT AND ROTATION

In 1900 it would appear to have been possible for a sailor to spend an entire enlistment, or several, serving in the same ship. There were no provisions for rotation ashore, although continuous service men could count on

four months on a receiving ship at the end of each enlistment. Reenlistment thus provided an opportunity for changing duty stations. Many shore billets were occupied by people enlisted for one year tours of special service. A sailor with twenty-five years service could apply for shore duty.

The 1980 picture is one in which rotation from sea to shore and back again is automatic and the system, in theory, responds to the desires of individual sailors.

The stated aims of the present system were to reduce family separations and the inequities which developed in the 1950s and 1960s when some sailors experienced repeated tours at sea without relief. To a degree these aims have been met. Rotation for most members of the Navy does occur and at least a rough equity of sea-shore rotation has been established. Family separations have indeed been reduced in length, but regular displacement of families moving from one duty station to the next every two or three years has created an equally vexing problem. It should be recalled that the present system was put in place when the Navy was considerably larger. One is forced to speculate that the system as presently operated does not fit the present situation as neatly as it once did. Many sailors and officers complain that the impression is that people are being regularly and sometimes arbitrarily displaced in order to adhere to rotation policy. It is entirely possible that the system as officially described, raises expectations which simply cannot be met under present circumstances. The home-steading concept, which is being discussed and experimented with, is perhaps an adjustment which may reduce some of the stresses generated by the present sea-shore rotation system.

Another problem created by the system which is frequently mentioned is the fact that tenure in a particular billet and unit is so short that it inhibits the development of unit identification, which is perhaps the strongest morale builder in any military system. The rapid turnover of officers and senior petty officers does not allow the crew to develop a sense of permanency, a feeling that "in this ship this is the way it's done." This generates a high level of day-to-day instability and often a sense of irresponsibility because "everyone is always short." This complaint is not completely supported by an examination of the record. A cursory examination of the record since 1900 suggests that the tenure of a commanding officer has been, on the average, about two years. A review of the service of Chiefs of Naval Operations indicates that a transfer every two to three years has been a norm in this century.

The record leaves one with a distinct impression, however, that transfers were often from oneship to another. One is also struck by the fact that repeated command tours, if not the norm, were very common until at least the 1950s. Review of the documentation yields little information on enlisted rotation. Interviews with veterans of the 1920s and 1930s and official policy requiring six years at sea before shore duty eligibility, suggest that enlisted personnel remained in place much longer than did officers.

In general the data suggest that extremely long stretches of sea duty generated dissatisfaction in post-WWII operational climates. But, on the other hand, too frequent movement ashore or afloat and between sea and shore, especially if it requires family relocation, also generates dissatisfaction. At the same time it contributes to a sense of institutional instability which prevents development of genuine unit identification, which, if properly developed, may act to counter balance dissatisfactions ashore.

An overriding question is whether there is any system of rotation which can, on one hand, satisfy the Navy's need for continual manning of sea billets with expert personnel and at the same time meet the demands of American cultural attitudes toward equity. The modern Navy has shifted from a force which was largely at sea to one in which a major portion of its personnel must be ashore at any given time for training or to engage in support activities for the forces afloat. A number of specialties do not have many (or in some cases any) sea billets, so that some personnel will spend their entire careers ashore, either in CONUS or overseas. This is a result of changes in naval warfare and, one suspects, requires a revised view of exactly what a Navy is or does. Not all members of the Navy can become sailors in the traditional sense of the word. Alternatives to short term rotation as a means of dealing with the sea-shore problem might be significant wage differentials between sea and shore duty (today's maximum for career sea duty pay is approximately \$100.00 per month, earned by relatively few); altering career expectations so that early years of service have a greater percentage of sea duty than the later years; granting periodic sabbaticals for career personnel; permitting those who wish to remain at sea to do so; and area homesteading. Some of these ideas have been tentatively considered but none seriously tested.

AUTHORITY

The Navy entered the twentieth century as a relatively small force in which general authority was rather widely fragmented and held very narrowly by those who actually exercised it. The narrowness of authority is illustrated by regulations quoted in earlier sections which appear to have limited authority to suppress a riot, for instance, to officers within a command. Questions of seniority and responsibility were not infrequently a matter of bitter dispute, the most well known example being the controversy between Admirals Sampson and Schley.

On a day-to-day on board basis the same narrow lines of authority appear to have existed. the primary mechanism of enforcement of even the most minor regulations appears to have been captain's mast and the agent of that enforcement, the master at arms force. To a lesser extent some general authority was accorded to petty officers of the seaman branch, who, until a few years before, had been classified as petty officers of the line. Comments in official and semi-official publications indicate that in practice even these petty officers tended to exercise their authority narrowly, that is in their own departments or in their own parts of the ship. Seaman branch petty officers did however have precedence not only over petty officers from other branches of the same class, but, in military matters, any petty officer of the special and artificer branches. This particular

approach to enlisted authority reflects the organization of a sailing warship in the sense that the bulk of the crew consisted of landsmen, apprentices, and seamen needed to man the numerous guns. The artificers and special branch people of the sailing Navy constituted a relatively small number of generally older specialists who, as long as they observed regulations and carried out their technical duties, did not need the day-to-day supervision of enlisted superiors. The introduction of steam created a situation in which another branch of the ship was manned very much like the deck force. The large numbers of coal passers and firemen (82 out of a total on board of 398 on the U.S.S. Iowa) required to operate the ship's machinery required supervision in the same way as did the landsman, apprentice, and seaman of the deck force.

In practice the two branches remained quite separate, messing, berthing, and working in different spaces so that the authority of the petty officers in charge of each branch seldom clashed.

We have seen that the concept of all petty officers having both military and technical responsibilities began to develop in the first decade of this century. It was clearly articulated as policy by 1920 and remained the basic policy and practice until after WWII. It remains unquestioned policy, but practice has indeed changed. Any explanation of this change in institutional attitude must be speculative but the data presented do encourage such speculation.

The shift may rest very directly on the nature of naval service until WWII. At no period in our history have sailors been required to go ashore and operate as land troops more frequently than between 1900 and 1940. Detachments had gone ashore in Cuba. Landing parties to deal with rebel forces continued to be a necessity in the Philippines for several years. Sailors formed part of the force which relieved Peking. Armed parties often in large number went ashore in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Mexico and China. A detachment of sailors manned the large railway guns on the Western Front in WWI and other detachments fought ashore at Murmansk and in Siberia. Others went ashore under arms in the Adriatic and Eastern Mediterranean. To be sure, the bulk of naval service during WWI was at sea, but at the same time most of the Navy was composed of reservists or war time enlistments. It is safe to say that for a regular Navy officer or enlisted man in the first forty years of this century, the prospects of action ashore were much higher than those for action at sea (of the sixty-eight graduates of the Naval Academy memorialized in Dahlgren Hall as winners of the Congressional Medal of Honor, twenty-five were decorated for service ashore at Vera Cruz in 1914). Another institutionally memorable operation of the U.S. Navy in the early years of this century was the cruise of the Great White Fleet. This was perhaps the most important non-combat operation carried out by the Navy since its inception. One of the regular activities of the fleet was to hold a parade in each port of call. A strictly military organization was required to form and drill the large bodies of men required in the marching parties, setting another standard of military responsibility for petty officers detailed as squad leaders, platoon sergeants, etc. That petty officers of other than the seaman branch were expected to assume these duties is evidenced in the 1961 Bluejacket's Manual which states clearly that a machinist mate should be able, in addition to his technical duties,

to drill a body of men. The importance of military drill continued, particularly on capital ships, which were expected to provide marching parties for local parades and celebrations all during the 1920s and 1930s.

A third factor which has already been mentioned is the institution of a regular shore patrol in which each ship in port supplied a number of petty officers. The need to distribute this duty equitably led to the investing of all petty officers with police responsibilities. The disestablishment of the rating of master at arms and the practice of assigning these duties to petty officers of the seaman branch and, eventually, to other petty officers, added another element of non-technical or positional authority to the role of petty officer.

A final and more general factor is that, by 1920, the decision to recruit American citizens and train them had created an enlisted force which had, for the most part, similar basic military training as apprentice seamen. We cannot discount the possibility that officers were themselves more willing to entrust responsibility to American citizens with whom they shared many common assumptions and attitudes. By 1920 at least many of the chief petty officers in all branches were themselves veterans of the new recruiting and training policy. The role of chief petty officer itself appears to have been more fully defined as a major interfacing link between officers and crew than it was in the earlier decades of the century. To an increasing degree the CPO was seen as the key figure in the day-to-day management of the enlisted force and the direct representative of authority. The instigation of the liberty card system in the late 1920s also placed a formidable tool for enforcement, as well as a symbol of authority, in the hands of the senior enlisted people.

By 1940 the concepts which were first expressed thirty years earlier appear to have been dominant. All petty officers were assumed to hold military responsibility. Although the seaman branch still had precedence over other petty officers, class or rank had become more important and one no longer sees officers enjoined to avoid putting "left arm" CPOs in charge of "right arm" petty officers, although in practice aboard ship this was seldom done. The development of a close knit CPO mess probably contributed to enforcement inasmuch as it was generally the practice for a CPO observing misbehavior to bring it to the attention of the CPO actually in charge of the miscreants, unless the situation was flagrant. The demands of nationwide recruiting and apprentice seaman training also made it necessary to use petty officers of a number of different ratings as company commanders and recruiters.

The low number of NJPs reported in 1940, particularly in capital ships, suggests strongly that a multitude of offenses which previously had been reported by a master at arms and taken to mast were now resolved by petty officers. The increase in petty officer responsibility after the rating of master at arms was abolished suggests that there is a danger in over-specialization, inasmuch as it seems an inescapable part of human behavior to avoid responsibilities which are clearly assigned to a specialist.

The post war increase in reported NJPs appears to coincide with a shift in official emphasis on the duties of the petty officer; more and more attention is given to technical rather than military duties. An increasing

number of petty officers actually qualified for those positions by virtue of school attendance rather than through apprenticeships at sea. The abandonment of precedence between ratings, as noted earlier, appears to have gradually changed the attitude towards petty officers which resulted in class being increasingly seen as a measure of technical competence rather than an indication of military authority.

A further issue is the rapid increase in technical and administrative ratings in which the opportunity to exercise leadership is minimal. The broadly based military pyramid which characterized both the deck and the engine room is not appropriate to high tech, or administrative functions, in various fields of electronics for instance. In many ships work groups of high tech or administrative people may consist only of petty officers or of a senior petty officer, often a CPO, and only one or two strikers. In these situations authority is less a function of position and more a result of expertise and personal influence. In some sense the increase in ratings of this type has created a structural situation analogous to that of the 1900s when a few petty officers directed most of the ship's crew, save for a small number of artificers, whose position as petty officer was a recognition of their expertise and the market forces which required certain levels of pay.

In short there appear to be, as was recognized in 1900, two kinds of petty officers required to run a ship. The first must combine technical expertise with leadership and management ability in order to direct the labors of relatively large numbers of subordinates. The second holds his or her position by virtue of direct exercise of personal skills and knowledge and has neither time nor opportunity for the general exercise of authority. The assumption that the military authority of these diverse types of petty officer is exactly the same appears to encourage the abandonment of authority by all. While this does not imply that a return to the structure of the 19th century would solve today's problems, it does suggest that an institutional admission that the needs of the service require that some ratings exercise more general authority than others would lead to an overall improvement in petty officer performance by a clarification of expectations.

The Navy appears to be responding to problems of leadership by developing training programs at various levels of the structure and taking steps to enhance the position of petty officers. It has not yet, in any official sense, addressed the question of whether the structure of the Navy might not in fact be strengthened by reducing the number of roles expected to exercise general military authority.

GENERAL SUMMARY

The Navy has often been characterized as an extremely conservative and almost backward organization which resists change as a matter of principle. A review of the data presented in this report suggests that this view is simply not correct. An examination through time of any one of the dimensions explored reveals an almost constant state of change and adjustment. The contrast between the material Navy, the personnel Navy, or the organizational Navy of 1900 with that of 1980 would on the surface be a study of two entirely different organizations with little relation one to the other. The sense of continuity is remarkable. From an anthropological point of

view, the Navy demonstrates not stagnation and wrong headed conservatism, but rather a remarkable degree of cultural vitality which has enabled it to survive historical, economic, policial, technological, and social changes of the highest order of magnitude.

The essence of that vitality has been cultural; the service has, particularly on the symbolic level of its existence, maintained its own identity and made necessary changes and adjustments within definite cultural parameters. The conservatism of the Navy might be more profitably described as a struggle to maintain the cultural integrity of the service.

Only one example of this symbolic vitality is that of the uniform which, despite internal and external pressures, remained recognizably the same for a period of more than seventy years. Even more remarkable, when an extreme change was effected the service was able to recognize the threat this represented to its cultural continuity and retreat to within traditional cultural parameters while doing minimal damage to the system. This kind of cultural retrenchment, while not unknown, is nonetheless remarkable.

It is hoped that this study may contribute to, and encourage others to explore further, an understanding of the essential traits and characteristics of the Navy as a culture; which would allow future planners to identify policies and practices which will contribute to the continued vitality of the service; and thus avoid those which may weaken this important continuity as well as avoiding expending energy on issues which have no real impact on the system for either good or evil.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL MATRIX

It was the original intent of the principal investigator to develop a matrix which would be useful for naval planners in predicting possible impacts of one area of decisions on another. Unfortunately, at this level of analysis, we have concluded that such a matrix would not serve the purpose for which it was intended. There can be no question, based on the data and analysis as it stands, that certain consistent relationships do exist. Decisions about recruiting do have direct and long lasting impact on the question of training. The creation of a new rating does affect the structure of the enlisted force, both covertly and overtly. Rapid and frequent changes in any of the major areas of personnel policy do appear to be closely linked with good order and discipline.

The time lag between decision and impact is less clearly demonstrated. The incorporation of the engineer into the line resulted in an immediate (and one would presume foreseeable) shortage of engineering officers, which in turn required the warranting of one hundred machinists, which in turn began to affect the overall attitude toward the duties and responsibilities of warrant officers in general. The introduction of new technical and administrative practices appears to have threefold impact: first on the creation of an enlisted job; then a rating; and finally the development of a warrant specialty. At a much later time it would seem such changes may or may not impact officially on commissioned structure.

Some of the dimensions selected may not have been appropriate. Retirement is a case in point. The policy has not changed significantly for a long period. Its impact on enlisted careers, however, has been obscured by the Fleet Reserve option, which has been regularly chosen by most career enlisted. On the other hand we may be seeing, twenty years after the act, the impact of the creation of senior and master chief petty officer rates, which seems to be affecting the higher percentage of people remaining on active duty after twenty years.

The arbitrarily-selected ten year intervals used in the horizontal dimension of the proposed matrix may not be the appropriate choice. Actual historical events may be more useful or, if it is possible to determine, some measure of operational tempo at a particular time.

Even without the complete development of the matrix, it seems clear from the data and analysis presented that certain aspects of personnel policy are recurring, the combining and separating of certain ratings for instance. This suggests that some underlying structural, or perhaps even cultural issue, is repeatedly not being addressed.

We are more and more inclined to suggest that the "generational" element in naval personnel history is extremely important. Put simply, practices experienced by the ensigns of one period may well become policy when those ensigns become admirals.

FOOTNOTES

¹Kroeber, A.L., and Kluckhohn, Clyde, Culture: Papers of Peabody Museum, Harvard University, Vol. 47, No. 1. Cambridge 1952.

²Professional concern with this issue is evidenced by the regular appearance of articles on the subject in Naval Institute Proceedings.

³Destroyer data from logs of 1902 and 1903. No logs for 1900 were available.

⁴Due to the nature of the data used, no ship with a crew larger than 800 was in the 1970 sample.

⁵Harrod, Fredrick S., Manning the Modern Navy; The Development of the Modern Naval Enlisted Force, 1899-1940, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, London 1978.

⁶Karsten, Peter, The Naval Aristocracy, The Free Press, New York, 1972.

⁷The term "chief" has a long history. It did not, however, refer to rank, being rather something of a synonym for the term "leading." Not all ratings boasted a chief, but where it did appear it was applied to a rating classed as that of petty officer first class (NR 1876). Even at these early dates certain "principle" petty officers were permitted officer style uniforms. (UR)

⁸The single admiral, Dewey, and 18 rear admirals all had entered the service prior to 1859. The most junior ensigns had seven years of service.

⁹A special act of Congress had authorized the promotion of at least one enlisted man to the rank of ensign for heroism in Samoa during the hurricane of 1889.

¹⁰The Dewey Medal and the Sampson Medal were authorized in 1898 to memorialize Santiago and Manila Bay.

¹¹Valle, James E., Rocks and Shoals, Order and Discipline in the Old Navy, 1800-1861, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1980.

¹²At one point in the post-Civil War period, the principle of comparability was carried to the point of creating the rank of ensign (jg) to compare with second lieutenant. It was almost immediately disestablished when it was pointed out that an ensign (jg) would actually be a rank lower than a second lieutenant.

¹³Valle (op cit) pp. 15-16.

¹⁴Coxswains to the C-in-C, lamplighters, etc., were "ratings" in special jobs, which set the holder apart from regular seaman or landsmen, but which might or might not be classed as petty officers.

¹⁵Mates performed whatever duties they were assigned by the commanding officer. (NR)

¹⁶Warrant machinist was the only community in which every member had at least some enlisted service.

¹⁷Contrary to statements made in the Uniform Regulations, trousers in the 19th century were indeed bell bottomed. Fatterns and specifications in Uniform Regulations, 1899, called for a close fit on the upper leg and a flare below the knee.

¹⁸The rating of schoolmaster was disestablished in 1900. (Harrod)

¹⁹In the past, most musicians had been foreigners. The recruiting of American citizens cut off this source of supply, necessitating the founding of a school.

²⁰Cf tables of contents of Bluejackets' Manuals in the appendix.

²¹It should be remembered that most of the carrier captains and admirals of WWII had begun their careers as surface officers. Many, like Halsey, earned their wings in middle age in order that the Navy have aviators of senior enough rank to qualify for large commands.

²²Zumwalt, Elmo, Jr., On Watch, Quadrangle, New York 1976.

²³The equation of pilot and officer was not complete even in our Navy. The rating of first class and chief aviation pilot existed until after WWII. Two squadrons of carrier aircraft were piloted by enlisted men during the war.

²⁴In such societies segmentary opposition is counterbalanced by the fact that the opposing groups usually practice exogamy, that is they marry each other. The Navy has no such unifying device to counteract the fragmenting tendencies of segmentary opposition.

²⁵CWO J.B. Hart, U.S.N.: "Warrant Officers; Use Them or Lose Them," NIP April 1982, pp. 54.

²⁶Over the years changes in the engineering rates had been occurring, with machinist's mates becoming the boatswain's mates of the engineering department.

²⁷Downs, J.F., "Environment, Communications and Status Change Aboard an American Aircraft Carrier," Human Organization, Vol. 17., No. 3, 1959

²⁸The "instructor" in a computer learning center is essentially an administrator who manages the flow of completed assignments. The opportunity to interact with students is minimal and the role of military superior drastically reduced. The student thus lacks the petty officer role model previously provided by the podium instructor.

²⁹It is no longer possible to re-rate a disgraced sailor in a few weeks or months as it was in the past.

³⁰Xroeber, A.L., and Richardson, Jane, Three Hundred Years of Women's Dress Styles, University of California, Anthropological Records, 1932.

A P P E N D I C E S

A. "GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE"

B. BLUEJACKETS' MANUAL TABLES OF CONTENTS

1902

1940

1978

C. NON-JUDICIAL PUNISHMENT RATES

A P P E N D I X A

"GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE"

APPENDIX A

GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE: THE HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS

By:

James F. Downs, PhD.

A paradox of naval life is that we refer so frequently to tradition but spend so little time trying to learn and understand our history. When we consider that our standards of personnel behavior are frequently based on our view of the "Old Navy," this paradox becomes a problem. Examples of this use of the past as a standard are the "pride and professionalism" statements of Admiral Thomas Hayward. These urge a return to a more traditional naval lifestyle, a restoration of prestige and authority of petty officers and regaining military values. This is not a matter of personal style. Admiral Elmo E. Zumwalt repeatedly referred to tradition and the actions of his predecessors in support of his program. In addition, our individual personal experience, or the most cursory reading of naval memoirs and biographies suggests that we, as a profession, tend to see the "Old Navy" (whenever it may have been) as a period of greater discipline, more obedient sailors and more competent officers and petty officers.

The danger of basing today's standards on our memories of the past is that our memories may not serve us well. We may be trying to meet goals established in the glow of nostalgia. It might be argued that it really doesn't make any difference whether our view of the past is correct as long as the standards we derive from that view are sound. Good management practices would suggest, however, that if we set impossible goals for ourselves and for the organization, we are creating a situation which develops high levels of frustration and stress. On the organizational level it creates a kind of frenzied paranoia which generates ever increasing numbers of regulations, directives, and instructions, supported by more and more frequent and arbitrary inspections, all demanding higher and higher levels of reporting. To strive for excellence is one thing, but to create standards which can never be met is another. One sets the tone which encourages effort. The other creates the environment of frustration and failure.

If, on the other hand, the memories of our senior leaders are correct; if there was a time in the past when levels of good order and discipline were higher, when petty officers were more responsible and competent, when the system in general was tauter and smarter, common sense argues that we should study in detail the conditions and processes which produced those sailors and petty officers.

The research upon which this article is based was undertaken to ask two questions. First: Was the "Old Navy" better disciplined than today's Navy? And secondly: If it was, what did we do then that we aren't doing now?¹

To this end the deck logs of a number of ships were collected at ten year intervals beginning in 1900. The number of captain's masts were counted, the offenses classified and the punishments awarded recorded. Ship types examined included battleships, carriers, cruisers, destroyers, colliers, oilers and fleet tugs.

Operating on the assumption that the rate of non-judicial punishment is at least a rough index of good order and discipline, the rates of mast cases, as a percentage of the total on board the ship type in question, were compiled.²

An additional product of the research was an analysis of actual on-board manning drawn from quarterly muster lists to determine the distribution of ranks and rates on board.

The most obvious conclusion one can draw from these figures is that in the earliest years of the century the NJP rates were extremely high. In battleships and destroyers the rate represents approximately two captain's masts for each person on board. The overall average for battleships, cruisers, and destroyers in 1900 would probably have been higher except that the USS Chicago did not, apparently, send sailors who were over leave only a few hours, to mast (unauthorized absence under one day was, throughout the 80 year period, the most frequent single offense).

Although the rates vary between ship types and there is a slight increase in overall 1920 rate over those of 1910, the trend from the high point at the beginning of the century was down until the year 1940. That year marks a surprising low point as contrasted not only with previous years but with subsequent periods as well.

If our basic assumption is correct, we can say, in answer to the first question, that the really "Old Navy" of pre-WWI times was far from ideal. And, it would seem, that the late 1930s and 1940 was a period of relative disciplinary tranquility. This is particularly significant if we examine the careers of our most recent senior naval leaders. Admiral Thomas Hayward graduated in the class of 1946, Admiral James Holloway in the class of 1945 and Admiral Elmo E. Zumwalt in the class of 1943. In short, these men and their generation received their training and indoctrination to naval life under the tutelage of junior officers and with the guidance of chief petty officers who had experienced a long period of improvement in discipline and professional competence. Thus Admiral Hayward is not engaging in nostalgia. Rather, he is drawing on his own rather accurate memories and experiences of a period when standards of professionalism were indeed higher than they are today (or indeed than they ever had been before).

The answer to the second question, what were we doing then that we aren't doing now, is not amenable to numerical or statistical proof. Rather we must examine the conditions and procedures of the past to determine how they impacted on good order and discipline.

It is tempting to credit the low captain's mast rate of 1940 to the Great Depression. We could argue that in times of economic hardship, sailors were afraid to misbehave because they would be sent out into the cold jobless civilian world. This, at first glance would be supported by the re-enlistment figures for the late 1930s which soared to the 90% plus levels as the unemployment rates climbed to over 24 percent. If, however, a taut, smart, competent Navy is nothing more than the product of national and international economic conditions, we must simply resign ourselves to having a good Navy when times are bad and a slack and lubberly one during affluent

times. I think there are few people in the naval service as resigned and fatalistic as that. Moreover, the figure for 1950 when unemployment was only 5.3%, only slightly higher than 1940, suggests that good order and discipline are not simply a product of "bad times." To understand the factors involved we must separate effects of external events from the consequences of internal policies and procedures.³

Although the simple explanation of the impact of the Depression may misstate the case, it would be foolish to assume that such a national catastrophe had no effect at all. In the early 1930s fiscal constraints, the results of the disarmament conferences of the 1920s, kept the Navy undermanned and relatively stable in total numbers. The pressure of the Depression did indeed influence the number of young men seeking enlistment. Naval veterans we have interviewed recall lines four abreast forming around the block when the Navy recruiters made periodic visits to towns such as Omaha, Nebraska. As the Depression worsened and more and more people chose to remain in the service, the number of youngsters entering each year was reduced. By 1940, the Navy was composed of relatively high numbers of long service people. Harrod⁴ shows us that in 1907, the first year such statistics are available, 78% of the enlisted force had served less than four years. Only 8.7% of the force had more than eight years of service. In 1910 the eight-year figure had climbed to 9.3%, while in 1920 it rose to 10.2%. In 1940 the over eight years service percentage had risen to 26.2%. Another 16.2% of the force had over four years service, leaving only 57.6% of the force composed of Depression years recruits with less than four years service.⁵ If we contrast the 1940 situation with that of 1907 we can see that the early day petty officer or leading seaman had thirteen juniors to supervise and train. In 1940 this ratio had dropped to slightly less than three-to-one, two-to-one if we consider the four-to-eight year cohort as "veterans." In short, the Navy in 1940 was the beneficiary of longer service and greater occupational and leadership competence.

In most cases people with more service are older than people with less service. That being the case we can contrast the early years, when almost 80% of the enlisted force was in a first enlistment (and some had enlisted at age 16), which suggests that the bulk of the enlisted force was in its teens. Thus we are dealing not only with naval experience but also with maturity. The 1940 Navy had a much higher ratio of people in their mid and late 20s and early 30s. Single men in barracks, as Kipling said, do not grow into plaster saints, but older men have often learned the lessons of youth and have more self control and sophistication. The thirty year old has probably learned when one more drink is too much. He'll be back on board on time and perhaps suffer a hangover. But the youngster might well take the extra drink and slug the shore patrol. Thus, one apparent consequence of the depression was to create a more experienced and, above all, older and more mature enlisted force in which the burden of leadership and guidance did not fall so heavily on a relatively few shoulders. It is a good thing to remember that the loss of a career petty officer is not simply the loss of badly needed and hard to replace technical skills, but also irreplaceable maturity. It also increases the burden of leadership on those who remain on board and reduces their effectiveness. Thus we can suggest without much fear of contradiction, that an older enlisted force is probably a more disciplined and more competent force.

The average age of the enlisted force can be impacted by two things: the age of the people you recruit and how long you are able to keep them in the service. Minimum and maximum age requirements, broken service enlistment policy, and lateral or advanced pay grade entry are all issues which impact on the first factor. The second is influenced by active retention programs, as well as the sailor's own assessment of actual naval experience. In considering the cost effectiveness of direct or indirect retention programs, we must not lose sight of the true cost of loss of maturity on the overall environment in which all sailors must live.⁶

The second external factor which had a very direct impact on morale as evidenced by NJP and re-enlistment rates is the international situation.

By 1940 the wars in Europe and Asia were being felt in the American armed forces. The Navy was experiencing the first stages of rapid expansion. The draft had been put in place and the prestige of the military was on the rise. Military service had become more than an alternative to the CCC or WPA. Newsreels featured a closing scene of a column of battleships breasting the waves. In 1940 Life Magazine devoted an entire issue to the Navy. Books for young people were published providing information about military organization, ranks and insignia, ship and aircraft types and other details of military life. The ability to identify military and naval rank and organizational insignia, as well as decoration and campaign ribbons, became matters of pride and competition among young men and women. It was "smart" in all classes to use military slang. Boy scout troops, led by veterans of WWI, learned close order drill. Moreover, newspaper and news magazines provided regular summaries of the wars in Europe and Asia, complete with situation maps. In the Atlantic Fleet many sailors were already involved in the Neutrality Patrol. The Pacific Fleet had shifted from the West Coast to Hawaii. The Asiatic Fleet was operating in a war zone. In short, the general social environment was one in which a member of the Navy was accorded prestige from the populace in general. Society was providing our sailors with an understanding of their role in the historic events then unraveling. Moreover, society, in its films, magazines, and books was providing potential recruits with knowledge about the services which today must be taught in accession training...or not taught at all. This "social conditioning" may have been even more important in explaining the relatively low NJP rates in 1950 when Hollywood produced dozens of films cast in the heroic mode based on WWII.

Obviously, we cannot count on wars and rumors of war to maintain morale and discipline any more than we can hope for a depression. But it may be possible to recreate the positive consequences of the depression by adjusting recruiting policy and retention programs. We may also be able to achieve high levels of awareness, enthusiasm, and appreciation of the sailor's own role in events through more imaginative internal communication activities and enhanced and redirected training programs.

While external events do clearly have an impact on the personnel of the Navy, there are also a number of internal historical trends which, over the years under study, reached something of a culmination in 1940 and relate most directly to good order and discipline.

Most startling is the dramatic shift from heterogeneity to homogeneity, which began in the early years of the century and culminated about 1940, at which time the trend was reversed and began to shift back toward heterogeneity. Perhaps this is best illustrated by contrasting the personnel environment of a sailor aboard a battleship in 1900 and that of a battleship sailor in 1940. In 1900, a sailor on the USS Iowa served with a racially mixed crew. Of the 496 souls on board, 35 were non-white, with 17 of these being black Americans. Japanese made up the largest minority other than blacks, but had totally disappeared from the service by 1935. The remainder were Filipino, Chinese, and Guamanian. While a large number of the Asians were stewards, blacks served in all ratings, so that the average sailor had more interaction with minorities than he did in later years when minorities were occupationally restricted.⁹

Even more startling than racial heterogeneity are the figures on nationality. A hypothetical and representative crew of 496 would include 175 people born in foreign countries. Twenty percent of the crew would have been non-citizens and another 19.9% were naturalized American citizens. In sharp contrast to the variety found in the enlisted force was the homogeneity of the officer corps. The racial, religious, and social class origins of naval officers which were studied in depth by Karsten were remarkably homogeneous.⁷ White, upper middle class, main line in religion and veterans of four years of training at the Academy, the officer corps was perhaps singularly unsuited to understand and manage such a racially, nationally, and therefore culturally, mixed bag.

This racially and nationally mixed crew found its way on board by various routes and learned its jobs by a number of different means.

A considerable number were apprentices, lads enlisted at 16 for a six year period. The first six months of their service was spent ashore before going into training ships for an extended period, prior to being assigned to cruising ships, where they continued to receive special instruction in mathematics and other academic subjects, taught most often by the chaplain.⁸

For young men over 18 who had no experience at sea nor skills in a trade, there was the rating of landsman. These might enlist at naval rendezvous (recruiting stations) located in several major ports on the East Coast and in San Francisco. Or, they might enlist directly on board ships in other ports. The amount of training they received at any time is hard to determine. Some obviously went directly to work on board the ship into which they had enlisted, learning on-the-job on board. Others apparently were assigned, at least briefly, to training ships, while others received some cursory instruction in a receiving ship while awaiting assignment. If a potential recruit had experience at sea he would be recruited directly on board as an ordinary seaman or, if he had more experience, a seaman.

In the engineer, artificer, special and commissary branches, a recruit could be enlisted at any rate and rating for which he could demonstrate proficiency. Only the rate of chief petty officer (an innovation created in the mid 1890s)⁹ required time in service longer than one enlistment. Thus, many of the people on board classed as "rated" and called petty officers might have had only a few months in the service and no military

training other than that gained on the job. Clearly petty officer meant something very different in 1900 than it did in 1940 or does today. An analysis of military authority in the enlisted force is far too complex a question to address in this context. Suffice to say that in 1900, most practical authority rested on the shoulders of the master at arms rate. Other petty officers exercised authority within their own domains and a very strict precedence of ratings existed. The appearance of torpedo boats, destroyers, and submarines made a rating of such limited technical utility impractical and the burden of authority passed to seaman ratings, boatswains mates, turret captains, and quartermasters, who wore their rating badges on the right arm and ranked above all "left arm" rates. Officers were admonished not to put "left arm" CPOs in charge of details containing "right arm" petty officers. This dichotomy existed until the reorganization of 1949.

We can summarize the 1900 situation as one in which a large number of young and inexperienced men from many backgrounds were recruited and trained in several different ways and then assigned to the cramped and demanding environment of a man-o-war. This odd lot was commanded by a small number of white officers with upper middle class, conservative, mainline origins who shared a common process of accession and training. One could be hard put to create a situation with more potential for indiscipline and disorder.

Let us now look at the sailor in a battleship in 1940. The crew was almost three times as large and its makeup was vastly different. Since the late years of the 1900s the Navy had attempted to reduce the number of foreign and foreign born sailors. By WWI this policy had been implemented by opening recruiting stations throughout the nation rather than locating them only in a few large coastal cities. Inasmuch as these large cities were the sites of highest concentration of immigrants, the native born-foreign born ratio began to change. By 1940, 96.6% of the enlisted force was American born. It was also white: of the 1208 people on board a battleship there would have been approximately 36 Blacks and 15 Filipinos. These, plus perhaps 5 Chamorros (Guamanians), would, except in rare instances, be in the steward branch with separate quarters, messing and uniforms, seldom associating with the rest of the crew.¹⁰

Except for a few very old CPOs or warrant officers, every one in the enlisted force would have undergone the familiar pattern of enlistment at a local recruiting office, followed by four months of recruit training in one of three or four training stations. They would have enlisted at the rate of apprentice seaman and been promoted to seaman second class upon completing four months service. This of course was a consequence of the shift in recruiting emphasis which reduced the number of potential recruits with experience at sea. In response the Navy was forced to train its own seamen from scratch. With few exceptions they would have been sent to the fleet to occupy a billet in the deck force (or for some, conversion to firemen and assignment to the engineering department) until they were drafted into other gangs and divisions to strike for ratings.

Thus, even though the rating structure was becoming more complex in response to technological change, the enlisted force as a whole was a product of similar experience. This tended to enforce the authority of petty officers, who could give advice and counsel to their subordinates

based on similar experience without having to depend on specialists. The examination of 1940 muster lists indicates, however, that the trend toward homogenization was beginning to reverse. The military build up saw retired and fleet reserve personnel back on active duty. Many Naval Reserve officers were on active service. The wartime expansion sought personnel from a wide number of sources. Experienced artisans were recruited in advanced placement programs. Veterans of WWI were re-enlisted or directly commissioned. By the end of the war even the racial restrictions had been abandoned. The NROTC and OCS officer had become a permanent part of the personnel picture. The enlisted force, at least on the junior levels, contained short term draft motivated reservists as well as regular enlistees. Women, who had entered the Navy briefly in 1917-18, returned during WWII and have never left. Today's Navy still contains a percentage of native born citizens as high as it did in the 1930s and 1940s. The emphasis on recruitment of minority personnel, however, has created a Navy as culturally and racially varied as it was in 1900.

A summary of the data suggests that, all things being even, high NJP rates correlates roughly with high degrees of heterogeneity. Lest anyone conclude that the only way we can achieve good order and discipline is to return to overtly racist and sexist policies, I hasten to re-emphasize that the homogeneity of 1940 was a total homogeneity not simply a matter of race or sex. A glance at the figures reveals that NJP rates of the 1970s and 1980s do not reach the levels of 1900 and 1910, which suggests that training, orientation, law, regulation and general social and cultural climate contribute to mitigating indiscipline generated by heterogeneity, and that race and sex may be much less important than in-service experience in determining the degree of homogeneity. The commonality of naval life, shared experience, and the necessity for mutual dependence, can, with properly designed training and indoctrination, outweigh pre-entry differences in social background, sex, race, ethnicity or culture.

There are, in addition to the cycles of homogeneity and heterogeneity, other internal historical issues which must be considered as we analyze the naval personnel environment of 1940. Not the least of these is what I have chosen to call structural stability; that is, a continuity of policy and practice which enabled the rawest recruit to learn about the new universe which he had entered and find, in that learning, an increasing degree of familiarity and sense of security. An example, but most certainly not the only one, is the rating structure.

By 1900 the skills of the sailing Navy, which were highly prized in the 19th century, were becoming, or had become, obsolete. New technology could not be managed with the rates and ratings of the past. Between 1890 and 1905, fourteen new ratings were established, forty-one disestablished, and twenty-six changed or combined. In addition, almost all ratings were divided into classes, from third class to chief. Between 1905 and 1920, eight new ratings were established, none disestablished, and seven changed or combined. From 1921 through 1927 or 1928, except for adding the rate of third class to three artificer ratings, all new rates and ratings were in aviation. Only four rates were disestablished or combined. From 1930 to 1940 no new ratings were established, two disestablished (in 1931) and four changed or combined. Thus a sailor enlisting in 1925 would, by 1940, have

served for fifteen years without any major alterations in the rating structure. Experience tells us that rating is one of the principle foci of self identification among enlisted people. One's rating provides a means of establishing one's own self image and evaluating and identifying others. Frequent changes in the rating structure and the insignia and "folklore" which go with that structure create a profoundly unsettling situation. Even the newly created aviation ratings, once established, remained stable until WWII. The explosive expansion and seemingly constant combining, disestablishment and recombining of ratings since WWII may have contributed subtly but materially to a sense of impermanence and confusion which weakens the personal identification with the service, so essential to good order and discipline.¹¹ The question of enlisted occupational classification in a rapidly changing technological environment is one which perhaps needs serious and immediate consideration for psychological as well as administrative and management reasons. Rating structure is an example of structural stability which appears to be related to lower NJP rates. Other areas which should be considered are re-enlistment bonuses, assignment policy, sea-shore rotation, uniform and grooming regulations, school programs, and a host of other programs and policies. The tendency to adjust and fine tune all these policies in response to the latest survey or computer run in the name of cost effectiveness generates an atmosphere of uncertainty and unpredictability. Service life contains many unavoidable uncertainties. The degree to which this can be minimized appears to contribute to good order and discipline.

One additional historical factor that was revealed by interviews with naval veterans of the 1920s and 1930s is institutionalized competition. Without exception career sailors who served during this period, much of it characterized by undermanning, low (and even reduced) pay, and strict discipline, remember with enthusiasm the organized competitions of the time. They recall, and publications of the time, such as *Our Navy*, record in detail boxing, baseball, football, and other sporting contests between ships, squadrons and fleets. They speak with pride of the Pacific and Atlantic Fleet football teams which played leading colleges and the naval veterans who became renowned boxers. With equal enthusiasm they describe more sailorly competitions in sail boats, and pulling boats. The more thoughtful of them credit this emphasis on recreational competition with developing a sense of competitiveness in day-to-day activities. Being better, smarter, faster than anyone else became part of the working atmosphere for sideboys, signalmen, coxswains, bowhooks and others, particularly those whose activities were visible. Gunnery, which in 1900 was an activity of so little import that flag officers went ashore during practice firings, became the focus of competition for the Gunnery E, while engineers competed for an E of their own. Even today veterans of the 1930s argue vigorously about who won fleet maneuvers in one year or another. It is difficult to claim that sporting competition "caused" operational effectiveness. But it would be unwise to disregard the impact on morale and discipline and good order of officially sponsored sports programs which were considered an integral part of the life of a ship, with time and resources allocated to them.

It would be presumptuous to claim that the factors identified and described above were, in and of themselves, responsible for the remarkable record of discipline and good order in 1940 or the much higher NJP rates of

earlier and subsequent periods. What the research on this paper does reveal is the complexity of the subject. It suggests that the behavior of sailors is not affected simply by orders and directives, but rather is the reaction to a total environment. This environment is the result of implementation of policy, which is in itself a consequence of historic trends and cycles of response to changing demographic, political, economic and technological factors.

A further suggestion of this research is that it is entirely within the control of the Naval service to recreate situations analogous to those during periods of good order and discipline and avoid analogies to those periods of indiscipline. This is not the place for programmatic recommendation, save to argue that we can learn a great deal about ourselves and our Navy by studying its history and using this understanding to affect the future.

FOOTNOTES

¹This research was funded in part by Office of Naval Research contract number N00014-80-C0198, A Cultural-Structural History of Navy Personnel Policy, 1900-1980.

²The compilation represents an average of all the ships surveyed in each year period except for 1970. Individual unit NJP records are not available for that year and extrapolations from other sources have been made.

³Re-enlistment and unemployment figures for the years 1905-1939 are presented in Harrod, F.T., Manning the Modern Navy; The Development of a Modern Naval Enlisted Force, 1899-1940, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut 1978. Post WWII figures are derived from Navpers 15658, Navy Military Personnel Statistics and Handbook of Labor Statistics; U.S. Department of Labor Statistics Bulletin 2070, December 1980.

⁴Harrod, op cit pp. 186-87.

⁵A higher ratio of older people can be noted in the mid-1920s and is not immediately reflected in the NJP rates. This, I feel, supports the contention that good order and discipline are not products of a single factor, but rather a combination of factors of which the maturity of the force is only one.

⁶It is useful to note that the thirty year career for enlisted people has, throughout this century, been more potential than real. The percentage of the enlisted force with over twenty years service has varied from a low of .3% to the present high of approximately 2.0%.

⁷Karsten, Peter, The Naval Aristocracy, Free Press, MacMillan, New York, 1972.

⁸The curriculum at the apprentice training station at Newport, Rhode Island consisted of reading, mathematics, geography, seamanship, and gunnery in that order. Academic instruction was continued for apprentices on training and cruising vessels, but not for landsmen or seamen. Blue Jacket's Manual, 1902.

⁹Since the 1860s there were "chiefs" in some of the ratings, e.g., chief carpenter's mate. They were, however, rated as first class petty officers. The creation of the chief petty officer with different uniform, berthing, etc., was a product of the 1890s.

¹⁰Racial and ethnic percentages are drawn in part from Harrod op cit., p. 184.

¹¹An almost legendary exception was Chief Gunner's Mate Dick Turpin, a black man who was, in 1940, senior enlisted man in the Navy.

Footnotes (Continued)

¹²An example is the confused history of the rating of signalman, which was, before WWI, a collateral distinguishing mark for seamen and marines under the direction of quartermasters, then in 1921 a separate rating, recombined in 1950 with quartermaster (and bugler!) only to be separated again in the 1960s. As a signalman who woke one day to himself and his mates lost among quartermasters and buglers and bereft of his crossed flags, I can attest to the disturbing impact of rating instability. (CF. Downs, J.F., "Environment, Communications and Status Change Aboard an American Aircraft Carrier," Human Organization, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1959.)

A P P E N D I X B

THE BLUEJACKETS' MANUAL

TABLES OF CONTENTS

1902 (First Edition)

1940

1978

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I. PETTY OFFICERS.

	PAGE
Hints for Petty Officers.....	7
Boatswain's Mates.....	9
Masters-at-Arms.....	9
Gunner's Mates.....	11
Gun Captains.....	12
Quartermasters.....	13
The Log Book.....	13
Weather—Storms.....	16
Storm Signals.....	17
Distress Signals.....	18
Signals for Pilots.....	19
Seamen's Proverbs.....	19
Questions for Quartermasters.....	20
Flags, Signals and Ceremonies.....	20
Miscellaneous Questions.....	23
Honors.....	24
Coxswains.....	26
General Instructions for Coxswains.....	26
Care of Boats.....	27
Hoisting Boats.....	28
Boat-lines.....	28
Questions for Coxswains.....	28
Boat Salutes.....	31
Life Boats.....	33
General Rules.....	35
Rules of the Road, Lights, etc.....	35
Buoys.....	40
Boat Tactics.....	40

CONTENTS CHAPTER II. EVENTS IN DAILY ROUTINE.

	PAGE
GENERAL DUTIES IN CONNECTION WITH LIFE ON BOARD SHIP.	
Questions on Discipline and Routine.....	46
Sea and Port Routine.....	47
Scrubbing and Cleaning.....	52
Bright-work.....	56
Sick Call.....	56
Quarters and Drill; Ship Work.....	57
General Ship Regulations.....	58
Shore Liberty.....	59
Musters and Inspections.....	59
Coaling Ship.....	60
Clothes, Bags and Hammocks.....	60
Clothing Outfit.....	63
Requisitions for Clothing.....	63
Marking Clothes.....	64
Rag Inspection.....	65
Watches and Divisions.....	66
Messes.....	66
Smoking Hours.....	66
Messengers.....	67
Signal Boys.....	67
Side Boys.....	67
Lookouts.....	68
Spreading Awnings.....	68
Side Cleaners.....	69
Salutes and Honors.....	69

CHAPTER III. SEAMANSHIP.

	PAGE
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS IN SEAMANSHIP.	
Nomenclature of Ships.....	74
Questions on Spars and Sails.....	80
Nomenclature of Sails.....	84
Standing and Running Rigging.....	90
Knotting and Splicing.....	94

CONTENTS	PAGE
Blocks	100
Tackles	103
Rope	105
The Compass	108
The Log	113
The Lead and Sounding Machine	116
The Helm—Steering	120
Ground Tackle—Anchoring—Mooring	126
Carrying Out Anchors	130
Steering Effect of Propeller	139
Towing	140
Using Oil in a Heavy Sea	140
Restoring the Apparently Drowned	141
Instructions for Saving the Drowning	142
Rescue in Case of Shipwreck	143
Rescue with Breeches Buoy or Life Car	143
Definitions of Sea Terms	143
Tides	150

CHAPTER IV.

BOATS.

	PAGE
Classes of Boats	154
Nomenclature of Boats	155
Boat Gear	155
Arm-and-Away Boats	155
General Service with Boats	156
Boats under Oars	157
Boats under Sail	159
Principles of Boat-sailing	164
General Remarks on Reefing, Squalls, etc.	166
The Landing Force	167
	170

CHAPTER V.

ORDNANCE AND GUNNERY.

	PAGE
Naval Guns	177
Gun Metal	178

CONTENTS

	PAGE
Parts of a Gun	179
Breech Mechanisms	183
Driggs-Schroeder Breech Mechanism	183
Hitchkiss Breech Mechanism	184
Dashiell Breech Mechanism	185
Fletcher Breech Mechanism	185
Vickers Breech Mechanism	187
Gun Mounts	187
Ammunition	189
Bursting Charges	192
Fuses	193
Primers	193
Powder and Powder Charges	195
Fixed and Separate Ammunition	196
Magazines and Shell-rooms	197
Torpedoes	198
Questions on Gun at which Stationed	199
Elements of Naval Guns	200
Useful Rules	200
Gunnery	201
Gun Pointing	202
Accuracy and Rapidity of Fire	202
Estimation of Range	202
Gun Captains—Aiming Drill	204
Firing Regulations	205
Care and Preservation of Ordnance Outfit	206
Miscellaneous Instructions	207
Liquid for Recoil Cylinders	209
Care and Preservation of Cartridge Cases	211
Fitting and Adjusting Gas Check Pads	212
Remarks on Gun Drills	214
Organization	214
Gun Divisions	215
Ammunition Crew	215
Numbering the Guns	215
Training and Pointing	216
Crews in Reserve	216
Boarders and Riflemen	217
Raking Fire	218
Aids to Wounded	218
Fall of Shots	218
General Alarm and Call	219
Muster	219
Fire Alarm	219
Retreat	219

CONTENTS

303

	PAGE
Sharpshooters	219
Definitions	219
Gun Drills	220
Detail Notes on Drill of Main Battery	220
Gun Pointers	221
Prescribed Arc	221
Sights	221
Primers	222
Mishfires	222
Clearing the Vent	223
Firing Lock	223
Loading	224
Sponging	225
Gas Checks	225
Providing	226
Arms	226
Ammunition Supply	227
Care of Electric Firing Attachment	227
Sighting Telescopes	229
Rules for Firing	229
Detail Notes on Drill of Secondary Battery	229
Instructions for Aids to Wounded	232

CHAPTER VI.

SIGNALS.

	PAGE
Flag Signals	236
General Questions on Signals	237
Ship's Numbers	244
Boat Signals	245
Repeating Signals	247
Wig-wag Code	247
To Send and Receive a Message	249
Flash Signals—Searchlight	250
Sound Signals	250
Very's Signals	251
Ardois Night Signals	258
Distant Signals	258
Speed Signals	258
Special Squadron and Tactical Signals	260
International Signals	262
General Notes on Signals	267

CONTENTS

304

CHAPTER VII.

NAVAL AND SHIP REGULATIONS.

GENERAL INFORMATION.

	PAGE
Miscellaneous Regulations	27
The Executive Officer	27
Divisional Officers	27
The Officer-of-the-Deck	27
General Ship and Naval Regulations	27
Enlistments	27
Continuous Service	27
Fraudulent Enlistment	28
Promotion of Enlisted Men	28
Acting and Permanent Appointments	28
Seaman-Gunners	28
Gun-Captains	28
Discharge	28
Honorable Discharge	28
Ordinary Discharge	28
Bad Conduct Discharge	28
Desertion	28
Absence without Leave	28
Rewards and Privileges	28
Medals	28
Shore Duty—Retirement	28
Conduct Classes	28
Monthly Money	28
Pay Table	28
Apprentices	28
Redress of Wrongs	28
Exercise of Authority	28
Quarrels and Disturbances	28
Court-Martial	28

CONTENTS

Flags of Principal Maritime Nations	Plates I and II
Distinctive Flags and Pennants	Plate III
Flag and Dot-and-Dash Alphabet	Plate IV
Numeral Flags and Pennants	Plate V
Special Flags and Pennants	Plates VI and VII
National Anthem	Faces I

PART I.—FOR THE RECRUIT

CHAPTER 1.—The Navy as a Career	3
Your naval career; Leaks of men; General education; You enter the naval training station; Receiving unit; Pertinent advice.	
CHAPTER 2.—Clothing	9
Drawing clothing; Regulations for marking clothing; Prescribed outfit; Regulation clothing; Special advice about clothing; Folding clothes; Stowing clothes; Bag inspection; Stopping clothes on line.	
CHAPTER 3.—General Information	17
Hannocks; Cleanliness; Fickl day; Inspection; Medical service; Ship's service; Important points; Government insurance; Library; Deposits of money for safekeeping or saving; Friends; Gambling; Profanity; Moral turpitude; Athletics and recreation; Mast for requests; Captain's mast; Seeing the captain and executive officer; Officers at training station; Officers aboard ship.	
CHAPTER 4.—Rules and Regulations	28
Rules of discipline; Respect for authority; Good behavior; The twofold nature of duty in the Navy; Refusal to obey; Result of misconduct; Neglect of duty; Deliberate violation of orders or regulations; Punishments in the Navy.	
CHAPTER 5.—Rules and Regulations—Continued	34
Unauthorized absence; Desertion; Fraudulent enlistment; Fines; Summary; Theft; Articles for the government of the Navy; Redress of wrongs; Fighting and disturbances; Rules regarding salutes.	
CHAPTER 6.—School of the Recruit	42
Position of attention; Salute with the hand; The rests; Eyes right or left; Facing; Steps and marchings; To face in marching; To change step.	
CHAPTER 7.—Manual of Arms	49
CHAPTER 8.—School of the Squad	61
CHAPTER 9.—School of the Platoon	67
CHAPTER 10.—Boats under Oars	76
Tables of commands; Explanation of commands	
CHAPTER 11.—To Pull an Oar: Nomenclature	87
Positions; Nomenclature; Notes on handling boats under oars.	

vii

FOREWORD TO TENTH EDITION

This tenth edition has become necessary by the Navy's adoption of the U. S. Army's drill regulations and the desirability of new type setting for clearness of print. As compared with the ninth edition (revised) the following changes should be noted:

Chapters 7, 8, and 9 now accord with the close order drill of the U. S. Army.

Chapter 41, "Artillery: School of the Platoon," has been replaced by "Card Drill."

Chapter 51, "Artillery: 75-mm. Pack Howitzer," has been omitted because that weapon will no longer be carried aboard ship.

G. V. STEWART

Captain, U. S. Navy

Secretary-Treasurer

U. S. Naval Institute

ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND

June, 1910

CHAPTER 12.—Knots and Splices Knots; Lugs and short splices.	96
CHAPTER 13.—The Compass Description; Relative bearings.	101
CHAPTER 14.—Visual Signaling Semaphore; Semaphore alphabet; Procedure signs; Calls.	105
CHAPTER 15.—How to Swim The requirements; The strokes; Treading water; Conclusion.	109
CHAPTER 16.—What the Navy Offers Service schools; General requirements for entry to service schools; Appointment of enlisted men to Naval Academy; Promotion to warrant rank; Promotion to commissioned rank; Pay grades; The future the Navy has to offer; Conclusion.	121
CHAPTER 17.—Reporting for Duty aboard Ship General instructions.	126

PART 2.—SUBJECTS ALL ENLISTED MEN SHOULD KNOW—A TO N

CHAPTER 18.—A.—Discipline and Duty Twofold nature of duty in the Navy; The importance of accurate knowledge; Discipline; The nature of an order and of a command; Security of information.	131
CHAPTER 19.—B.—What the Service Offers General; Liberty; Leave; Shore duty; Re-enlistments; Permanent appointments for chief petty officers; The ship as a training school; Advancement in rating; Acting and permanent appointments; Retirement; Medals and rewards; Citizenship; Examining boards and examinations.	135
CHAPTER 20.—C.—Enlistments, Discharges, Courts martial First enlistments; Extension of enlistments; Re-enlistments; Discharges; Proficiency in rating and conduct; Advantage of honorable discharge; Transportation after discharge; Service records; Overstaying liberty; Desertion; Naval courts martial; Punishments by the commanding officer.	145
CHAPTER 21.—D.—Pay and Accounts Pay grades; Extra allowances; Accounts; Payments of money; Loss of pay due to breaking liberty; Example of chief petty officers' pay; Time not served and time lost due to misconduct; General information on stores titles; Ships' allotments.	158
CHAPTER 22.—E.—Navy Customs, Naval Organization Rules regarding salutes; Rules for saluting officers; National anthem; National flag; Quarter-deck and gangways; The Navy and its relation to the government; The President; The Secretary of the Navy; Bureaus and offices; The commander in chief of a fleet; Rank; Corps devices; Exercise of authority.	161
CHAPTER 23.—F.—General Characteristics of Ships General; Hull; Arms; Drainage system; Ventilation system; Watertightness; Nomenclature of decks; Bulkheads; Peak tanks; Questions and answers.	175

CHAPTER 24.—G.—General Features of Ships of the Navy Type classification; Features of different types of ships.	187
CHAPTER 25.—H.—Events in the Daily Routine Daily routine in port; Daily routine at sea; Notes on routine; Moves; Watches and divisions; Scrubbing and cleaning; Smoking hours; Lucky bag; Ship's orders; Miscellaneous information.	200
CHAPTER 26.—I.—Aim and Object of All General Drills General; Water-tight integrity; Details of drills; Fire drill; Collision; Abandon ship drill; Fire and rescue; Plane crash and salvage; Battle drill; Battle bill; General quarters; Fueling ship.	214
CHAPTER 27.—Regulations in Regard to Uniform and Clothing Regulations for marking clothing; Prescribed outfit; Uniform of the day; Side arms, leggings, etc.; Pins and jewelry; The hair and beard; Geneva-cross brassard and sick list badge; Custody of clothing, arms, and accoutrements; Regulation clothing; Rain clothing; Laws affecting the uniform; Neckties; Care of clothes; Requisitions for clothing; Fresh water.	234
CHAPTER 28.—K.—Personal Hygiene and First Aid Personal hygiene; Elementary first aid; Wounds in general; Hemorrhage or bleeding; Application of first-aid dressings; Sprains, dislocations, and fractures; Methods of carrying the wounded; Use of regular and improvised stretchers; Other injuries.	244
CHAPTER 29.—L.—Painting and Preparation of Surfaces Therefor Points in general; Application of paint; Bottom paints; Brushes and how to care for them; Preparation of surfaces to be painted; A few don'ts; Poisonous effect produced by paints.	285
CHAPTER 30.—M.—Swimming; Life Saving; Life Buoys Life-saving methods; Artificial respiration; Life buoys.	294
CHAPTER 31.—N.—Athletics Athletics on board ship.	305

PART 3.—RUDIMENTARY SEAMANSHIP AND GUNNERY

CHAPTER 32.—Boats Classes and types; Terms used with boats; Boat gear carried; Boat chest; Medical emergency box; Cooking utensils; Provisions; Abandon-ship ratings; Fire-fighting equipment; Stowage of boats; Boat salutes; Boat etiquette; Duties of a boat keeper, salutes required; Lifeboats.	311
CHAPTER 33.—Sails and Sailing Boat sails; Rigs of sailing ships; Rig of sail boats; Rigging; Definitions; Principles of sailing; Bending and sheeting sails; Trim; Tacking; Wearing; General precautionary notes; Rules of the road; Preparations prior to sailing; Boats under sail (drills); Sailing races, general rules.	341
CHAPTER 34.—Marlinespike Seamanship General; Rope; Fiber rope; Uncoiling Manila rope; Small cordage; Size of fiber rope; Care of fiber rope; Care of fiber rigging; Knotting; Miscellaneous methods of securing; Splicing; Seizing; Worming, parcelling, and serving; Palm and needle; Sennit; Turk's head; Circumventing; Pointing ropes and hawsers; Power-boat trimmings.	383

BLUEJACKETS' MANUAL

CHAPTER 35.—Duties of Seaman Watch, Under Way and at Anchor; Masthead and deck lookouts; Life buoy lookouts; Special lookouts; Engine-order telegraph; Breakdown and man-overboard signal watch; Speed-cone watch; Night-speed-indicator watch; Flag-speed-indicator watch; Fog-whistle and fog-bell watch; Fog-buoy or towing-spar watch; Duties of the various messengers; General duties of a sentry; General duties of an orderly; Side boys; Sweepers; Side cleaners; Jack-o'-the-lust; Anchor watch; The watch at sea.	419
CHAPTER 36.—Deck Seaman'ship Sea terms; Preparing for port; Getting under way; Rigging running ways and booms; Hauling a line; Mooring a ship with lines; Mooring to a buoy; Fenders; Boat lines and their uses; Coiling down rope; Forward hold; Tarring down; Awnings.	428
CHAPTER 37.—Ground Tackle Definition; Types of anchors; Anchors carried on ships; Anchors—General; Anchor cables; Shackles; Swivels; Cable markings; Billboard stowage of anchors; Poul anchors; Care of ground tackle; Mooring with anchors.	436
CHAPTER 38.—Steering and Sounding The rudder; Types of steering gear; Steering orders; Instructions for good steering; Compasses; Logs; Sounding.	461
CHAPTER 39.—Electricity Nature of electricity; Electrical apparatus.	478
CHAPTER 40.—Carrying the Automatic Rifle and Submachine Gun Rules governing carrying of the automatic rifle; Rules governing carrying of the submachine gun.	486
CHAPTER 41.—Carr Drill	489
CHAPTER 42.—Small Arms The United States magazine rifle, model of 1903; The pistol; The object of sighting, position, and aiming drills and of gallery practice, general principles of individual range firing; Safety precautions.	494
CHAPTER 43.—Elementary Gunnery Gunnery training; Guns; Primers; Fuzes; Powder; Projectiles; Summary; Magazines and shell rooms; Safety precautions for all hands.	515
CHAPTER 44.—Navy Signal Systems	535
PART 4.—ADVANCED SEAMANSHIP AND GUNNERY	
CHAPTER 45.—Advanced Seaman'ship and Gunnery Power boats; Aviation seaman'ship; Abbreviated rules for boat crossings; Safety precautions—Gasoline-driven power boats; Other boats—Landings and uses; Rules of the road; Tides; Buys; Storm warning signals.	543
CHAPTER 46.—A Section, a Watch at Sea, C. & R. Soundings	592
CHAPTER 47.—Marlinespike Seaman'ship	601
CHAPTER 48.—Deck Seaman'ship	622

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 49.—Instructing, Messes, Precedence	xi
CHAPTER 50.—Ground Tackle Hauling anchors and chain; Mooring ship.	636
CHAPTER 51.—Small Arms; Details of Individual and Collective Firing	641
CHAPTER 52.—Signals, Boat and Ship	654
PART 5.—PHYSICAL DRILLS	
CHAPTER 53.—Physical Drills without Arms General; Simple starting positions of the arms; Simple starting positions of the legs; Starting positions of the trunk; Miscellaneous starting positions; Combined starting positions of the arms and legs; Leg exercises carried out from the simple starting positions; Arm exercises carried out from the simple starting positions; Neck exercises carried out from the simple starting positions; Trunk exercises carried out from the simple starting positions.	669
CHAPTER 54.—Physical Drill with Arms	687
PART 6.—LANDING FORCE	
CHAPTER 55.—Equipment Carried by Each Man: Haversack, Pack, Rations; Assembling the Equipment Landing force; Light marching order; Heavy marching order; The infantry pack.	697
CHAPTER 56.—Extended Order Exercises; Combat principles of the rifle squad and platoon; Combat signals.	712
PART 7.—MISCELLANEOUS	
CHAPTER 57.—Miscellaneous Submarine service; Naval Reserve; Navy training courses; Duties of a petty officer; Disposition of effects of men.	737
CHAPTER 58.—Gas-Protective Apparatus War-time gas attack; Gas-mask drills; Upkeep of gas masks; Gases encountered in peace-time operations; Asphyxia; Artificial respiration; Protective apparatus; Gas masks for submarines.	750
CHAPTER 59.—The Use of Boatswain's Call	779

Foreword

The Bluejackets' Manual has historically contained a concise wealth of information about the many diversified tasks required of sailors in the United States Navy.


This 20th edition continues the tradition with a "back to basics" manual that covers a wide spectrum of subjects of interest to Navy men and women, from recruit to admiral, throughout their naval service.

During my thirty years in the Navy, I have often relied on *The Bluejackets' Manual* to refresh my memory or update my knowledge about such facets of Navy life as the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), customs and ceremonies, military duties, and compensation and entitlements.

As meaningful today as ever is the phrase "Look it up in *The Bluejackets' Manual*." In it you'll find condensed, up-to-date information that will answer most pertinent questions about the Navy.

By increasing your familiarity with the information contained in *The Bluejackets' Manual*, you will not only contribute to your professional growth, but you will be better equipped to assist in the fulfillment of the Navy's mission.

I encourage you to read and put to use the knowledge found in these pages



Robert I. Walker
Master Chief Petty Officer
of the Navy

ix

Contents

Foreword
Preface
Acknowledgements

ix
x
xi

I. Welcome Aboard

1. Introduction to the Navy
2. Classification, Rates, and Ratings
3. Uniforms
4. Leadership, Discipline, and the UCMJ
5. Courtesies, Customs, and Ceremonies
6. Sentry Duties and Recruit Drills
7. Security of Information
8. Hygiene, Health, and First Aid

3
16
39
61
77
90
99
110

II. The Navy Career

9. Duty Assignments and Advancements
10. Educational and Commission Opportunities
11. Navy Pay, Benefits, and Retirement

145
161
177

III. Ships, Planes, and Weapons

12. Ship Construction
13. Ships and Aircraft
14. Ship and Squadron Organization
15. Weapons and Weapon Systems

199
220
244
256

IV. The Sailor at Sea

16. Living Aboard Ship
17. Shipboard Duties and Watchstanding
18. Damage Control and Firefighting
19. General Bills and Drills
20. Safety and Maintenance

275
296
311
340
363

V. Seamanship, Navigation, and Communication

21. Marlinespiking and Use of Ground Tackle

399

374.500

Contents	22. Small Boats	416
	23. Navigation and Electronics	435
	24. Communications	481
Appendices		
	A. Navy Organization	509
	B. Navy History	523
	C. Uniform Code of Military Justice	544
	D. Beaufort Scale	547
	E. Navigational Aids	549
	F. Running Lights	551
	G. Signal Pennants and Flags	554
	H. Decoration and Award Ribbons	556
	I. Notes on Sources	557
	J. Official Publications and Directives	559
	Photo credits	577
	Index	578

viii


vii

A P P E N D I X C

NON-JUDICIAL PUNISHMENT RATES


NJP RATES

Overall



NJP RATES

Battleships



NJP RATES

Destroyers

